**Jeffrey Epstein, Davos, and the World Economic Forum: Named Elites, Reciprocal Access, and the Architecture of Impunity**

Douglas C. Youvan

doug@youvan.com

www.youvan.ai

June 15, 2026

Jeffrey Epstein's post-conviction access to Davos-linked political, financial, academic, and institutional figures cannot be understood through abstractions about "elite networks" alone. It must be reconstructed person by person, institution by institution, and favor by favor. This paper examines named relationships involving Børge Brende, Terje Rød-Larsen, Jes Staley, Peter Mandelson, Larry Summers, Bill Gates, Ehud Barak, Prince Andrew, Bill Clinton, Donald Trump, Leon Black, Glenn Dubin, Leslie Wexner, Joi Ito, and others whose contacts, correspondence, meetings, funding relationships, introductions, or travel have entered the public record. Its central argument is that Epstein did not merely penetrate guarded circles; powerful insiders repeatedly admitted, used, financed, hosted, consulted, or socially rehabilitated him because he supplied access, money, discretion, introductions, prestige, or opportunity. Davos matters because it concentrated many of these actors within a private, status-driven infrastructure where personal and institutional roles blurred. By tracing documented chains rather than relying on rumor, the paper asks what specific elites wanted from Epstein, what he received in return, and what their continued association reveals about institutional accountability and moral corruption, especially after his 2008 Florida conviction.

Keywords: Jeffrey Epstein, Davos, World Economic Forum, WEF, Børge Brende, Terje Rød-Larsen, Jes Staley, Peter Mandelson, Larry Summers, Bill Gates, Ehud Barak, Prince Andrew, Bill Clinton, Donald Trump, Leon Black, Leslie Wexner, Joi Ito, elite networks, institutional impunity, reputational laundering, access brokerage, transitive trust, post-conviction rehabilitation, global elites, institutional corruption.

OpenAI GPT-5.5 Thinking. CC4.0. 116 pages / 140 references.

https://orcid.org/0009-0004-4206-4253

**Outline**

**1. The Named-Elite Method: Reconstructing the Epstein Network**

**1.1 Why Names Must Replace Abstractions**

The paper will begin by rejecting generalized references to politicians, bankers, academics, and global leaders when the documentary record permits identification of particular people and institutions.

**1.2 Categories of Documentary Evidence**

The analysis will distinguish emails, calendars, photographs, visitor records, flight logs, financial transactions, court testimony, sworn depositions, institutional investigations, and unverified third-party allegations.

**1.3 The 2008 Conviction as the Critical Moral Boundary**

Relationships before Epstein's conviction will be separated from meetings, payments, introductions, correspondence, and hospitality that continued after his criminal conduct was publicly established.

**1.4 Contact, Benefit, Knowledge, and Responsibility**

Each named relationship will be evaluated according to frequency, duration, timing, institutional position, apparent reciprocal benefit, and what the individual knew or reasonably should have investigated.

**1.5 Epstein Was Admitted, Not Merely Infiltrated**

The central thesis will be established: guarded elite systems repeatedly permitted Epstein to remain useful because insiders continued opening doors.

**2. Epstein's Davos Operations and the People He Connected**

**2.1 Davos as a Controlled Market for Elite Access**

Davos will be examined as a setting in which government officials, financiers, corporate leaders, diplomats, academics, and media figures were concentrated within an invitation-driven social environment.

**2.2 Epstein's Reported Role as a "Davos Concierge"**

The section will examine evidence that Epstein circulated participant information, discussed accommodations, proposed meetings, and positioned himself as an unofficial facilitator.

### 2.3 Peter Mandelson, Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, and European Political Access

The proposed Davos connection between Mandelson and the Dubai Ports World chairman will be reconstructed as an example of Epstein mediating between political and commercial power.

### 2.4 Jes Staley, Alistair Darling, and Mandelson

Epstein's involvement in arranging or facilitating meetings involving senior banking and British political figures will be examined in chronological context.

### 2.5 Larry Summers and the Mongolia-Related Davos Meeting

The reported meeting involving Summers, Epstein, and Mongolia-related interests will be used to show how Epstein could participate remotely or indirectly while retaining a central brokerage role.

### 2.6 What Epstein Gained from Making Other People's Meetings Possible

The section will analyze how each introduction increased Epstein's credibility, information, reciprocal claims, and value to the next participant.

## 3. Børge Brende, Terje Rød-Larsen, and Access to WEF Leadership

### 3.1 Børge Brende's Position at the Institutional Center

Brende's authority as president and chief executive of the World Economic Forum will be described to establish why his contact with Epstein was institutionally significant.

### 3.2 The Three Reported Dinners of 2018 and 2019

The participants, intermediaries, timing, and stated purposes of the dinners will be reconstructed as fully as the available record permits.

### 3.3 Emails, Text Messages, and Continued Contact

The section will examine the duration and tone of communications between Brende and Epstein rather than reducing the relationship to a single accidental encounter.

### 3.4 Terje Rød-Larsen as the Introducing Gatekeeper

Rød-Larsen's diplomatic standing, leadership of the International Peace Institute, financial relationship with Epstein, and role in introducing him to Brende will be analyzed.

### 3.5 Davos, the United Nations, and a Proposed Global Architecture

Communications in which Epstein and Brende discussed the strategic role of Davos and international coordination will be examined for what they reveal about Epstein's perceived standing.

### 3.6 The WEF Investigation and Brende's Departure

The institutional review, external scrutiny, disclosure failures, and leadership consequences will be treated as evidence that the contacts were materially relevant to the Forum.

## 4. Banking, Wealth Management, and the Financial Elite

### 4.1 Leslie Wexner and the Construction of Epstein's Wealth and Status

The extraordinary authority Wexner granted Epstein over finances, property, and personal affairs will be examined as a foundational relationship in Epstein's rise.

### 4.2 Jes Staley and JPMorgan Chase

The extensive correspondence between Staley and Epstein, internal warnings, post-conviction banking services, and later litigation will be reconstructed.

### 4.3 JPMorgan Leadership and Institutional Knowledge

The conduct of compliance officers, executives, legal personnel, and senior management will be examined to determine how institutional systems repeatedly failed to sever the relationship.

### 4.4 Deutsche Bank After JPMorgan

The decision to accept Epstein as a client after his departure from JPMorgan will be analyzed as a transfer of risk between elite financial institutions.

### 4.5 Leon Black and the Scale of Epstein's Fees

Black's payments to Epstein for tax, estate, and financial advice will be examined for what their magnitude suggests about Epstein's perceived usefulness.

### 4.6 Glenn Dubin, Eva Andersson-Dubin, and Financial-Social Continuity

The Dubins' long association with Epstein will be examined across financial, medical, philanthropic, and social settings.

### 4.7 Money as Service, Cover, and Mutual Dependency

The section will ask whether Epstein's financial role merely funded his access or whether financial relationships themselves bound powerful clients to him.

## 5. Political, Royal, and Diplomatic Relationships

### 5.1 Prince Andrew and Ghislaine Maxwell

Andrew's sustained association with Epstein, his continued contact after conviction, his public explanations, and the consequences for the British monarchy will be analyzed.

### 5.2 Bill Clinton and Epstein's International Travel Network

Clinton's travel, foundation-related context, staff presence, public explanations, and Epstein's attempts to associate himself with presidential prestige will be reconstructed carefully.

### 5.3 Donald Trump and the Palm Beach–New York Social Circle

Trump's documented social familiarity with Epstein, later estrangement, public statements, photographs, and contested claims will be separated chronologically.

### 5.4 Ehud Barak's Meetings, Investments, and Political Position

Barak's visits, business relationships, communications, and explanations will be examined in relation to his former position as Israeli prime minister and defense minister.

### 5.5 Peter Mandelson's Political and Commercial Network

Mandelson's communications and his usefulness as a bridge among British politics, European institutions, finance, and international business will receive focused treatment.

### 5.6 Terje Rød-Larsen, Diplomacy, and the International Peace Institute

The Epstein relationship will be examined as an example of private money and access entering institutions associated with peace, diplomacy, and the United Nations.

### 5.7 Political Prestige as Reputational Protection

The cumulative effect of royal, presidential, ministerial, and diplomatic contacts on Epstein's social legitimacy will be assessed.

## 6. Bill Gates, Larry Summers, and Elite Philanthropic Brokerage

### 6.1 Bill Gates's Meetings with Epstein

The number, timing, locations, intermediaries, and stated philanthropic purposes of Gates's meetings with Epstein will be reconstructed.

### 6.2 The Significance of Meeting After the Conviction

The decision to engage Epstein after 2008 will be evaluated against the resources available to Gates, his staff, advisers, and philanthropic institutions.

### 6.3 Larry Summers as an Institutional Bridge

Summers's positions at Harvard, the United States Treasury, and elite economic organizations will be considered in relation to his continued communications with Epstein.

### 6.4 Philanthropic Fundraising and Epstein's Proposed Role

The paper will investigate why Epstein was considered potentially useful in arranging large donations or relationships among wealthy philanthropists.

### 6.5 Boris Nikolic and the Gates–Epstein Intermediary Network

Nikolic's position, contacts, and unexpected appearance in Epstein's estate planning will be examined without assuming motives unsupported by evidence.

### 6.6 Reputation, Philanthropy, and Moral Camouflage

The section will analyze how charitable ambitions and scientific patronage may have provided respectable narratives for continued contact.

## 7. Harvard, MIT, Joi Ito, and the Academic Rehabilitation of Epstein

### 7.1 Harvard University and Epstein's Scientific Patronage

Epstein's donations, office access, faculty contacts, and post-conviction presence around Harvard-affiliated scholars will be examined.

### 7.2 Lawrence Krauss, Steven Pinker, and Elite Intellectual Association

Publicly documented contacts involving prominent academics will be distinguished by type, timing, and degree of involvement.

### 7.3 Noam Chomsky and Post-Conviction Meetings

Chomsky's meetings and stated explanations will be considered as evidence of how intellectual status could normalize continued engagement.

### 7.4 Joi Ito and the MIT Media Lab

Ito's acceptance of Epstein's money, concealment concerns, donor cultivation, and resignation will be treated as a central institutional case study.

### 7.5 Nicholas Negroponte and Institutional Defense

Statements defending the acceptance of Epstein's funding will be examined as an unusually explicit expression of elite utilitarian reasoning.

### 7.6 Marvin Minsky and the Problem of Disputed Allegations

Claims involving Minsky will be treated with strict attention to source, denial, corroboration, and the difference between documented presence and alleged conduct.

### 7.7 Science as Prestige Laundering

The section will ask how association with celebrated scholars allowed Epstein to present himself as a serious patron of knowledge rather than a convicted sexual offender.

## 8. Social Gatekeepers, Hosts, and Reputation Managers

### 8.1 Ghislaine Maxwell as Organizer and Social Bridge

Maxwell's role in recruitment, introductions, household management, and access to aristocratic and political networks will be central to this section.

### 8.2 Peggy Siegal and New York Social Rehabilitation

The role of publicity, screenings, dinners, and high-status social events in restoring Epstein's visibility after conviction will be examined.

### 8.3 Kathryn Ruemmler and the Legal-Political Network

Meetings, gifts, professional contacts, and institutional reactions involving the former White House counsel will be analyzed in context.

### 8.4 Woody Allen, Soon-Yi Previn, and Continued Social Contact

Documented post-conviction social interactions will be examined as part of Epstein's normalization within prominent New York circles.

### 8.5 Hosting as an Act of Certification

The paper will argue that inviting Epstein, attending his gatherings, or appearing repeatedly in his company transferred legitimacy regardless of participants' stated intentions.

### 8.6 The People Who Opened the Next Door

Assistants, advisers, publicists, lawyers, donors, and mutual acquaintances will be treated as active components of the network rather than invisible background figures.

## 9. What Named Elites Received from Epstein

### 9.1 Financial and Tax Services

The cases of Wexner and Black will be used to examine claims that Epstein provided unusually valuable wealth-management, tax, or estate-planning services.

### 9.2 Introductions to Money and Power

The relationships involving Staley, Mandelson, Summers, Gates, Brende, and others will be analyzed as exchanges in which Epstein offered access to additional networks.

### 9.3 Philanthropic and Scientific Prestige

Harvard, MIT, Gates-related philanthropy, and prominent scientists will be examined as environments in which money and intellectual legitimacy circulated together.

### 9.4 Diplomatic and Geopolitical Access

Barak, Rød-Larsen, Brende, Mandelson, and international business figures will be considered in relation to Epstein's interest in governments and global institutions.

### 9.5 Hospitality, Privacy, and Social Permission

The appeal of Epstein's residences, aircraft, private gatherings, and controlled environments will be assessed without assuming that all guests shared the same purposes.

### 9.6 Information, Secrets, and Potential Leverage

Documented evidence of information gathering, unusual surveillance, strategic questioning, or compromising environments will be distinguished from broader blackmail theories.

### 9.7 Why Usefulness Survived Public Disgrace

The section will argue that continued association indicates that Epstein's benefits were consciously or negligently judged more important than moral exclusion.

## 10. Institutional Complicity Beyond Individual Scandal

### 10.1 JPMorgan Chase

The bank's prolonged servicing of Epstein will be evaluated as an institutional process involving multiple decision-makers rather than one rogue executive.

### 10.2 Deutsche Bank

The bank's acceptance and retention of Epstein will be examined as evidence of competitive incentives overriding obvious reputational risk.

### 10.3 MIT and Harvard

Universities will be assessed for accepting money, providing status, concealing donor identities, or permitting access after Epstein's conviction.

### 10.4 The International Peace Institute

Epstein's financial relationship with Rød-Larsen and the organization's governance failures will be analyzed.

### 10.5 The World Economic Forum

The Brende relationship, the Forum's response, and the distinction between formal WEF activity and the wider Davos ecosystem will be considered without minimizing either.

### 10.6 Law Firms, Foundations, Family Offices, and Advisory Networks

Professional intermediaries that processed money, arranged meetings, managed reputations, or continued relationships will be included in the accountability framework.

### 10.7 From Failure of Due Diligence to Willful Institutional Accommodation

The paper will distinguish accidental oversight from repeated institutional decisions made despite accumulating warnings.

## 11. The Epstein Files, Rumored Names, and Standards of Judgment

### 11.1 A Name in a File Is Not a Single Category

Address books, flight logs, photographs, calendars, victim testimony, emails, FBI tips, and hearsay submissions will be ranked according to evidentiary value.

### 11.2 Documented Association Versus Alleged Sexual Conduct

The paper will avoid converting every contact into a sexual accusation while refusing to treat repeated, beneficial, post-conviction association as morally trivial.

### 11.3 Public Denials and Their Testability

Statements by Clinton, Trump, Gates, Andrew, Barak, Summers, Brende, Black, Staley, and others will be compared with records where possible.

### 11.4 The Problem of Selective Disclosure and Redaction

The limitations created by incomplete releases, sealed records, missing context, privacy protections, and institutional control of documents will be addressed.

### 11.5 Excessive Caution as Elite Protection

The paper will examine how demands for criminal-proof certainty can be used to suppress legitimate judgments about ethics, governance, and institutional responsibility.

### 11.6 Avoiding Fabrication and Guilt by Mere Mention

A clear boundary will remain between rigorous condemnation of documented conduct and unsupported claims about individuals whose names appear incidentally.

## 12. Conclusion: The Named Elite Chose Continued Access

### 12.1 Epstein's Network Was Reciprocal

The evidence will be summarized as a pattern of exchange in which Epstein provided services and insiders provided access, money, prestige, and legitimacy.

### 12.2 Post-Conviction Association as the Decisive Evidence

The years from 2008 to 2019 will be treated as the clearest test of elite judgment because Epstein's criminal status was no longer hidden.

### 12.3 Davos as a Concentration of the Broader System

The Davos ecosystem will be presented as one visible intersection of political, financial, philanthropic, academic, and institutional actors rather than the sole location of the network.

### 12.4 Institutional Morality Revealed by Named Decisions

The paper will conclude that institutions are morally defined not by public mission statements but by whom their leaders admit, fund, consult, protect, and continue to use.

### 12.5 From Infiltration to Invitation

The final argument will be that Epstein did not simply overcome elite defenses. Named individuals repeatedly reopened the gates because they wanted something he could provide.

## 13. References

The final section will contain court records, government releases, institutional reports, banking litigation, authenticated correspondence, calendars, flight records, investigative journalism, books, and official public statements.

**Art**

## 1. The Named-Elite Method: Reconstructing the Epstein Network

Any serious investigation of Jeffrey Epstein's relationships with Davos, the World Economic Forum, international finance, political leadership, philanthropy, and academia must begin with names. General expressions such as "the elite," "global leaders," "powerful bankers," or "prominent academics" may describe the social class in which Epstein operated, but they conceal the individual decisions through which his network was built and sustained. Epstein did not interact with an abstraction. He interacted with Børge Brende, Terje Rød-Larsen, Jes Staley, Peter Mandelson, Larry Summers, Bill Gates, Ehud Barak, Prince Andrew, Leon Black, Leslie Wexner, Joi Ito, and many others whose positions gave their choices institutional consequences.

The named-elites method asks a direct series of questions. Who met Epstein? Who introduced him to someone else? Who accepted his hospitality, money, financial advice, political access, or philanthropic assistance? Who continued communicating with him after his 2008 conviction? Which universities, banks, foundations, diplomatic organizations, corporations, and international forums benefited from relationships that Epstein cultivated? Which institutional leaders possessed the authority to exclude him but chose continued contact instead?

This approach does not assume that every named person committed a crime or participated in Epstein's sexual abuse. It does insist, however, that the absence of proven criminal participation does not erase other forms of responsibility. Political leaders, bankers, philanthropists, scholars, and institutional executives can be judged for accepting money, sustaining access, ignoring warnings, providing legitimacy, or using a convicted offender as an intermediary. Criminal guilt is only one category of judgment. Ethical failure, institutional accommodation, reputational laundering, and knowing indifference are also consequential.

A person-by-person reconstruction is especially important because Epstein's power depended on chains of relationships. Leslie Wexner's delegation of extraordinary financial and personal authority helped establish Epstein as a wealthy and credible figure. Jes Staley's relationship with Epstein linked him to the highest levels of JPMorgan Chase. Terje Rød-Larsen provided diplomatic legitimacy and reportedly introduced Epstein to Børge Brende, the serving president and chief executive of the World Economic Forum. Joi Ito's cultivation of Epstein as a donor helped preserve his access to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Leon Black's enormous payments represented a separate form of financial validation. Bill Gates's meetings with Epstein gave him proximity to one of the world's most prominent philanthropic networks. Prince Andrew's continued association offered royal prestige. Each relationship strengthened the social plausibility of the next.

The purpose of this paper is therefore not to assemble a sensational list of famous names. It is to identify the specific pathways through which Epstein acquired money, status, institutional

access, and post-conviction rehabilitation. The question is not simply who appeared in a photograph, address book, flight record, email, or calendar. The question is what the documented relationship consisted of, when it occurred, what each side obtained, and how it affected Epstein's continued standing among powerful people.

**1.1 Why Names Must Replace Abstractions**

The language of generalized elite corruption can express a valid moral intuition while still weakening historical analysis. When every participant is described only as an unnamed banker, politician, academic, or philanthropist, responsibility becomes diffuse. The reader may understand that a corrupt system existed but cannot determine who made the decisions that sustained it.

Naming Jes Staley changes the analysis because Staley was not merely "a banker." He was a senior JPMorgan executive who maintained an extensive relationship with Epstein while the bank continued servicing Epstein as a client. Naming Leon Black matters because Black was not merely "a billionaire." He paid Epstein extraordinarily large sums for tax, estate, and financial advice. Naming Joi Ito matters because Ito was not simply "an academic administrator." He led the MIT Media Lab and participated in decisions concerning Epstein's donations and access. Naming Børge Brende matters because he was not simply "a Davos attendee." He was the president and chief executive of the organization at the center of Davos.

Specificity reveals institutional position. It distinguishes a casual guest from a decision-maker, a passing acquaintance from a repeated correspondent, and an incidental institutional connection from a relationship involving money, introductions, or continued access. It also prevents the analytical error of treating all names as equivalent.

Bill Clinton's presence on flights associated with Epstein, for example, must be analyzed differently from Leon Black's financial payments or Joi Ito's fundraising relationship. Donald Trump's documented social familiarity with Epstein during an earlier Palm Beach and New York period must be separated from later claims, denials, and disputed allegations. Bill Gates's post-conviction meetings require a different analysis from Leslie Wexner's earlier and foundational relationship with Epstein. Prince Andrew's continued association after Epstein's conviction demands a different category of scrutiny from someone who attended a single public event.

Names also expose relationship chains. Terje Rød-Larsen's relevance is not limited to his own dealings with Epstein. His significance includes his reported role in introducing Epstein to Børge Brende. Ghislaine Maxwell's importance cannot be reduced to her personal relationship with Epstein; she served as a social bridge into British, American, philanthropic, and aristocratic circles. Jes Staley's relationship cannot be isolated from JPMorgan's compliance systems,

executive hierarchy, and institutional decisions. Each name identifies a node, but the larger objective is to map the connections among nodes.

The named-elites method therefore rejects two opposite errors. The first is anonymous condemnation, in which an entire class is denounced without showing how the system operated. The second is atomized exoneration, in which every person is treated as an isolated case and the cumulative pattern disappears. The network can be understood only by examining named relationships together.

**1.2 Categories of Documentary Evidence**

Not all appearances of a name in the Epstein record have the same evidentiary value. A disciplined reconstruction must distinguish among categories of evidence rather than combining them into a single undifferentiated list.

Authenticated correspondence is among the most informative forms of evidence because it can establish direct communication, timing, tone, purpose, and continuity. Emails and messages involving Jes Staley, Larry Summers, Peter Mandelson, Børge Brende, Terje Rød-Larsen, Joi Ito, and others can reveal whether contact was occasional or sustained and whether it concerned business, philanthropy, social arrangements, politics, or introductions.

Calendars and appointment records can establish planned meetings, but they do not always prove that a meeting occurred. Visitor logs may demonstrate entry into a residence or institution but may not disclose the substance of the encounter. Flight records can establish travel on a particular aircraft, but they must be read carefully because presence on a flight does not by itself establish participation in criminal activity.

Financial records occupy another category. Payments from Leon Black to Epstein, Epstein-related accounts maintained by JPMorgan Chase and Deutsche Bank, donations directed toward MIT or Harvard-associated programs, and financial relationships involving the International Peace Institute can reveal institutional benefit and economic dependency. Money does not always prove corrupt intent, but it provides a concrete measure of the value assigned to a relationship.

Photographs establish co-presence at a particular moment but often provide little context. Address books establish that contact information was retained, not that a close relationship existed. Public-event attendance may demonstrate social proximity without proving private association. Court testimony, sworn depositions, and victim statements can carry greater evidentiary weight, but they must still be examined for corroboration, consistency, and the opportunity for response.

Institutional investigations provide another layer. Reviews conducted by banks, universities, boards, law firms, or governing committees may reveal internal warnings and decision-making structures. They may also be constrained by the institution's interest in limiting liability or reputational damage. The MIT investigation into Epstein-related donations, banking litigation concerning JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank, and the World Economic Forum's review of Brende's contacts must therefore be read both for what they disclose and for what they leave unresolved.

Finally, there are unverified tips, rumors, internet lists, anonymous allegations, and third-party statements. These cannot be treated as equivalent to authenticated emails, financial transfers, sworn testimony, or documented travel. The presence of a famous name in a raw investigative file may indicate nothing more than that someone mentioned that person to authorities.

The paper will consequently rank evidence by type and context. It will not treat all names as guilty. It will, however, refuse the opposite distortion in which every piece of evidence is dismissed because no single document independently proves the entire network.

**1.3 The 2008 Conviction as the Critical Moral Boundary**

Epstein's 2008 Florida conviction marks the decisive boundary for evaluating the conduct of his associates. Before that conviction, some people could plausibly claim that they did not know the nature of his offenses. Afterward, Epstein was no longer merely the subject of private rumor. He was a registered sex offender whose criminal case had received substantial public attention.

The post-2008 period therefore presents a clearer moral test. Those who met, funded, advised, hosted, employed, introduced, or continued corresponding with Epstein after his conviction were not dealing with a man whose reputation was entirely concealed. They were dealing with someone whose treatment of underage girls had become part of the public record.

This boundary is central in assessing Prince Andrew's continued association with Epstein, Bill Gates's meetings with him, Jes Staley's communications, Leon Black's payments, Joi Ito's donor relationship, Noam Chomsky's meetings, Kathryn Ruemmler's contacts, Woody Allen's social interactions, and Terje Rød-Larsen's continuing relationship. The relevance of these contacts does not depend on proving that each participant knew every detail of Epstein's conduct. The question is why basic knowledge of the conviction was not sufficient to make him socially and professionally unacceptable.

A sophisticated institution cannot rely entirely on the defense that one individual failed to perform an internet search. Bill Gates had staff, advisers, lawyers, security personnel, and a major philanthropic organization. JPMorgan possessed compliance departments, risk officers, senior executives, and legal counsel. MIT and Harvard had development offices, administrators, boards, and donor-review procedures. The World Economic Forum was an organization devoted

to global leadership and institutional governance. When such actors continued to engage Epstein, the issue was not merely a missing fact. It was a failure to treat an available fact as disqualifying.

The conviction also permits comparison between what elites said publicly and what they did privately. Many later described their engagement as an error, a limited encounter, a professional matter, or a relationship whose significance they had misunderstood. These explanations must be compared with the duration, frequency, and benefits of the documented contact.

The central question is not whether Epstein completed a criminal sentence and therefore retained legal rights. It is whether institutions and individuals presenting themselves as guardians of social responsibility were obligated to exercise moral judgment beyond the minimum requirements of criminal law. A person may be legally free to seek renewed social acceptance. Others remain responsible for deciding whether to provide it.

**1.4 Contact, Benefit, Knowledge, and Responsibility**

Each named relationship will be analyzed through four connected categories: contact, benefit, knowledge, and responsibility.

Contact concerns the nature and intensity of the relationship. Was there a single encounter, repeated correspondence, private travel, financial management, social hosting, philanthropic collaboration, or institutional access? How long did the relationship last? Did it continue after 2008? Was it initiated by Epstein, by the other person, or through an intermediary?

Benefit concerns what each side received. Leslie Wexner gave Epstein exceptional financial authority, while Epstein gained wealth, property, and credibility. Leon Black paid Epstein for financial advice, while Epstein gained extraordinary fees and the validation of a major financier. Joi Ito and MIT obtained donations and access to wealthy networks, while Epstein gained association with scientific innovation. Bill Gates explored philanthropic possibilities, while Epstein acquired proximity to globally recognized philanthropic power. Jes Staley benefited from a relationship he evidently regarded as personally or professionally valuable, while Epstein retained access to JPMorgan and senior banking circles.

Knowledge concerns what was known, what was publicly available, and what a reasonable actor in that position should have investigated. Knowledge is not limited to a confession of complete awareness. Institutional leaders have duties to inquire, especially when warnings exist. Deliberate avoidance can itself be ethically significant.

Responsibility concerns the consequences of the relationship. Did the person introduce Epstein to others? Did the institution continue processing his money? Did the association restore his credibility? Did a respected guest’s presence make later guests less cautious? Did a donation

permit him to present himself as a patron of science? Did a meeting with a former president, prime minister, billionaire, or institutional chief executive signal continued elite acceptance?

This framework avoids the crude claim that all contact is identical. It also rejects the equally crude claim that nothing short of proven participation in Epstein's sexual crimes matters. A person may bear responsibility for reputational rehabilitation, financial enablement, institutional accommodation, or the transfer of access even without being accused of direct sexual abuse.

**1.5 Epstein Was Admitted, Not Merely Infiltrated**

The language of infiltration portrays Epstein as an external aggressor who defeated the defenses of unsuspecting elites. It contains an element of truth: Epstein was manipulative, strategic, persistent, and skilled at presenting himself differently to different audiences. Yet the infiltration narrative becomes inadequate when access is repeated, sustained, and renewed after public conviction.

Elite environments are guarded. A person does not casually obtain recurring access to former presidents, prime ministers, royal households, major banks, billionaires, elite universities, diplomatic institutes, and the head of the World Economic Forum. Assistants return calls. Intermediaries make introductions. executives approve accounts. University officials accept donations. Guests attend dinners. Institutional leaders agree to meetings. Each step requires an affirmative decision by someone already inside.

Epstein was therefore admitted through many gates. Leslie Wexner admitted him into extraordinary financial and social authority. JPMorgan retained him as a valuable client. Deutsche Bank accepted him after JPMorgan. Joi Ito and others admitted him into MIT's donor network. Harvard-associated academics and administrators allowed his scientific patron identity to persist. Terje Rød-Larsen helped connect him to diplomatic and WEF leadership circles. Børge Brende met and communicated with him. Bill Gates agreed to meetings. Prince Andrew continued social contact. Leon Black paid him enormous fees.

These decisions were not identical, and they do not imply identical motives. Together, however, they establish reciprocity. Epstein offered money, advice, introductions, access, hospitality, discretion, and proximity to other influential people. In return, elite participants offered him fees, meetings, legitimacy, institutional affiliation, and continued social usefulness.

The defining scandal is therefore not that Epstein fooled every powerful person he encountered. It is that so many powerful people found reasons to continue dealing with him. His network survived because individuals and institutions repeatedly concluded, explicitly or implicitly, that what he could provide remained more valuable than the moral cost of excluding him.

This paper begins from that judgment. Epstein did not merely penetrate a resistant establishment. Named members of that establishment repeatedly opened its doors.

## 2. Epstein's Davos Operations and the People He Connected

Jeffrey Epstein's relationship to Davos is best understood through the specific people he sought to connect rather than through vague claims that he moved among global elites. The documentary record depicts him as an unofficial broker who monitored the annual gathering, discussed who would be present, proposed meetings, helped solve logistical problems, and attempted to place himself between political officials, bankers, corporate executives, and wealthy private clients.

Davos offered Epstein an unusually efficient environment for this work. For several days, senior figures who were ordinarily dispersed across governments, banks, corporations, universities, foundations, and international organizations were concentrated in one location. Their physical proximity did not make them equally accessible. Entry remained controlled by official credentials, private invitations, personal assistants, security arrangements, and trusted intermediaries. A person who could navigate those barriers possessed something valuable.

Epstein's importance did not depend on appearing on the official World Economic Forum program. The surrounding ecosystem included hotels, rented homes, private dinners, corporate receptions, bilateral meetings, informal conversations, and events organized independently of the Forum. Epstein could exploit the concentration of power without holding an official WEF position. His reported characterization of himself as a "Davos concierge" accurately described this unofficial function.

The concierge metaphor should not be treated as harmless social language. A concierge knows who has arrived, where people are staying, which meetings are possible, and which requests require special access. At Davos, such knowledge could be converted into political, commercial, and reputational value. By arranging meetings for others, Epstein made himself part of their relationship and accumulated obligations that could later be exchanged for additional access.

Several named episodes involving Peter Mandelson, Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, Jes Staley, Alistair Darling, and Larry Summers illustrate this brokerage model. The surviving records do not prove that every proposed meeting occurred or produced a concrete result. They do show that Epstein positioned himself as someone entitled to arrange contact among individuals occupying senior positions in government, banking, international business, and academic-economic policy.

### 2.1 Davos as a Controlled Market for Elite Access

Davos is often described as a place where powerful people meet informally. That description is correct but incomplete. The gathering functions as a controlled market for access in which time, attention, invitations, and introductions are scarce commodities.

A cabinet minister may be physically present in the same town as a corporate executive, but that does not mean the executive can obtain a private meeting. A banker may know that a former prime minister is attending but still require a trusted intermediary to make an introduction. A business leader may want access to a government official but need the request framed in a way that appears legitimate and mutually beneficial.

This is the environment in which Epstein could become useful. His role was not necessarily to supply substantive expertise about every issue discussed. His value lay in claiming that he knew the right people, understood their interests, and could create an encounter that conventional channels might delay or prevent.

The principal actors in this system were not anonymous. Peter Mandelson carried influence from British politics, European institutions, and international business. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem led a major global ports and logistics enterprise. Jes Staley occupied a senior position within JPMorgan Chase. Alistair Darling served as Britain's chancellor of the Exchequer during the global financial crisis. Larry Summers had led the United States Treasury, served as president of Harvard University, and remained deeply connected to finance, government, and economic policy.

Each person brought a different form of power. Epstein's brokerage consisted of moving between these forms and suggesting that he could connect them.

Davos magnified the value of this service because the opportunity window was brief. A meeting arranged during the gathering could be portrayed as urgent, exclusive, or unusually convenient. The compressed schedule also reduced the likelihood of full institutional review. Introductions could be made socially before legal, ethical, or reputational questions were examined.

### 2.2 Epstein's Reported Role as a "Davos Concierge"

Epstein's reported use of the term "Davos concierge" reveals how he understood his own position. He was not describing himself as a passive attendee. He was claiming an operational role within the informal network surrounding the meeting.

The services of such a broker could include obtaining information about participants, finding accommodation, arranging transportation, coordinating private dinners, suggesting useful contacts, and persuading one person to meet another. These favors varied in scale, but all could create reciprocal obligations.

Accommodation was particularly important because lodging in Davos during the Forum was scarce and expensive. Helping someone secure a room or private residence could provide Epstein with an opening into a larger relationship. A logistical favor could lead to a dinner invitation, a private meeting, or a request for an introduction. What appeared mundane could therefore become strategically important.

Participant information was equally valuable. Knowing who planned to attend allowed Epstein to approach contacts before they arrived, propose meetings, and present himself as informed about the gathering's internal possibilities. A person who possessed such information appeared connected even if he lacked formal authority.

The phrase "Davos concierge" also implied discretion. Epstein did not need public recognition for his role. Indeed, invisibility could increase his effectiveness. If two powerful figures met privately because of his intervention, he gained value without creating a public record of his involvement.

This form of power is difficult to measure because it operates through relationships rather than titles. It is also difficult to regulate because the broker may remain outside the formal institution while exploiting the institution's ability to gather powerful people.

**2.3 Peter Mandelson, Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, and European Political Access**

One reported episode involved Epstein attempting to connect Peter Mandelson with Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem in relation to Davos.

Mandelson represented a particularly valuable contact. His career linked the British Labour Party, cabinet government, the European Commission, international trade, and later commercial and advisory work. He possessed both political prestige and knowledge of European regulatory systems.

Bin Sulayem, meanwhile, led Dubai Ports World, a major international logistics and port operator with interests that depended heavily on government policy, trade regulation, infrastructure, and geopolitical relationships. A meeting between Mandelson and bin Sulayem could therefore carry commercial and political significance.

Epstein's role in proposing or facilitating contact between them demonstrates the type of position he sought. He was not simply asking to attend a gathering with famous people. He was presenting himself as the person capable of connecting a senior European political figure with a global business executive.

The surviving evidence may not conclusively establish whether the proposed meeting occurred or what resulted from it. Nevertheless, the attempt itself is significant. Epstein evidently

believed that both parties would recognize his authority to make such a proposal. He also expected that his intervention would be treated as useful rather than presumptuous.

For Mandelson, Epstein could offer access to wealthy individuals and international business figures. For bin Sulayem, Epstein could offer proximity to European political influence. For Epstein, the proposed connection increased his relevance to both.

This triangular structure was central to his brokerage. He gained power not by possessing the formal authority of either participant but by placing himself between them.

**2.4 Jes Staley, Alistair Darling, and Mandelson**

Another reported Davos-related chain involved Jes Staley, Alistair Darling, and Peter Mandelson.

Staley's position within JPMorgan gave him access to one of the world's most powerful financial institutions. Darling, as British chancellor of the Exchequer, stood at the center of government economic policy during a period of financial crisis and bank intervention. Mandelson, serving in senior government and political roles, added another channel into British and European power.

Epstein's participation in arranging or encouraging meetings among these men placed him at an intersection of banking and government. Such introductions would have been valuable during a period when financial institutions depended heavily on political decisions, regulatory responses, public guarantees, and relationships with senior officials.

The significance of this episode is not that a meeting among a banker and government ministers was inherently improper. Such meetings occur routinely. The important question is why Epstein was useful as the intermediary.

Staley already possessed institutional channels through JPMorgan. Darling and Mandelson had official staffs. Yet Epstein appears to have offered a private route that operated through personal familiarity rather than formal procedure. That route could provide speed, discretion, and a less documented environment.

Epstein benefited whether or not he participated in the substance of the discussion. By making the meeting possible, he demonstrated usefulness to Staley and strengthened his claim to political access. He could later point, implicitly or explicitly, to his ability to reach senior British officials.

The episode also demonstrates how his relationships reinforced one another. His connection to Staley increased his value to politicians and business figures. His apparent access to Mandelson and Darling increased his value to Staley. The broker's power grew through the combination.

### 2.5 Larry Summers and the Mongolia-Related Davos Meeting

Larry Summers provides another example of Epstein's ability to connect economic policy, academia, philanthropy, and international interests.

Summers had served as United States secretary of the Treasury, president of Harvard University, and a senior economic adviser. He remained connected to political leaders, investors, academics, and international institutions. Access to Summers therefore carried value far beyond a single conversation.

A reported Davos-related episode involved a meeting concerning Mongolia in which Summers participated and Epstein joined or contributed remotely. Even if Epstein was not physically present in Davos, his involvement illustrates how his brokerage could operate at a distance. He did not need to occupy the meeting room to remain part of the connection.

The Mongolia context is significant because it involved a country seeking investment, policy expertise, international relationships, and access to influential economic thinkers. Summers could provide intellectual authority and links to finance and government. Epstein could position himself as the person capable of bringing such authority into the discussion.

This episode also challenges the idea that Epstein's Davos role was merely social. The subjects he entered included international economics, investment, government policy, and strategic development. His participation allowed him to present himself as an actor in serious global affairs.

Epstein's later communications with Summers further demonstrate that the relationship was not limited to a single event. Their correspondence touched academic, philanthropic, personal, and institutional matters. Summers's stature helped reinforce Epstein's self-presentation as an intellectually sophisticated adviser rather than merely a wealthy social figure.

The relationship provided benefits in both directions. Summers received access to people, discussions, and potential philanthropic or international opportunities. Epstein gained validation from one of the most recognizable figures in American economic policy and higher education.

### 2.6 What Epstein Gained from Making Other People's Meetings Possible

The immediate result of an introduction may have belonged to the people being connected, but the long-term advantage often accrued to Epstein.

First, he gained information. By arranging a meeting, he learned what each participant wanted, which relationships were valuable, and where future opportunities might arise. Such information allowed him to make increasingly targeted proposals.

Second, he gained reciprocal claims. A person who benefited from an introduction might later accept Epstein's request for another meeting, a recommendation, an institutional introduction, or attendance at a private dinner.

Third, he gained reputational validation. If Staley, Mandelson, Darling, Summers, or bin Sulayem treated him as a legitimate intermediary, others could infer that he had been vetted by people of comparable status. Every successful interaction made the next one easier.

Fourth, he gained access to institutions through individuals. A relationship with Staley connected him to JPMorgan. Contact with Mandelson linked him to British and European political networks. Summers connected him to Harvard, American economic policy, philanthropy, and finance. These were not merely personal acquaintances. Each person represented multiple institutional pathways.

Finally, Epstein gained the appearance of indispensability. The more relationships he facilitated, the more he could claim that he alone possessed the combination of contacts necessary to make certain meetings possible.

This is why the Davos evidence matters. It shows Epstein functioning not merely as a wealthy spectator but as a broker among named political, financial, and commercial actors. His influence came from making himself useful to people who already possessed formal power.

The people he connected were not defenseless outsiders. They were among the most experienced and well-advised figures in government, finance, and international business. Their willingness to use or entertain Epstein's brokerage is therefore part of the historical record that must be explained.

Epstein did not create the Davos power structure. He recognized its value, inserted himself between its participants, and converted their desire for access into his own continuing legitimacy.

**3. Børge Brende, Terje Rød-Larsen, and Access to WEF Leadership**

The relationship connecting Jeffrey Epstein, Terje Rød-Larsen, and Børge Brende is central to understanding Epstein's access to the institutional leadership of Davos. It moves the analysis beyond Epstein's contact with individual conference participants. Through Rød-Larsen, Epstein reached the serving president and chief executive of the World Economic Forum, communicated with him repeatedly, hosted him at three dinners, and discussed the future direction of the organization Brende led.

This chain was not formed among politically inexperienced people. Rød-Larsen was an internationally known Norwegian diplomat associated with the Oslo peace process, the United Nations, and the International Peace Institute. Brende was a former Norwegian foreign minister who became president and chief executive of the WEF in 2017. Both men understood diplomacy, reputation, institutional protocol, and the significance of introductions. They were accustomed to evaluating people who sought proximity to international power.

The documented relationship therefore cannot be reduced to Epstein deceiving naïve outsiders. Rød-Larsen served as the bridge. Brende accepted the introduction. Epstein supplied the venue, cultivated the relationship, and treated the WEF leader as someone with whom he could discuss Davos strategy, political participants, and the future architecture of international coordination.

Brende has said that he did not know about Epstein's criminal history when they met and that he regretted not investigating him. That explanation must be considered alongside the dates. The dinners occurred in 2018 and 2019, approximately a decade after Epstein's Florida conviction and registration as a sex offender. Brende was not a private citizen with no staff or institutional support. He led an organization whose primary business was assessing, convening, and managing relationships among globally prominent people.

The central issue is not whether Brende participated in Epstein's crimes. No such claim is required to establish the seriousness of the institutional failure. The issue is that the chief executive of the World Economic Forum entered and maintained a cordial relationship with a convicted sexual offender through an intermediary who himself had accepted money from Epstein. The relationship continued through meetings, emails, and text messages until shortly before Epstein's 2019 arrest.

This was access to the institutional center of Davos.

### 3.1 Børge Brende's Position at the Institutional Center

Børge Brende was not merely another prominent person attending Davos. He was the senior executive responsible for the World Economic Forum itself. As president and chief executive, he occupied the point at which the Forum's official programs, corporate partnerships, government relationships, public reputation, and private convening power converged.

Brende brought substantial political authority to the position. Before joining the WEF, he had served in the Norwegian government in several ministerial roles, including foreign minister. His career placed him within European diplomacy, development policy, international business, and multilateral affairs. When he became WEF president in 2017, he assumed leadership of an organization whose influence depended heavily on trust, access, and the credibility of its personal networks.

This made Brende especially valuable to Epstein. A relationship with him offered several advantages at once.

First, Brende represented direct proximity to the institution that organized Davos. Epstein had already used the gathering as an environment for introductions. Contact with its chief executive could enhance his claim to understand the Forum and its participants from the inside.

Second, Brende's diplomatic history extended Epstein's reach beyond business and philanthropy. He was connected to governments, foreign ministers, heads of state, international organizations, and major corporations.

Third, Brende's presence could provide reputational validation. If the president of the World Economic Forum accepted Epstein's hospitality and communicated with him cordially, other people could interpret that association as evidence that Epstein remained socially acceptable.

Fourth, Epstein could gain information. Even without access to confidential WEF systems, conversations with Brende could provide insight into the Forum's priorities, expected participants, strategic concerns, and relationships.

The significance of the connection therefore arose from Brende's office as much as from his identity. A private dinner involving a serving institutional leader cannot be understood entirely as a private act when the leader's desirability as a guest comes directly from his public and professional position.

Brende carried the authority of the WEF into Epstein's home whether or not the Forum formally approved the encounter.

**3.2 The Three Reported Dinners of 2018 and 2019**

The relationship between Brende and Epstein included three reported dinners in New York during 2018 and 2019. The surviving communications indicate planning, anticipation, follow-up, and continued efforts to meet. This was not a single accidental encounter in a crowded reception.

Rød-Larsen appears to have begun attempting to connect the two men during the United Nations high-level meetings in New York in September 2017, around the time Brende assumed leadership of the WEF. The introduction placed Epstein before Brende as someone already accepted by a prominent Norwegian diplomat and international-institutional figure.

The first reported dinner occurred in 2018. Records associated with the dinners and surrounding communications identify figures including Rød-Larsen, former Trump adviser Steve Bannon, and financier Leon Black within the broader guest network. Their presence illustrates

the type of environment Epstein created: diplomacy, populist political strategy, finance, and global institutional leadership brought together in a private residence under Epstein's control.

A second dinner was arranged for September 25, 2018, at Epstein's Manhattan home. Communications indicate that Brende and Epstein planned it directly. Journalist and author Michael Wolff and Rød-Larsen were listed among the expected participants. The date reportedly coincided with Brende's birthday, further personalizing the occasion.

The direct planning matters. Brende was not simply added unknowingly to a large event. The messages show that he and Epstein discussed when they could meet and expressed anticipation about seeing one another. Epstein, in turn, communicated the confirmed arrangement to others.

The third reported dinner occurred in June 2019. In the preceding messages, Brende indicated that there was much to discuss and asked whether Epstein would be in New York on a particular date. Epstein responded that he would make himself available. The ensuing arrangements included discussion of Brende's preferred food and a dinner scheduled at Epstein's residence.

This final meeting came only weeks before Epstein's arrest in July 2019 on federal sex-trafficking charges.

The sequence is important:

March 2018: an initial reported dinner and continuing contact.

September 2018: a directly coordinated dinner at Epstein's Manhattan home.

June 2019: another planned dinner shortly before Epstein's arrest.

Between these meetings, Brende and Epstein exchanged emails and text messages. The relationship therefore had continuity. Epstein remained someone Brende was willing to contact, visit, and engage.

Brende later characterized the occasions as business dinners involving diplomats and business leaders. That description does not diminish their importance. Business dinners involving the president of the WEF are precisely the mechanism through which private access acquires institutional value.

### 3.3 Emails, Text Messages, and Continued Contact

The communications between Brende and Epstein prevent the relationship from being dismissed as a few impersonal encounters arranged entirely by Rød-Larsen. Rød-Larsen opened the door, but Brende and Epstein subsequently communicated directly.

The messages reportedly carried a cordial and familiar tone. Brende expressed enthusiasm about future meetings and praised Epstein's hospitality. Epstein addressed him as a valued contact, coordinated dinners with him, and sought ideas from others about matters Brende was expected to discuss.

The quantity and tone of correspondence matter because elite relationships are often minimized after public exposure by reducing them to isolated meetings. A chronological record can reveal something different: anticipation before a dinner, appreciation afterward, discussion between meetings, and active planning for the next encounter.

The communications also suggest that Epstein did not regard Brende merely as a ceremonial guest. Before one dinner, Epstein sought Steve Bannon's ideas about revitalizing the World Economic Forum. Bannon reportedly proposed making the Forum more like an exclusive club. Epstein responded favorably to greater exclusivity and invitation-based access.

This discussion is revealing even if Brende did not endorse every idea exchanged between Epstein and Bannon. Epstein was preparing to engage the WEF president on the organization's identity and future. He treated the dinner as an opportunity to shape or at least participate in strategic discussion.

Afterward, Epstein transmitted information concerning anticipated Davos participation, including politically sensitive claims about major leaders. Brende also sent Epstein information concerning the expected presence of Donald Trump and numerous heads of state or government at Davos.

Such exchanges indicate that Epstein was incorporated into a stream of conversation concerning the Forum's participants and prospects. The evidence does not establish that Brende supplied classified or legally protected information. It does show that Epstein had obtained a direct channel to the person managing one of the world's most exclusive political-business gatherings.

Brende's later assertion that he had been unaware of Epstein's past is also difficult to separate from his position and resources. The criminal conviction was public. Epstein's name could have been checked easily. Brende led an institution whose success depended on reputational judgment. Even accepting his statement of ignorance, the failure to inquire was not trivial. It was a failure at the very activity the WEF claimed to perform well: evaluating and connecting consequential people.

Published accounts also reported that Brende had earlier denied having known or met Epstein before the later document release established the dinners and communications. The discrepancy intensified the controversy because it transformed the issue from poor vetting alone into a question of candor and disclosure.

The institutional problem was therefore not merely that the meetings happened. It was that their extent became clear only when external records emerged.

### 3.4 Terje Rød-Larsen as the Introducing Gatekeeper

Terje Rød-Larsen was the crucial intermediary connecting Epstein to Brende. His role demonstrates how Epstein gained access through trusted insiders rather than by approaching institutional leaders without sponsorship.

Rød-Larsen possessed unusual diplomatic prestige. He was closely associated with the negotiations that produced the Oslo Accords, had served in senior United Nations roles, and led the International Peace Institute in New York. IPI operated near the United Nations and cultivated relationships with diplomats, governments, foundations, and policy leaders.

An introduction from Rød-Larsen therefore carried substantial weight. To Brende, he was not an unknown social promoter. He was a fellow Norwegian with international stature and long experience in diplomacy. His endorsement could substitute for independent scrutiny.

That transfer of trust was precisely what made elite introductions valuable to Epstein. Rød-Larsen's reputation crossed the bridge first. Epstein followed behind it.

Rød-Larsen's own relationship with Epstein was financially and institutionally significant. Epstein-associated foundations donated a total of approximately $650,000 to IPI between 2011 and 2019. These donations all occurred after Epstein's 2008 conviction. Rød-Larsen also obtained a personal loan of approximately $130,000 from Epstein in 2013. He later stated that the loan had been repaid.

The IPI board was reportedly not informed at the time about either the full donation relationship or Rød-Larsen's personal borrowing. When the relationship became public in 2020, Rød-Larsen resigned from the institute and apologized for his judgment.

An outside forensic review found the donations in IPI's records and reported no evidence that laws or regulations had been violated. It also concluded that the donations represented less than one percent of the institute's revenue over the relevant period. Those findings answer limited accounting and legal questions. They do not remove the ethical significance of an institutional leader accepting post-conviction funding from Epstein, obtaining a personal loan from him, and then introducing him to other prominent figures.

The relationship illustrates a more troubling form of transitive access:

Epstein supplied money to an institution led by Rød-Larsen.

Epstein supplied a personal loan to Rød-Larsen.

Rød-Larsen supplied Epstein with diplomatic legitimacy.

Rød-Larsen introduced Epstein to Brende.

Brende supplied Epstein with access to WEF leadership and the prestige attached to that relationship.

This does not prove an explicit bargain among the three men. It does demonstrate a chain in which money, trust, introductions, and institutional status moved through the same network.

The gatekeeper was not standing outside the relationship. He had benefited from it.

**3.5 Davos, the United Nations, and a Proposed Global Architecture**

The communications between Epstein and Brende reportedly included discussion of the World Economic Forum's potential role in global governance. Epstein proposed that Davos could replace or assume functions associated with the United Nations and become a more permanent setting for international discussion.

Brende reportedly responded in terms of the need for a new global architecture and the Forum's distinctive public-private model. The precise meaning of such exchanges should not be exaggerated into proof that Epstein influenced WEF policy. There is no demonstrated basis for claiming that he controlled the Forum's agenda or that Brende implemented Epstein's proposals.

The importance lies elsewhere. Epstein was treated as someone with whom the serving WEF president could discuss the strategic future of the institution.

That standing is remarkable. Epstein had no elected mandate, no acknowledged WEF office, no public international-policy role, and no transparent source of authority. His qualification was access. Yet in private communication, he participated in discussion about whether Davos might become a more central mechanism of global coordination.

The exchange also reveals the political meaning of Epstein's social brokerage. His interest was not confined to parties, personal introductions, or private wealth management. He sought proximity to institutions capable of shaping international agendas.

The contrast between the United Nations and Davos is especially significant. The United Nations is composed of states operating through treaties, charters, formal representation, published resolutions, and public procedures. The WEF is a private foundation whose authority arises from convening governments, corporations, investors, experts, and civil-society leaders.

A shift from formal multilateral institutions toward private public-private coordination would increase the importance of precisely the kind of informal access Epstein cultivated. In a system

governed by official representation, a person requires legal or diplomatic standing. In a system governed by networks, proximity to the conveners may be sufficient.

Epstein's suggestion therefore aligned with his own mode of power. He benefited from systems in which personal access could rival formal authority.

The discussion also places Rød-Larsen's role in a broader context. Rød-Larsen linked the United Nations world, the International Peace Institute, Epstein, and the head of the World Economic Forum. He stood at the intersection of formal diplomacy and private elite coordination. Through him, Epstein moved from the periphery of international affairs into direct conversation with people occupying its institutional centers.

**3.6 The WEF Investigation and Brende's Departure**

The Brende–Epstein relationship eventually became a formal World Economic Forum governance matter. After the release of records documenting the dinners and communications, the WEF Governing Board referred the issue to its Audit and Risk Committee. An independent review by outside counsel was commissioned.

This response established that the matter could not be dismissed as entirely private. The Forum itself recognized that the conduct of its president and chief executive raised questions affecting institutional integrity.

Brende supported the review and stated that he had requested scrutiny of the relationship. He acknowledged the three dinners and communications while maintaining that he had not known of Epstein's criminal history. He expressed regret that he had not investigated Epstein more thoroughly.

The outside review reportedly found no additional concerns beyond the contacts already disclosed. That conclusion was presented as limiting the scope of the matter. It did not erase the disclosed conduct:

Brende met Epstein three times.

The meetings occurred at Epstein's residence during 2018 and 2019.

The men exchanged emails and text messages.

Their discussions included Davos, WEF strategy, international participants, and global governance.

The relationship was initiated through Rød-Larsen, who had received a personal loan from Epstein and whose institute had accepted Epstein-linked donations.

Brende's contacts continued until shortly before Epstein's 2019 arrest.

Brende subsequently stepped down as WEF president and chief executive in February 2026. He said that the Forum should be able to continue its work without distraction. The WEF appointed an interim leader and began the process of finding a permanent successor.

The institutional sequence was therefore direct:

Rød-Larsen introduced Epstein to Brende.

Brende attended repeated dinners and maintained communication.

External document releases exposed the extent of the relationship.

The WEF opened a board-level independent review.

Brende resigned after the review concluded.

This chain demonstrates why the relationship belongs at the center of an analysis of Epstein and Davos. Epstein did not merely socialize with people who happened to attend the annual meeting. He obtained repeated private access to the leader of the organization itself.

The case also reveals the weakness of describing elite relationships as accidental penetration. Epstein entered through Rød-Larsen, a trusted diplomat who had his own financial relationship with him. Brende then maintained direct contact. No gate was physically broken. No credential was forged. Access moved through respected insiders who regarded Epstein as useful or acceptable.

The moral failure was distributed but not anonymous. Rød-Larsen made the introduction. Brende accepted it. Epstein cultivated it. IPI received his money. The WEF bore the eventual institutional consequences.

The available evidence does not establish that the World Economic Forum participated in Epstein's sexual crimes. It establishes something independently serious: a convicted sexual offender was able, through a financially connected diplomatic intermediary, to obtain sustained personal access to the president and chief executive of the institution at the center of Davos.

Epstein did not remain outside the walls offering vague promises of influence. He was seated at the table with the man who led the Forum.

**4. Banking, Wealth Management, and the Financial Elite**

Jeffrey Epstein's access to political leaders, universities, philanthropists, and international institutions rested on an earlier foundation: his acceptance within the world of private wealth. His social power depended on the appearance that he was not merely rich but trusted by people who controlled immense fortunes. Leslie Wexner, Jes Staley, JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche

Bank, Leon Black, Glenn Dubin, and other financial actors helped create or preserve that appearance at different stages of Epstein's career.

These relationships cannot be collapsed into a single allegation. Wexner gave Epstein unusually broad authority over his personal and financial affairs. JPMorgan maintained Epstein as a client for years after his conviction while Staley sustained an extensive personal relationship with him. Deutsche Bank accepted Epstein after JPMorgan ended its relationship with him. Leon Black paid Epstein extraordinary sums for tax, estate-planning, and related advice. Glenn Dubin and Eva Andersson-Dubin remained part of a longstanding social and financial network around him.

The common element was not identical conduct but institutional validation. Wealthy individuals and major banks treated Epstein as someone worthy of trust, service, payment, or continued access. That treatment strengthened his ability to present himself as a financier and adviser even though the full nature of his business remained opaque.

Money performed several functions in Epstein's network. It funded his properties, travel, staff, hospitality, and social operations. It gave him access to wealthy clients and institutions. It allowed him to become a donor to universities and policy organizations. It also created relationships in which other people had incentives to minimize reputational danger, preserve confidentiality, or avoid scrutiny of how the relationship had begun.

The financial history therefore cannot be treated as background to the social network. It was the structure that made the network possible.

**4.1 Leslie Wexner and the Construction of Epstein's Wealth and Status**

Leslie Wexner was one of the most consequential figures in Epstein's rise. As the founder of the retail empire that included The Limited and Victoria's Secret, Wexner possessed enormous wealth and access to corporate, philanthropic, and political circles. Epstein's relationship with him transformed Epstein from an obscure financial operator into a person who could plausibly claim authority over major private fortunes.

Wexner granted Epstein power of attorney, giving him broad legal authority to act on Wexner's behalf. This was not an ordinary advisory arrangement. Power of attorney can permit one person to conduct transactions, sign documents, manage property, and represent another person in important financial matters. The extent of the authority conveyed exceptional trust.

Epstein's association with Wexner also contributed materially to his visible wealth. The Manhattan residence that became one of Epstein's principal homes had previously been connected to Wexner. Epstein also acquired other property and benefited from access to Wexner's social and business environment. These assets helped create the image of Epstein as an independent financier of extraordinary means.

That image was essential to his later operations. A person residing in one of Manhattan's largest private homes, traveling by private aircraft, employing staff, and entertaining billionaires could appear to possess financial stature even when outsiders understood little about his clients, investment record, or source of income.

Wexner's trust therefore gave Epstein more than money or property. It gave him a financial identity.

The relationship also created reputational leverage. Epstein could present himself as the adviser trusted by one of America's most successful businessmen. That association could reassure prospective clients, donors, academics, and political figures. If Wexner had entrusted Epstein with extraordinary authority, others might assume that Epstein had been carefully vetted.

Wexner later stated that Epstein had misappropriated substantial sums from him and that he severed the relationship after discovering the misconduct. He has described himself as deceived and expressed regret over the association. Those claims are important and should not be ignored. They also raise difficult questions about how Epstein retained so much authority for so long and why the mechanisms surrounding an immense private fortune failed to detect or prevent the alleged abuse earlier.

The Wexner relationship established a recurring pattern. Epstein gained legitimacy from a respected and wealthy insider. That legitimacy then helped him approach the next insider. Whether Wexner intended this effect is less important than the effect itself. The relationship supplied Epstein with assets, social credibility, and a story about who he was.

Without Wexner, Epstein might have remained a marginal figure. Through Wexner, he acquired the appearance of belonging at the summit of private finance.

### 4.2 Jes Staley and JPMorgan Chase

Jes Staley's relationship with Epstein linked him to one of the most powerful banks in the world. Staley held senior positions at JPMorgan Chase, including leadership roles in private banking and asset management. He later became chief executive of Barclays. His career depended on managing relationships with wealthy clients and understanding the reputational risks associated with them.

Epstein became a JPMorgan client in the late 1990s and remained one until 2013. The relationship continued for approximately five years after Epstein's 2008 conviction. During this period, the bank processed transactions, maintained accounts, and provided financial services despite repeated internal concerns.

Staley was more than a banker assigned to Epstein's accounts. Their communications and social contacts reflected a close personal relationship. Records disclosed through litigation showed

extensive correspondence, visits, and expressions of familiarity. Staley visited Epstein's properties, including his private island, and communicated with him in terms that were far more personal than ordinary client correspondence.

Staley has denied knowledge of Epstein's sexual crimes and has denied participating in them. The public record does not justify treating every suggestive or coded message as proof of a specific criminal act. It does, however, establish that Staley maintained a sustained and unusually intimate relationship with Epstein while occupying a senior position at the bank serving him.

The institutional significance lies in the interaction between Staley's personal relationship and JPMorgan's corporate decisions. Epstein was not an obscure retail customer. He was a high-value private-banking client associated with a senior executive. Internal personnel raised concerns about him, yet the relationship continued.

JPMorgan later argued that Staley had concealed important aspects of his relationship with Epstein and acted contrary to the bank's interests. Litigation between the bank and Staley reflected an attempt to separate his conduct from the institution. That distinction may be relevant to individual liability, but it cannot explain the entire institutional history.

A major bank does not maintain a controversial high-net-worth client through the decision of one employee alone. Accounts are processed by teams. Transactions are reviewed. Compliance personnel create records. Executives receive warnings. Legal and reputational risks are discussed. The continued relationship required more than Staley's private friendship.

Epstein benefited greatly from JPMorgan's services. A relationship with such a bank allowed him to move money, maintain accounts, make payments, and present himself to others as a legitimate financial actor. The bank's willingness to serve him after conviction sent an implicit message that his criminal record had not made him unacceptable to elite finance.

JPMorgan also benefited. Epstein was reportedly treated as a valuable client who could bring additional wealthy customers to the bank. His network itself had financial value. He could introduce bankers to billionaires, investors, entrepreneurs, and politically connected individuals.

This created a reciprocal arrangement. Epstein received institutional legitimacy and financial infrastructure. The bank received fees, deposits, and potential access to other wealthy clients. Staley occupied the human connection between them.

The relationship ended only in 2013, not immediately after Epstein's conviction. That delay is one of the clearest examples of utility overriding exclusion.

### 4.3 JPMorgan Leadership and Institutional Knowledge

The JPMorgan case cannot be understood solely through Jes Staley. Internal communications and later litigation revealed that concerns about Epstein were known within several parts of the bank. Employees raised questions about his criminal history, his transactions, and the reputational danger of continuing to serve him.

The precise distribution of knowledge varied. Not every executive necessarily saw the same warning or understood the same facts. Yet institutional responsibility does not require that every person possess complete knowledge. A bank is designed to aggregate information through compliance systems, legal review, account monitoring, management reporting, and escalation procedures.

Epstein's continued presence exposed the limits of those systems when a profitable or well-connected client was involved.

Senior executives were reportedly included in discussions about whether to terminate the relationship. Compliance personnel documented concerns. Some internal records questioned why the bank continued doing business with him. These were not warnings arriving from outside after the fact. They arose within the institution while the accounts remained open.

The institution nevertheless continued the relationship.

This suggests that Epstein's perceived value outweighed the concerns for an extended period. His value may have included account revenue, deposits, fees, and his capacity to introduce other wealthy clients. The calculation need not have been expressed openly as a choice between profit and morality. Institutional accommodation often occurs through delay, fragmented responsibility, repeated requests for more information, or reluctance to challenge a powerful internal sponsor.

No single official must decide, "We will tolerate a convicted sexual offender." Instead, one office defers to another. A relationship manager emphasizes commercial importance. Compliance raises concerns but lacks final authority. Executives assume that legal review has resolved the issue. The client remains while responsibility disperses.

Epstein's banking history demonstrates how institutional systems can fail without a formal conspiracy. A sequence of individually defensible delays can produce a collectively indefensible result.

The later settlements and litigation involving JPMorgan reflected the seriousness of these failures. The bank agreed to substantial financial resolutions connected to claims that it had enabled Epstein's operations by continuing to provide services. Settlement does not constitute

an admission of every allegation. It does show that the relationship created legal, financial, and reputational consequences far beyond one executive's personal misconduct.

The central question is not whether JPMorgan employees knew every detail of Epstein's abuse. It is whether the institution knew enough to terminate the relationship much earlier. The documented warnings indicate that it did.

**4.4 Deutsche Bank After JPMorgan**

When JPMorgan ended its relationship with Epstein in 2013, Deutsche Bank accepted him as a client. This transfer is especially revealing because Epstein's conviction was already several years old and his reputation was not a hidden risk.

Deutsche Bank did not encounter Epstein before the public record existed. It accepted him after another major bank had decided to remove him.

The relationship was reportedly facilitated through bankers seeking to bring valuable clients to the institution. Epstein again arrived not only as a holder of assets but as a person capable of introducing other wealthy individuals. His network increased his commercial appeal.

Deutsche Bank maintained accounts for Epstein and associated entities, processed transactions, and provided services until 2018. Regulators later identified serious deficiencies in the bank's handling of the relationship. The bank was penalized for failures involving monitoring, due diligence, and transactions connected to Epstein and people in his network.

As with JPMorgan, the issue was not merely that an account existed. Financial institutions possess obligations to understand their clients, monitor unusual activity, and respond to elevated risk. Epstein's criminal history should have triggered exceptional caution.

Instead, the bank entered the relationship and retained it for years.

The transfer from JPMorgan to Deutsche Bank demonstrates a broader institutional problem. When one elite organization finally rejects a controversial client, another may see commercial opportunity. Risk does not disappear; it moves.

This competitive structure weakens collective sanctions. Epstein did not need every bank to accept him. He needed one. As long as a major institution remained willing to provide services, he could continue operating with the external appearance of financial legitimacy.

The banks may have viewed themselves as separate actors making independent commercial decisions. From Epstein's perspective, however, they formed a continuous infrastructure. JPMorgan served him until 2013. Deutsche Bank served him afterward. Institutional continuity survived reputational rupture.

The episode therefore contradicts the idea that Epstein's conviction placed him outside elite finance. His banking relationships changed, but the system continued to accommodate him.

**4.5 Leon Black and the Scale of Epstein's Fees**

Leon Black's payments to Epstein represent one of the most striking examples of Epstein's financial value to a named elite client. Black was the co-founder and chief executive of Apollo Global Management, one of the world's most influential private-equity firms. His wealth, financial sophistication, and access to elite legal and tax advisers make the relationship especially significant.

Black paid Epstein very large sums for services described as tax planning, estate planning, family-office advice, philanthropic strategy, and assistance involving complex financial matters. The total reportedly reached well over one hundred million dollars.

The extraordinary scale of the payments demands explanation. Epstein was not known publicly as the leader of a major law firm, accounting practice, investment bank, or tax consultancy. Yet Black treated his advice as sufficiently valuable to justify compensation exceeding what many established professional firms would receive.

Black maintained that Epstein provided legitimate and valuable financial services and that the relationship was professional. An independent review commissioned by Apollo reported that it found no evidence Black participated in Epstein's criminal activities. Black nevertheless acknowledged poor judgment in continuing the relationship after Epstein's conviction.

The absence of evidence that Black joined Epstein's sexual crimes does not resolve the financial and moral questions. Why was Epstein selected for such sensitive and lucrative work after his conviction? What capabilities did he possess that Black could not obtain from established advisers? Why were the fees so large? What additional access, knowledge, or influence accompanied the formal financial services?

The relationship benefited Epstein in several ways. The payments increased his wealth. Association with Black validated his claim to extraordinary financial expertise. Serving one of the most sophisticated financiers in the world could be used, directly or indirectly, to reassure others about his abilities.

Black also provided entry into additional networks. Apollo, museums, foundations, universities, and philanthropic organizations surrounded him. Even when Epstein had no formal role in these institutions, his relationship with Black placed him near their resources and decision-makers.

The case illustrates how professional descriptions can obscure broader social effects. A payment may be characterized as compensation for tax advice. Yet the relationship also produces prestige, introductions, access, and mutual confidentiality.

Black's continued use of Epstein after 2008 reinforced the same message sent by the banks: conviction had not made Epstein unusable to the highest levels of finance.

**4.6 Glenn Dubin, Eva Andersson-Dubin, and Financial-Social Continuity**

Glenn Dubin and Eva Andersson-Dubin were longstanding members of Epstein's social world. Glenn Dubin was a hedge-fund manager and co-founder of Highbridge Capital Management. Eva Andersson-Dubin was a physician, former model, and former romantic partner of Epstein. Their relationship with him extended across personal, financial, medical, philanthropic, and social settings.

The Dubins have denied participating in Epstein's crimes and have disputed allegations involving their family. Any claims of direct misconduct must be evaluated separately and according to their evidence. The significance of the documented relationship lies in its duration and continuity.

Epstein remained socially connected to the Dubins after the end of his earlier romantic relationship with Eva Andersson-Dubin. He appeared in their broader family and social environment. Such continuity helped normalize him. A person retained within the orbit of a respected financier, physician, philanthropist, and family could appear less dangerous to outsiders.

Glenn Dubin's financial stature also added legitimacy to Epstein's identity as a trusted participant in sophisticated wealth networks. Highbridge became a major investment firm, and Dubin later occupied influential positions in finance and philanthropy. His association placed Epstein near investors, executives, donors, and institutions.

The relationship demonstrates that Epstein's network was not composed only of isolated transactions. It included long-term social bonds capable of surviving scandal. These bonds may have been explained by friendship, loyalty, disbelief, compartmentalization, or confidence in private assurances. Whatever the explanation, the effect was continued inclusion.

Eva Andersson-Dubin's medical background and philanthropic profile added another form of reputational protection. Epstein's presence around a prominent physician and family environment could counter public perceptions of him as socially untouchable.

The Dubin relationship therefore matters less because it proves a single financial transaction than because it shows social continuity within the financial elite. Epstein was not merely retained as an adviser at a distance. He remained embedded in relationships that combined friendship, family familiarity, wealth, and institutional prestige.

This type of acceptance was especially valuable after 2008. Formal public rehabilitation was unnecessary if private networks continued to receive him.

### 4.7 Money as Service, Cover, and Mutual Dependency

Epstein's financial relationships served three overlapping functions: service, cover, and dependency.

As service, Epstein claimed to provide tax advice, estate planning, wealth management, introductions, philanthropic strategy, and access to other wealthy or influential people. Leslie Wexner entrusted him with broad authority. Leon Black paid him extraordinary fees. Jes Staley and private-banking teams treated him as a valuable client and connector.

Some of these services may have been genuine. Epstein appears to have understood aspects of wealth, taxation, trusts, and the preferences of extremely rich clients. The argument does not require that every service was fraudulent. His usefulness was likely strengthened by the fact that he could sometimes deliver real value.

As cover, finance supplied a respectable explanation for his wealth and relationships. Calling Epstein a financier or adviser transformed private meetings into business meetings, payments into consulting fees, and contact with billionaires into professional association.

This professional identity also protected other participants. A person questioned about meeting Epstein could say that the subject was tax planning, investment, philanthropy, or international business. The financial label did not need to explain the entire relationship. It needed only to provide a plausible public account.

As dependency, money created bonds that were difficult to unwind. A client who had shared confidential tax, family, estate, or investment information with Epstein might be reluctant to expose the relationship fully. A bank earning revenue from his accounts and introductions might resist termination. An institution receiving donations might avoid asking questions that threatened future funding.

The dependency could operate in both directions. Epstein relied on wealthy clients and banks for income, services, and legitimacy. Clients may have relied on him for specialized advice, introductions, discretion, or knowledge of private affairs.

Such relationships create mutual vulnerability. The adviser knows the client's finances. The client knows the adviser's unconventional role. Each may possess information the other prefers to keep private. Even without explicit blackmail, the structure encourages silence and continued accommodation.

The financial network therefore did more than fund Epstein's lifestyle. It protected his identity as a legitimate elite actor. Wexner helped create that identity. JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank provided institutional continuity. Staley supplied personal sponsorship within banking. Black

demonstrated that Epstein's advice could command extraordinary fees. The Dubins contributed long-term financial and social legitimacy.

These people and institutions did not all play the same role. They did, however, participate in a system that repeatedly converted wealth into credibility and credibility into further access.

Epstein's financial power cannot be separated from the people who recognized it, paid for it, serviced it, or allowed it to stand unquestioned. His fortune may have appeared private, but the legitimacy surrounding it was collectively produced.

**5. Political, Royal, and Diplomatic Relationships**

Jeffrey Epstein's political and diplomatic network gave him something money alone could not provide: public stature. Association with former presidents, cabinet ministers, royalty, prime ministers, diplomats, and senior advisers allowed him to appear as a person whose presence among powerful people had already been accepted. These relationships helped transform a private financier of uncertain professional standing into an apparent participant in international affairs.

The named figures in this network did not all have the same relationship with Epstein. Prince Andrew maintained a highly visible and consequential association. Bill Clinton traveled on Epstein's aircraft in connection with international trips after leaving the presidency. Donald Trump knew Epstein socially in Palm Beach and New York before their reported estrangement. Ehud Barak met Epstein repeatedly and entered business dealings connected to him. Peter Mandelson exchanged communications with Epstein and appeared within his network of bankers, politicians, and international business figures. Terje Rød-Larsen accepted Epstein-linked support for the International Peace Institute, borrowed money personally from Epstein, and introduced him to Børge Brende.

These relationships varied in timing, intimacy, purpose, and evidentiary significance. They must not be treated as interchangeable. Yet together they demonstrate that Epstein's political access was not imaginary. He possessed recurring contact with people who had occupied some of the highest offices in the United States, Britain, Israel, Norway, and international diplomacy.

Political prestige strengthened Epstein in three ways. It reassured potential associates that he belonged in elite company. It made his claimed ability to arrange introductions more credible. It also created ambiguity about who had vetted whom. A banker meeting Epstein through a former minister might assume that the politician trusted him. A politician meeting him through a billionaire might assume that the financier had investigated him. The presence of recognized leaders allowed social trust to circulate without anyone accepting full responsibility for it.

The political network was therefore not separate from Epstein's financial, academic, and philanthropic relationships. Each domain validated the others. Wealth created access to politics. Political access attracted bankers and business figures. Academic connections gave his gatherings intellectual respectability. Diplomatic relationships allowed him to present private brokerage as participation in global affairs.

**5.1 Prince Andrew and Ghislaine Maxwell**

Prince Andrew's relationship with Epstein became the most damaging royal association in the network. Andrew was not merely a private social figure. As the son of Queen Elizabeth II, he embodied the prestige of the British monarchy and possessed access to government officials, business leaders, diplomats, wealthy families, and royal households throughout the world.

Ghislaine Maxwell was central to the relationship. As the daughter of British media proprietor Robert Maxwell, she moved within aristocratic, political, and financial circles. Her friendship with Andrew helped connect Epstein to a royal environment that would otherwise have been difficult to reach. She did not simply introduce two acquaintances. She served as a durable social bridge between Epstein's residences and Andrew's world.

Andrew visited Epstein's properties and traveled in his company. Their association continued after Epstein's 2008 conviction. Photographs of Andrew walking with Epstein in New York in 2010 became especially important because they showed the prince maintaining personal contact with a registered sex offender whose criminal history was already public.

The 2010 visit cannot easily be explained as a failure to know who Epstein was. Andrew later said that he went to end the friendship in person. That explanation raised its own questions. Ending a relationship did not require staying at Epstein's Manhattan residence or appearing publicly with him. The explanation also confirmed that a meaningful relationship had existed.

Virginia Giuffre alleged that she had been trafficked to Andrew by Epstein and Maxwell when she was seventeen. Andrew denied the allegation. A widely circulated photograph showed Andrew with his arm around Giuffre's waist, with Maxwell standing behind them. Andrew and his defenders questioned aspects of the photograph and account, but no convincing public demonstration established that the image was fabricated.

Andrew's 2019 televised interview deepened the crisis. His explanations concerning the photograph, his whereabouts, his physical condition, and his decision to stay with Epstein were widely regarded as implausible or morally inadequate. Rather than demonstrating concern for Epstein's victims, the interview centered Andrew's own reputation and portrayed Epstein's hospitality as something the prince had accepted while attempting to manage a difficult friendship.

The institutional consequences were substantial. Andrew withdrew from public duties. His military affiliations and royal patronages were removed. He later reached a civil settlement with Giuffre without admitting liability.

The importance of the Andrew relationship extends beyond the sexual allegation. His presence supplied Epstein with royal legitimacy. A financier hosting a British prince could appear to belong within a rarefied international class. Other guests could infer that Epstein had passed through security, diplomatic, and royal scrutiny.

Andrew also represented a potential source of introductions. During his period as a British trade representative, he interacted with governments, investors, corporations, and wealthy families. Epstein's relationship with him therefore had possible commercial and diplomatic value as well as social prestige.

The scandal demonstrates how mutual usefulness can preserve a relationship after moral disqualification should have occurred. Epstein gained royal status and access. Andrew gained hospitality, social connections, and entry into Epstein's network of wealthy and influential people. Maxwell made the exchange possible.

**5.2 Bill Clinton and Epstein's International Travel Network**

Bill Clinton's association with Epstein brought former presidential prestige into the network. After leaving office in January 2001, Clinton traveled internationally for philanthropic, humanitarian, political, and speaking activities. Epstein's aircraft was used for several portions of travel involving Clinton, members of Clinton's staff, Secret Service personnel, foundation associates, and other passengers.

Flight records document Clinton's presence on multiple flight segments. Public argument has often become confused because a flight log records individual legs rather than necessarily representing separate trips. The responsible analysis must therefore distinguish the number of flights, the number of journeys, the destinations, and the people present.

Clinton's representatives stated that the travel was connected to Clinton Foundation work and related activities, including trips to Africa, Asia, and Europe. They also stated that Secret Service agents and staff accompanied him and that Clinton knew nothing of Epstein's crimes.

The documented travel does not by itself establish participation in Epstein's sexual abuse. It does establish that Epstein's aircraft and logistical resources were useful to a former president operating on the international stage. Epstein could supply transportation and access to a network involving wealthy donors, public figures, and philanthropic initiatives.

For Epstein, Clinton's presence had extraordinary reputational value. A former president traveling on his aircraft communicated legitimacy to nearly anyone who later entered Epstein's

orbit. The association allowed Epstein to present himself as someone trusted at the highest level of American political life.

Epstein reportedly cultivated the image that he had a close relationship with Clinton. The exact intimacy of that relationship remains disputed. Clinton's office described the contacts as limited and denied visits to Epstein's private island. Other accounts and documentary fragments have produced continuing questions about the full extent of their interactions.

The principal historical point does not depend on resolving every disputed claim. Clinton accepted transportation and association that benefited Epstein's standing. A former president had substantial staff, security, legal advice, and institutional resources. Epstein nevertheless became a service provider within Clinton's post-presidential activities.

The relationship also illustrates how philanthropy could provide a respectable framework for elite contact. International travel associated with development, health, poverty reduction, or foundation work carried moral prestige. Epstein's participation in that environment could soften or obscure the private nature of his interests.

Clinton's association therefore contributed to the larger cycle of validation. A banker could see Epstein's connection to a former president. A donor could see his connection to global philanthropy. A politician could see him surrounded by financial power. Each association made the others appear more credible.

**5.3 Donald Trump and the Palm Beach–New York Social Circle**

Donald Trump and Jeffrey Epstein moved within overlapping social circles in New York and Palm Beach during the 1980s and 1990s. Photographs and video footage document them together at social events. Trump publicly described Epstein in favorable terms in 2002, calling him a "terrific guy" and commenting that Epstein liked women, including some "on the younger side."

The quotation became significant after Epstein's crimes were exposed because it demonstrated familiarity with his social preferences. It does not independently establish that Trump knew about criminal abuse. It does show that Epstein's interest in unusually young women was noticeable enough to enter Trump's public description of him.

The two men were associated with the Palm Beach social environment surrounding Mar-a-Lago, wealthy residents, models, parties, and real estate. Epstein's nearby residence and his access to young women placed him within the same social geography.

Trump later said that he had fallen out with Epstein and had not spoken with him for many years. Reports have offered different explanations for the break, including disputes over real estate or Epstein's conduct toward young women. Accounts also state that Epstein was barred from Mar-a-Lago, although the timing, reason, and documentation have been debated.

The chronology is essential. Trump's documented social contact with Epstein belongs largely to an earlier period than the post-2008 relationships involving Gates, Black, Ito, Brende, or Chomsky. The nature of moral responsibility therefore differs. Association before Epstein's public conviction cannot automatically be judged by the same standard as deliberate engagement after it.

That distinction does not make the earlier relationship irrelevant. Trump was part of the wealthy social world in which Epstein found access to models, business figures, celebrities, and political donors. His public praise contributed to Epstein's social legitimacy during the period when Epstein's abuse was occurring.

Later claims involving Trump must be separated carefully according to evidence. His name has appeared in released materials, witness statements, social records, and unverified allegations. Mere appearance in a document does not prove misconduct. At the same time, categorical claims that the men barely knew one another are inconsistent with photographs, video, public comments, and their participation in the same social environment.

Trump's later presidency increased the significance of the historical association. Decisions by his administration, political allies, and Justice Department concerning Epstein-related matters generated additional scrutiny. Those institutional questions must be evaluated separately from the earlier social relationship.

The Trump case shows why named analysis requires chronology. He was not merely a random name in an address book. He was a documented social acquaintance who spoke positively about Epstein. Yet the available public record does not establish that his relationship had the same post-conviction duration or institutional form as those of Prince Andrew, Jes Staley, Leon Black, or Børge Brende.

### 5.4 Ehud Barak's Meetings, Investments, and Political Position

Ehud Barak's relationship with Epstein connected the network to Israeli politics, defense, intelligence-adjacent technology, and international investment. Barak had served as prime minister of Israel, defense minister, foreign minister, and chief of the general staff of the Israel Defense Forces. His stature gave Epstein access to a person with extraordinary political, military, and diplomatic experience.

Barak met Epstein repeatedly after Epstein's 2008 conviction. He acknowledged visiting Epstein's Manhattan residence and being present at other meetings and social occasions. Photographs showed him entering Epstein's townhouse with his face partially covered by cold-weather clothing, creating public controversy when the images emerged.

Barak stated that his meetings concerned business, philanthropy, science, and introductions to prominent people. He denied attending sex parties or meeting underage girls through Epstein. No public evidence has established that Barak participated in Epstein's sexual crimes.

The business dimension is nevertheless significant. Epstein was involved in financing or facilitating investment connected to Reporty Homeland Security, later known as Carbyne, an emergency communications technology company with which Barak was associated. The company's links to Israeli security and intelligence veterans added strategic importance to the relationship.

Epstein's role again combined money, introduction, and prestige. He could provide or arrange capital. Barak could provide political credibility, technological connections, and access to Israeli and international networks. Their association was reciprocal even if the stated business purposes were legitimate.

Barak also acknowledged attending a gathering at Epstein's residence where other prominent figures were present. Such meetings reinforced Epstein's function as a host at the intersection of politics, finance, science, and technology.

The post-conviction timing makes the relationship difficult to reduce to ignorance. Barak was an experienced political leader with access to advisers, security professionals, diplomats, and public information. He later stated that he regretted knowing Epstein and would not have maintained contact had he understood the full circumstances.

The question remains why the known conviction did not itself trigger exclusion. The explanation cannot rest solely on incomplete knowledge of later allegations. Epstein's status as a convicted offender was enough to require scrutiny.

Barak's continued engagement helped Epstein portray himself as relevant to geopolitical and technological affairs. Contact with a former Israeli prime minister and defense minister elevated Epstein beyond ordinary finance or philanthropy. It placed him near questions of national security, emergency technology, diplomacy, and international investment.

**5.5 Peter Mandelson's Political and Commercial Network**

Peter Mandelson occupied an unusually valuable position within Epstein's network because his career connected British politics, European institutions, global trade, banking, corporate advice, and elite social life.

Mandelson was a major architect of the modern British Labour Party, served in senior cabinet positions, became a European commissioner, and later returned to government as business secretary. His career gave him relationships throughout London, Brussels, corporate boardrooms, and international policy circles.

Epstein's communications involving Mandelson show that he viewed the British politician as someone who could be connected to bankers, business leaders, and government officials. Mandelson appeared within Epstein's Davos-related brokerage, including the proposed connection with Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem and contacts involving Jes Staley and British economic officials.

The relationship between Mandelson and Epstein extended beyond a single introduction. Communications revealed familiarity and a tone that suggested continuing contact. Mandelson stayed at Epstein-associated properties and moved through social networks involving Staley and other financial figures.

Mandelson later expressed regret about the relationship and characterized Epstein as a persuasive manipulator. Such descriptions may be accurate as far as they go. Epstein clearly cultivated people strategically. Yet manipulation does not fully explain why an experienced political operator continued the association, particularly after Epstein's conviction.

Mandelson was not inexperienced in reputational risk. His political career had included intense media scrutiny, government ethics controversies, and close interaction with business interests. He understood the importance of appearances, disclosure, and personal relationships.

Epstein offered him access to financiers, billionaires, international executives, and private gatherings. Mandelson offered Epstein political credibility and connections across Britain, Europe, and global commerce. The exchange did not require a formal contract. Their mutual usefulness was embedded in the network.

The Mandelson relationship is particularly important because it overlapped with Jes Staley. Epstein stood between a senior banker and one of Britain's most influential political figures. This triangle illustrates his ability to connect financial institutions with political power through private channels.

Mandelson's later prominence meant that the historical relationship continued to carry institutional consequences. A person does not cease representing his networks when he leaves a ministerial office. Former officials retain contacts, knowledge, prestige, and the capacity to influence decisions.

For Epstein, Mandelson was therefore not simply a former politician. He was a durable bridge linking government, banking, Europe, business, and Davos.

**5.6 Terje Rød-Larsen, Diplomacy, and the International Peace Institute**

Terje Rød-Larsen's relationship with Epstein demonstrates how private money entered an institution devoted publicly to diplomacy, peace, and international cooperation.

Rød-Larsen had achieved international recognition through his role in the Oslo peace process and later served in senior United Nations positions. As president of the International Peace Institute, he led an organization located near the United Nations and connected to diplomats, policymakers, foundations, and governments.

Epstein-linked foundations contributed approximately $650,000 to IPI over several years after Epstein's 2008 conviction. Rød-Larsen also received a personal loan of approximately $130,000 from Epstein, which he said he later repaid.

These financial ties were not adequately disclosed to the institution's board at the time. Rød-Larsen resigned after the relationship became public and acknowledged serious errors in judgment.

The payments must be understood in relation to Rød-Larsen's role as a gatekeeper. He did not merely accept money. He introduced Epstein to other influential people, including Børge Brende. His diplomatic reputation supplied credibility that Epstein could transfer into new relationships.

The sequence was consequential. Epstein supported an institution led by Rød-Larsen. Epstein also lent money personally to Rød-Larsen. Rød-Larsen then opened doors into diplomatic and WEF circles.

No public record establishes an explicit agreement exchanging donations or a loan for introductions. The pattern nevertheless demonstrates how financial dependence and social sponsorship could coexist. Even without a stated bargain, the recipient of money may become more willing to include, defend, or introduce the benefactor.

IPI also benefited from Epstein's funding. The proportion of its total budget may have been limited, but the ethical issue did not depend on whether the donations were indispensable. An organization associated with peace and international responsibility accepted money from a convicted sexual offender and failed to ensure transparent board oversight.

The institutional mission intensified the contradiction. Organizations devoted to diplomacy and moral leadership rely heavily on credibility. Their authority is not based principally on coercion or profit. It depends on the belief that they apply standards consistent with their public values.

Rød-Larsen's role therefore combined diplomatic access, institutional legitimacy, financial benefit, and personal obligation. He became one of the clearest examples of how Epstein converted money into entry at the highest levels of international affairs.

**5.7 Political Prestige as Reputational Protection**

Each named political relationship supplied Epstein with a different form of legitimacy.

Prince Andrew supplied royal prestige and entry into aristocratic and diplomatic circles.

Bill Clinton supplied former presidential stature and association with global philanthropy.

Donald Trump supplied membership in the Palm Beach and New York world of wealth, property, entertainment, and political ambition.

Ehud Barak supplied the prestige of a former prime minister, defense minister, and military commander.

Peter Mandelson supplied access to British government, European institutions, global trade, and finance.

Terje Rød-Larsen supplied diplomatic standing, United Nations connections, and introductions into international organizations.

Børge Brende supplied direct access to the leadership of the World Economic Forum.

These associations did not merely add famous names to Epstein's contact list. They protected him from ordinary social judgment.

A newly introduced person might reasonably assume that a former president, prince, prime minister, foreign minister, or senior diplomat possessed better information than an outsider. If such figures continued to meet Epstein, the observer could conclude that the conviction had been misunderstood, exaggerated, resolved, or privately investigated.

This inference allowed political prestige to function as reputational protection. The powerful did not need to issue public declarations defending Epstein. Their continued presence around him performed the defense silently.

The protection was cumulative. Andrew's association could reassure a banker. Clinton's travel could impress a philanthropist. Barak's meetings could interest technology investors. Mandelson's contact could attract international business figures. Rød-Larsen's sponsorship could reassure Brende. Each relationship became evidence supporting the next.

This process also diffused accountability. Andrew could point to Epstein's other distinguished acquaintances. Brende could rely on Rød-Larsen's introduction. A banker could note Epstein's political contacts. A politician could observe that major banks continued to serve him. Everyone could assume that someone else knew more.

The result was a circular system of elite authentication. Epstein appeared legitimate because powerful people associated with him. Powerful people felt safer associating with him because he appeared legitimate.

His 2008 conviction should have broken the circle. Instead, several named relationships continued or began afterward. The persistence of contact indicates that political and institutional elites did not uniformly regard sexual exploitation of vulnerable girls as a decisive barrier to association.

That conclusion does not require the assertion that every associate shared Epstein's crimes. It requires recognition of the hierarchy of values revealed by their decisions. Access, money, opportunity, friendship, curiosity, philanthropy, business, and social advantage repeatedly prevailed over exclusion.

The political network therefore performed more than a decorative function. It helped sustain Epstein's capacity to operate. Royal and presidential associations made him appear important. Diplomatic contacts made him appear internationally consequential. Former ministers and prime ministers made his brokerage credible. Their presence told others that Epstein remained inside the world of legitimate power.

Epstein did not manufacture political prestige alone. Named political figures lent it to him.

**6. Bill Gates, Larry Summers, and Elite Philanthropic Brokerage**

Jeffrey Epstein's relationships with Bill Gates and Larry Summers reveal how philanthropy, academic prestige, financial influence, and personal access could be combined within a single network. These relationships were not peripheral to Epstein's post-conviction rehabilitation. They placed him near one of the world's most prominent philanthropists and one of the most influential economists and university leaders of his generation.

Gates and Summers did not occupy identical positions. Gates controlled immense private wealth and co-led a foundation capable of shaping global health, education, agriculture, and development. Summers had served as United States treasury secretary, president of Harvard University, director of the National Economic Council, and a senior figure in economic policy. Each possessed access to donors, political leaders, financiers, scholars, and international institutions.

Epstein offered himself as a bridge between these worlds. He could arrange meetings, identify wealthy prospective donors, introduce academics to financiers, discuss large-scale philanthropic projects, and present himself as someone who understood both the ambitions of billionaires and the institutional needs of universities and foundations.

The relationship was especially important because it continued after Epstein's 2008 conviction. By the time Gates began meeting Epstein, Epstein's criminal status was public. Summers

likewise continued corresponding with and meeting him after the conviction. These were not encounters that occurred before anyone could reasonably have known about Epstein's offenses.

The central question is therefore not whether Gates or Summers participated in Epstein's sexual crimes. The public record does not establish that they did. The question is why a convicted sexual offender remained useful to people with extraordinary resources, staff, advisers, security, lawyers, and access to information.

Their continued engagement helped restore Epstein's status. A man meeting privately with Bill Gates and corresponding regularly with Larry Summers could present himself as a legitimate participant in global philanthropy, economic policy, and elite intellectual life. Gates and Summers, in turn, appear to have treated Epstein as someone who might facilitate useful relationships, fundraising, advice, or access.

This was philanthropic brokerage: the conversion of wealth, introductions, institutional ambition, and personal proximity into mutual advantage.

**6.1 Bill Gates's Meetings with Epstein**

Bill Gates began meeting Epstein after Epstein's conviction. The meetings included visits to Epstein's Manhattan residence and discussions involving philanthropy, science, wealthy donors, and possible large-scale charitable initiatives.

Gates later described his engagement with Epstein as a serious error in judgment. He stated that the purpose of the meetings was to explore whether Epstein could help raise substantial funds for global health and other philanthropic projects. He denied having a friendship with Epstein and emphasized that no useful philanthropic relationship ultimately resulted.

The distinction between a friendship and a strategic relationship is relevant but not exculpatory. Gates did not need to regard Epstein as a close friend for the association to provide Epstein with extraordinary legitimacy. Agreeing to repeated private meetings was itself consequential.

Gates was not an inexperienced philanthropist seeking his first donor. He co-chaired one of the largest private foundations in history. The Gates Foundation already maintained relationships with governments, international organizations, corporations, wealthy families, and major donors. Gates had direct access to heads of state, chief executives, financiers, scientists, and philanthropic leaders around the world.

This makes the stated need for Epstein's help especially significant. Epstein must have appeared to offer something that Gates or his advisers believed could not be obtained as easily through ordinary channels. That value may have included access to particular wealthy individuals, willingness to coordinate private giving, familiarity with unconventional donor structures, or the ability to convene people discreetly.

The meetings also reflected a failure of screening. Gates had access to professional staff, legal advisers, security teams, foundation officials, and public information. Epstein's conviction did not require investigative expertise to discover. The problem was not that his criminal history was impossibly obscure. The problem was that it was not treated as disqualifying before the meetings proceeded.

Gates later acknowledged that spending time with Epstein gave Epstein credibility. This admission identifies the core reputational effect. Epstein did not need Gates to publicly endorse him. Private access to Gates was itself an endorsement that could be communicated selectively to others.

A person invited to meet Epstein could be told that Gates had met with him. A prospective donor could infer that the world's most prominent philanthropist had found Epstein worth consulting. An academic or investor could conclude that Epstein retained standing within the highest philanthropic circles despite his conviction.

The Gates meetings therefore mattered even though no major joint philanthropic project emerged. The meeting itself was the product Epstein could display.

**6.2 The Significance of Meeting After the Conviction**

The post-conviction timing changes the moral character of the Gates relationship.

Before Epstein's 2008 conviction, a person might plausibly argue that Epstein's criminal conduct was concealed or known only through private rumor. After the conviction, his status as a registered sex offender was part of the public record. Continued engagement required either ignorance that should not have existed, deliberate avoidance, reliance on reassuring intermediaries, or a conclusion that the potential benefits justified the reputational and moral risk.

Gates's later description of the meetings as a mistake acknowledges poor judgment but does not fully explain the decision process. Who recommended Epstein? What due diligence was performed? Which staff members knew about the proposed meetings? Did anyone raise objections? Why were those objections insufficient, if they existed?

These questions matter because decisions made by people at Gates's level are rarely purely personal. Meetings are scheduled by staff. Security personnel review locations. Advisers prepare background material. Foundation officials may discuss the purpose. Even a supposedly private meeting can involve an institutional chain.

The Gates case therefore illustrates how elite responsibility can be dispersed. Gates may describe the meeting as a personal judgment. Staff may regard the decision as belonging to

Gates. Foundation personnel may say the project never became official. Each description can be technically accurate while obscuring the collective machinery that enabled the contact.

The conviction also raises the issue of moral proportionality. The possible benefit was additional philanthropic funding. The known cost was lending status to a convicted sexual offender. The decision to proceed suggests that the possibility of raising more money was treated as sufficient reason to overlook or minimize Epstein's past.

That calculation reveals a broader feature of elite philanthropy. Large charitable ambitions can become a justification for engaging morally compromised people. The scale of the intended good is invoked to excuse the means used to pursue it.

In this framework, Epstein could be tolerated because the proposed outcome was global health, scientific advancement, or large-scale giving. Philanthropic purpose became a form of moral cover.

**6.3 Larry Summers as an Institutional Bridge**

Larry Summers occupied a distinctive place in Epstein's network because his career connected government, academia, finance, philanthropy, and international economic policy.

As treasury secretary, Summers had stood at the center of United States economic power. As president of Harvard, he led one of the world's most prestigious universities. As a White House economic adviser, commentator, professor, and board member, he remained influential across policy and finance.

Epstein's relationship with Summers extended across several of these domains. Their communications involved philanthropy, academic matters, political discussion, personal advice, and introductions. Summers participated in meetings arranged or facilitated by Epstein, including Davos-related activity and international discussions.

The relationship continued after Epstein's conviction. This persistence is important because Summers was not merely an academic unaware of public controversy. He had spent his career in institutions that depended on legal review, reputational management, political judgment, and donor scrutiny.

Summers's value to Epstein was substantial.

His Harvard connection offered access to faculty, administrators, donors, and scientific prestige.

His government service offered proximity to policymakers and international economic institutions.

His relationships in finance linked Epstein to investors, bankers, and wealthy families.

His intellectual reputation allowed Epstein to portray their exchanges as serious discussions among sophisticated thinkers.

Summers also appears to have used Epstein as a sounding board and adviser in personal matters. This is revealing because it shows a level of trust beyond formal philanthropic contact. Epstein was not merely an address used to arrange a meeting. He became someone Summers consulted.

Such trust strengthened Epstein's standing. If a former treasury secretary and Harvard president treated him as a confidant, others could assume that Epstein possessed unusual insight, discretion, or wisdom.

Summers later expressed regret over the relationship. Regret is relevant, but it came after Epstein's arrest and death, when the reputational cost had become unavoidable. During the years of contact, Epstein's prior conviction had not prevented continued engagement.

The Summers relationship therefore demonstrates how Epstein moved through institutions by attaching himself to individuals whose careers crossed several sectors. Summers was not one node. He was a bridge among many.

**6.4 Philanthropic Fundraising and Epstein's Proposed Role**

Epstein's proposed role in philanthropy was not simply that of donor. He presented himself as a fundraiser, strategist, connector, and organizer capable of assembling very large gifts from wealthy individuals.

This role was attractive because major philanthropic projects often depend on coordination among several donors. A single billionaire may be willing to contribute only if others participate. Foundations may seek matching funds, pooled giving, or public-private partnerships. Someone who can persuade multiple wealthy participants to commit simultaneously can become extremely valuable.

Epstein appears to have suggested that he could perform this function for Gates-related philanthropy. He could identify billionaires, arrange private discussions, and create structures through which donors might contribute large sums while receiving influence, recognition, tax advantages, or association with prestigious causes.

The feasibility of such a plan depended on Epstein's claim to access. He needed Gates to believe he could reach donors. He needed donors to believe he had Gates's confidence. Each side's interest validated him to the other.

This was a classic brokerage structure.

Gates supplied philanthropic scale and global legitimacy.

Epstein supplied claims of access to additional wealth.

Prospective donors supplied money and social proof.

Epstein stood between them as the person who could make the arrangement possible.

Even if no large fund was ultimately created, the discussions themselves increased Epstein's standing. He could credibly state that he was involved in conversations concerning major global philanthropy.

The ambiguity between personal and institutional activity again benefited him. Gates could regard the meetings as exploratory. The foundation could say that no formal project existed. Epstein could nevertheless use the proximity as evidence of his importance.

Philanthropic brokerage also allowed Epstein to combine several identities. He could appear as a financier because he discussed large sums. He could appear as a humanitarian because the proposed projects involved health or development. He could appear as an intellectual because scientists and policy experts were involved. He could appear as a global strategist because governments and international institutions might participate.

This combination made philanthropy an ideal vehicle for reputational rehabilitation.

**6.5 Boris Nikolic and the Gates–Epstein Intermediary Network**

Boris Nikolic was a physician and biotechnology adviser who served as a senior scientific adviser to Bill Gates. His presence in the Gates–Epstein network illustrates how relationships were often mediated through advisers rather than formed directly.

Nikolic moved within the worlds of science, biotechnology, investment, and philanthropy. He was connected to Gates's interests in health and innovation and was therefore positioned to evaluate projects, researchers, and potential philanthropic opportunities.

Epstein's contact with Nikolic gave him another route into Gates's circle. Through Nikolic, Epstein could present scientific ideas, discuss investments, identify researchers, or propose meetings. Nikolic's professional standing could also reassure others that Epstein's interest in science was serious.

Nikolic later attracted public attention because Epstein named him as a successor executor in a will signed shortly before Epstein's death. Nikolic stated that he had not been consulted, had no intention of serving, and was shocked by the designation.

The appearance of his name in the will does not prove that Nikolic had agreed to manage Epstein's estate or understood Epstein's intentions. It does, however, show that Epstein regarded him as sufficiently significant to place him in an important legal document.

Why Epstein selected him remains uncertain. The designation may have reflected trust, an attempt to create obligation, a symbolic gesture, or a unilateral decision with no expectation that Nikolic would accept. The available record does not justify a definitive conclusion.

What is clear is that Nikolic formed part of the intermediary structure between Epstein and Gates. Elite networks rarely operate through principals alone. Advisers, scientists, investment managers, assistants, lawyers, and foundation officials create the pathways through which access becomes possible.

By cultivating Nikolic, Epstein increased his ability to reach Gates and to participate in discussions involving science, health, biotechnology, and philanthropy.

**6.6 Reputation, Philanthropy, and Moral Camouflage**

Philanthropy gave Epstein a particularly powerful form of reputational cover because charitable activity is normally associated with generosity, public service, and moral concern.

A donor to science can be portrayed as a patron of knowledge.

A participant in global health discussions can be portrayed as a humanitarian.

A fundraiser for universities can be portrayed as a supporter of education.

A person arranging meetings among philanthropists can be portrayed as helping solve major social problems.

These identities did not erase Epstein's conviction, but they could make it appear secondary. Associates could tell themselves that they were engaging him for a higher purpose. The larger the proposed philanthropic benefit, the easier it became to rationalize the contact.

This dynamic affected both Gates and Summers.

Gates could frame the meetings as an effort to obtain more resources for global health.

Summers could frame communications and introductions as academic, philanthropic, economic, or intellectual exchanges.

Nikolic could interact with Epstein through scientific and investment discussions.

Each participant had access to a respectable explanation.

Epstein benefited because respectable purposes obscured the reputational cost of dealing with him. He did not need others to deny his conviction. He needed them to believe that the work under discussion was important enough to justify continued contact.

This is moral camouflage rather than simple deception. The underlying facts remain visible, but they are covered by a narrative of social benefit.

Philanthropy can be especially vulnerable to this problem because it is dominated by private discretion. Wealthy donors decide which causes matter, which institutions receive support, and which experts gain access. Public accountability is limited even when the decisions affect global policy.

Epstein understood that donors, universities, scientists, and political figures all needed one another. Donors wanted prestige and influence. Universities wanted money. Scientists wanted funding. Political leaders wanted philanthropic partnerships. Foundations wanted access to governments and wealthy contributors.

By standing between these groups, Epstein could become useful despite his criminal record.

The Gates and Summers relationships therefore reveal more than individual errors in judgment. They show how elite philanthropy can create a protected environment in which morally compromised intermediaries remain welcome because they promise money, access, and large-scale outcomes.

The central fact is not that Epstein successfully completed a major philanthropic project with Gates or Summers. He did not need to. His achievement was gaining the meetings, correspondence, and trust necessary to appear capable of doing so.

That appearance restored status.

Gates gave Epstein proximity to the world's most visible philanthropic enterprise.

Summers gave him access to government, Harvard, finance, and intellectual prestige.

Nikolic gave him entry into scientific and biotechnology networks.

Together, these relationships helped Epstein present himself as a participant in global problem-solving rather than as a convicted offender seeking rehabilitation.

The moral contradiction is severe. Philanthropy claims to protect the vulnerable and improve human welfare. Yet some of its most powerful figures were willing to consult a man whose known history involved the exploitation of vulnerable girls.

The proposed charitable ends did not merely coexist with the moral failure. They helped conceal it.

**7. Harvard, MIT, Joi Ito, and the Academic Rehabilitation of Epstein**

Jeffrey Epstein's academic relationships gave him a form of legitimacy that money and political access alone could not provide. Association with Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, prominent scientists, economists, linguists, psychologists, and technology leaders allowed him to present himself as a patron of advanced knowledge. He was no longer merely a wealthy man with an obscure financial career. He appeared to be a participant in serious discussions about evolution, genetics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, cosmology, mathematics, and the future of humanity.

This identity was cultivated deliberately. Epstein funded research, hosted scientists, attended academic gatherings, arranged meetings, and surrounded himself with recognizable intellectual figures. He invited academics into his homes and placed himself near institutions whose reputations had been accumulated over centuries. Their prestige became transferable.

The academic network was especially important after his 2008 conviction. Harvard and MIT were not casual social environments. They possessed administrators, development offices, faculty committees, legal counsel, donor databases, public-relations staff, and institutional procedures. Their leaders knew how to investigate donors, assess reputational risk, and restrict access when they chose to do so.

Yet Epstein's relationships with academics and academic institutions continued. Some faculty members accepted meetings, hospitality, or funding. Some administrators treated his money as useful despite its source. At MIT, efforts were made to conceal the visibility of his donations. At Harvard, his earlier philanthropy and relationships continued to provide an intellectual identity that outlived the formal period of his largest gifts.

The named figures in this history include Martin Nowak, Lawrence Krauss, Steven Pinker, Noam Chomsky, Joi Ito, Nicholas Negroponte, Marvin Minsky, Seth Lloyd, George Church, and others whose degrees of association varied widely. They should not be assigned identical conduct or motives. Their collective significance lies in the way their reputations helped preserve Epstein's standing as a scientific patron.

Academic rehabilitation did not require a formal declaration that Epstein had been forgiven. It occurred through meetings, invitations, correspondence, donations, dinners, photographs, intellectual discussion, and institutional access. Each interaction suggested that his conviction had not made him unacceptable to the world's most prestigious intellectual communities.

### 7.1 Harvard University and Epstein's Scientific Patronage

Harvard played a foundational role in constructing Epstein's identity as a patron of science. Before his conviction, Epstein donated millions of dollars to the university, most prominently in support of the Program for Evolutionary Dynamics led by mathematical biologist Martin Nowak.

Nowak's program studied evolutionary processes using mathematics, biology, game theory, and related fields. Its subject matter aligned closely with Epstein's desire to associate himself with ambitious questions about human nature, genetics, intelligence, and the future of life.

The relationship benefited both sides. Harvard and Nowak received substantial funding. Epstein received association with one of the most prestigious universities in the world and with a scientific program whose intellectual ambitions matched the image he wished to project.

The importance of the gift extended beyond its monetary value. Harvard's acceptance of Epstein as a donor gave him a recognized institutional role. He could describe himself as a benefactor of serious science. He could invite academics to meetings and present himself not as an outsider seeking prestige but as someone who had already earned institutional recognition through philanthropy.

Epstein maintained close contact with Nowak and the Program for Evolutionary Dynamics. He visited Harvard, met faculty members, and participated in gatherings involving scientists and intellectuals. His relationship with the program reportedly continued in various forms even after his conviction, despite restrictions that Harvard later said were placed on his formal involvement.

The distinction between formal and informal access became critical. An institution could state that Epstein was no longer an approved donor or official participant while faculty members continued meeting him privately or receiving him socially. The formal boundary protected the university's public position, but informal relationships preserved much of Epstein's intellectual access.

Nowak's role was especially consequential because he functioned as more than the recipient of a past donation. His program became a hub through which Epstein could meet additional scientists. The prestige of Harvard and the legitimacy of Nowak's research created an environment in which Epstein's presence appeared intellectually purposeful.

Harvard later conducted a review of its relationships with Epstein and acknowledged failures involving his access after conviction. The university concluded that Epstein had received benefits from association with faculty and programs even when he no longer held a legitimate institutional role.

The Harvard case demonstrates that donor influence is not limited to the period when money changes hands. A large gift can create durable relationships, gratitude, institutional memory, and personal loyalty. The donor's name may remain connected to a program long after the original transaction.

Epstein's earlier money continued generating later access. The donation had become social capital.

**7.2 Lawrence Krauss, Steven Pinker, and Elite Intellectual Association**

Lawrence Krauss and Steven Pinker illustrate two different ways prominent intellectuals became part of Epstein's scientific and social network.

Krauss was a theoretical physicist and public intellectual known for writing and speaking about cosmology, science, religion, and the origin of the universe. His public stature made him valuable to Epstein, who sought association with scientists capable of conveying intellectual seriousness to broad audiences.

Krauss participated in gatherings connected to Epstein and defended aspects of Epstein's continued inclusion after the conviction. His willingness to remain within the network helped communicate that Epstein was still acceptable among respected scientists.

The importance of such association did not depend on Krauss endorsing Epstein's criminal conduct. Continued social or intellectual engagement was enough to produce reputational value. A convicted offender surrounded by prominent physicists, biologists, mathematicians, and authors could present himself as a patron whose scientific commitments deserved to be considered separately from his crimes.

Pinker's relationship was more limited but still instructive. Pinker, a Harvard psychologist and widely known author, appeared in Epstein-related social and intellectual contexts and was asked to provide linguistic analysis concerning wording relevant to Epstein's legal defense.

Pinker later stated that he regretted the involvement and had performed the linguistic analysis at the request of Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz rather than as part of a close personal relationship with Epstein. That distinction is relevant. It also reveals how Epstein's network operated through intermediaries.

Pinker did not need to be a close friend to contribute intellectual authority to a matter benefiting Epstein. A trusted colleague could make the request. The academic could treat it as a narrow technical question. Epstein received the prestige of the expertise without requiring a direct or extensive relationship.

This pattern allowed responsibility to be fragmented. The scientist answered a technical question. The lawyer used the answer. The institution regarded the matter as private. No single participant needed to consider the cumulative effect.

Krauss and Pinker should not be treated as equivalent. Krauss had a more visible and continuing association with Epstein-linked activities. Pinker's documented role was narrower. Their common relevance lies in the transfer of intellectual legitimacy.

Epstein surrounded himself with people whose names signified rationality, expertise, and scientific authority. Their presence countered the image of him as a socially disqualified offender. The public could see a convicted man. His guests could see a room filled with professors.

Academic reputation became a shield.

**7.3 Noam Chomsky and Post-Conviction Meetings**

Noam Chomsky's meetings with Epstein are especially significant because they occurred after Epstein's conviction and involved one of the most internationally recognized intellectuals of the modern era.

Chomsky was known not only for linguistics but for decades of political criticism directed at concentrated power, American foreign policy, corporate influence, and elite hypocrisy. His association with Epstein therefore carried symbolic weight beyond ordinary academic contact.

Records indicated that Chomsky met with Epstein and participated in arrangements involving travel, meals, or intellectual discussion. Chomsky later stated that the meetings concerned political and academic subjects and that he had no knowledge of Epstein's later criminal conduct beyond what was publicly known.

He also argued that Epstein had served his sentence and that private meetings were not matters requiring public explanation. That response exposed a central tension in the academic network.

A completed sentence may satisfy a legal obligation. It does not compel universities, professors, or public intellectuals to restore social access. The issue was not whether Epstein possessed a legal right to speak with academics. It was whether academics claiming moral and political authority should have treated him as an acceptable interlocutor.

Chomsky's stature gave the relationship unusual value. Epstein could say that he discussed politics, language, international affairs, or philosophy with one of the world's most famous intellectuals. The content of the discussion was less important than the status of the participant.

The relationship also demonstrates how intellectual curiosity can become a moral exemption. Academics may believe that discussion itself is neutral and that ideas should be separated from

the character of the person presenting them. In ordinary circumstances, this openness can be valuable. In Epstein's case, it allowed a convicted sexual offender to convert intellectual conversation into social legitimacy.

Chomsky's willingness to meet him communicated that Epstein remained worthy of serious engagement. Whatever Chomsky intended, the reputational benefit flowed to Epstein.

The moral contradiction was especially sharp because Chomsky's public work often condemned systems in which powerful people escaped accountability. Yet in this private setting, Epstein's status and access appeared sufficient to preserve the relationship.

The case illustrates how elite criticism can coexist with elite accommodation. A person may denounce structural injustice publicly while privately applying a more permissive standard to a well-connected offender who offers interesting conversation, hospitality, or access.

**7.4 Joi Ito and the MIT Media Lab**

Joi Ito's relationship with Epstein became one of the clearest documented examples of institutional accommodation and concealed donor influence.

Ito served as director of the MIT Media Lab, an institution associated with technological innovation, entrepreneurship, design, artificial intelligence, digital culture, and futurist research. The Media Lab depended heavily on relationships with wealthy donors, corporations, investors, and sponsors.

Epstein offered precisely the combination of money and access that such an institution valued. He could donate directly, introduce Ito to other wealthy individuals, and help expand the Media Lab's fundraising network.

The central issue was not only that MIT accepted Epstein-linked money after his conviction. It was that people within the institution recognized the reputational danger and attempted to reduce the visibility of his role.

Epstein was reportedly treated as a disqualified or unacceptable donor at the university level while Ito and the Media Lab continued to engage him. Donations were accepted in ways designed to avoid public recognition. Internal communications described strategies for concealing or minimizing his involvement.

This transforms the case from simple ignorance into something more serious. The institution knew there was a problem. The solution was not immediate exclusion. It was discretion.

Ito also received money from Epstein for investment funds or personal financial activities separate from the Media Lab. This dual relationship blurred institutional fundraising and private

benefit. Epstein was simultaneously a donor, connector, adviser, and source of investment capital.

The relationship provided Epstein with substantial returns.

He gained continued association with MIT.

He gained access to faculty, researchers, entrepreneurs, and wealthy technology figures.

He gained evidence that a leading innovation institution still considered him useful after conviction.

He gained the loyalty or gratitude associated with directing money toward Ito's projects.

Ito gained donations, investment support, introductions, and the possibility of cultivating additional wealthy benefactors.

The relationship ended only after investigative reporting exposed its extent. Ito resigned from the Media Lab and other positions. MIT commissioned an external review of its handling of Epstein-related donations.

The review documented serious failures but framed much of the conduct through procedural categories such as donor vetting, disclosure, and institutional policy. Those categories were necessary but incomplete.

The deeper failure was moral. Ito and others understood that Epstein's name could not withstand public scrutiny. They nevertheless wanted the money and access he provided. Concealment allowed them to obtain the benefit while attempting to avoid the reputational cost.

This was not academic innocence. It was institutional calculation.

**7.5 Nicholas Negroponte and Institutional Defense**

Nicholas Negroponte, founder of the MIT Media Lab, became an important figure in the controversy because he publicly defended the earlier decision to accept Epstein's money.

At a faculty meeting following exposure of the relationship, Negroponte stated that he had advised Ito to take the funding and that, given the same circumstances, he would make the same decision again.

The statement was remarkable because it expressed openly the utilitarian reasoning often concealed beneath institutional language. Epstein's money could support research. The research was considered valuable. Therefore, accepting the money could be justified despite the donor's criminal history.

Negroponte later apologized or clarified aspects of his remarks, but the initial statement revealed the underlying hierarchy of values.

The donor was morally compromised.

The funds were useful.

The institution believed it could separate the money from the person.

The anticipated scientific benefit outweighed the obligation to reject him.

This reasoning ignored the benefits Epstein received in return. A donation is not morally purified when transferred to a university. The donor receives association, access, gratitude, influence, and reputational rehabilitation. Accepting the money therefore does not merely redirect tainted wealth toward good purposes. It participates in an exchange.

Negroponte's position also demonstrated how institutional loyalty can become defensive solidarity. Rather than centering the victims or asking why Epstein was allowed near the institution, the argument centered the needs of research and the difficulty of fundraising.

The university's aspirations became more important than the moral message conveyed by accepting the donor.

This defense is significant because it prevents the MIT episode from being dismissed as the isolated mistake of Joi Ito. Negroponte was a foundational figure in the Media Lab's culture. His response suggested that the willingness to accommodate Epstein was consistent with a broader institutional ethos in which unconventional wealth and powerful patrons were prized.

The Media Lab celebrated boundary-breaking, disruption, and freedom from conventional constraints. Those values could encourage creativity. They could also weaken moral boundaries when a donor appeared exciting, connected, or useful.

Epstein fit the mythology of the unconventional patron. He presented himself as wealthy, intellectually adventurous, skeptical of ordinary rules, and willing to finance speculative ideas.

The same characteristics that should have triggered scrutiny may have increased his appeal.

### 7.6 Marvin Minsky and the Problem of Disputed Allegations

Marvin Minsky was a pioneering figure in artificial intelligence and a co-founder of the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. His name became associated with Epstein through documented participation in an Epstein-funded scientific gathering and through a later allegation by Virginia Giuffre.

Giuffre alleged that Epstein directed her to have sexual contact with Minsky during a gathering in the United States Virgin Islands. Minsky died before the allegation became widely public and therefore never responded directly. His family and defenders disputed the claim and argued that available circumstances did not support it.

The allegation must be treated carefully. It appeared in testimony connected to litigation, but it was not adjudicated in a criminal trial. There is no public judicial finding that Minsky committed the alleged act.

Analytical restraint does not require erasing the allegation. Nor does acknowledgment of the allegation justify presenting it as proven fact.

What is documented is that Minsky participated in Epstein-associated scientific activity and was present within the intellectual network Epstein cultivated. Epstein funded conferences and gatherings that brought together scientists, technologists, and thinkers. These events allowed him to combine academic prestige with private hospitality.

Minsky's presence benefited Epstein regardless of whether the disputed allegation was true. A founder of artificial intelligence attending an Epstein-supported event strengthened Epstein's claim to be a serious patron of advanced science.

The allegation also raises broader questions about the environments Epstein created. Scientific gatherings held in private or resort settings could blur academic activity and personal hospitality. Participants might regard themselves as attending conferences while Epstein controlled the location, accommodations, guests, and surrounding social conditions.

This structure placed intellectual prestige inside an environment organized by a sexual predator.

The Minsky case therefore has two distinct layers.

The first is the documented academic association.

The second is a serious but disputed allegation concerning sexual conduct.

Conflating them would weaken the paper. Ignoring either would also be misleading.

The larger institutional question remains even without resolving the allegation: why did leading scientists accept Epstein's funding and hospitality, and what did their participation permit him to represent?

**7.7 Science as Prestige Laundering**

Epstein's scientific patronage functioned as prestige laundering because it converted money into association with knowledge, discovery, and human progress.

Finance alone could make him wealthy.

Politics could make him connected.

Science could make him appear enlightened.

This distinction mattered because scientific prestige carries a particular moral authority. Scientists are commonly associated with rationality, evidence, intellectual honesty, and service to humanity. Universities such as Harvard and MIT claim not only excellence but public purpose.

By placing himself among scientists, Epstein borrowed these qualities.

Martin Nowak's evolutionary research gave him association with advanced mathematical biology.

Lawrence Krauss connected him to cosmology and public science.

Steven Pinker connected him to psychology, language, and popular intellectual culture.

Noam Chomsky connected him to linguistics and political thought.

Joi Ito connected him to digital innovation and entrepreneurial technology.

Nicholas Negroponte connected him to the founding mythology of the Media Lab.

Marvin Minsky connected him to the origins of artificial intelligence.

Seth Lloyd connected him to quantum information and computation.

George Church connected him to genetics and biotechnology.

Each relationship added another field to Epstein's intellectual identity.

The individual academics may have believed they were attending a dinner, discussing an idea, seeking research support, or meeting a donor. Epstein assembled these separate acts into a larger social product: the image of himself as a patron at the center of modern science.

The laundering process operated through accumulation. One meeting could be incidental. A network of renowned scientists created a reputation.

This reputation then became useful outside academia. A banker could be impressed by Epstein's scientific connections. A philanthropist could regard him as knowledgeable about research. A political leader could see him as an adviser on technology. A wealthy donor could assume that Harvard and MIT had vetted him.

Academic prestige therefore circulated through the rest of the network.

The process continued after conviction because institutions and individuals treated scientific benefit as separable from moral responsibility. Research needed funding. Professors enjoyed access to donors. Administrators sought wealthy patrons. Intellectuals valued unusual conversations. Each person could describe his own involvement narrowly.

Epstein alone saw the cumulative system.

He understood that money given to a university purchased more than research. It purchased access to people whose reputations could rehabilitate him.

He understood that hosting scientists purchased more than conversation. It created photographs, stories, and relationships that could be displayed to others.

He understood that intellectual curiosity could overcome social caution. Academics who might reject a conventional criminal could become intrigued by a wealthy patron offering speculative ideas, influential guests, and unrestricted funding.

The institutions also gained something from the ambiguity. They could accept resources while presenting the relationship as support for knowledge rather than association with the donor. When controversy emerged, they could distinguish official policy from faculty conduct, institutional donations from private meetings, or personal investments from university decisions.

These distinctions fragmented accountability but did not prevent the reputational exchange.

Harvard received money and scientific programming.

MIT received donations and donor introductions.

Faculty members received funding, hospitality, intellectual access, or social opportunity.

Epstein received the imprimatur of Harvard, MIT, and celebrated scholars.

The academic world did not merely fail to detect him. Portions of it found him useful.

That usefulness explains why his scientific identity survived his conviction. He was able to continue meeting prominent thinkers because access to money and other elites made him attractive. His criminal record became one fact among many rather than the decisive moral boundary it should have been.

The final contradiction is stark. Universities claim to educate moral and civic leaders. Scientists claim allegiance to evidence. Public intellectuals claim the authority to judge institutions and society. Yet Epstein's academic relationships show how quickly those standards could weaken in the presence of money, access, and intellectual flattery.

Academic prestige did not simply surround Epstein.

Named scholars and institutions helped manufacture it.

## 8. Social Gatekeepers, Hosts, and Reputation Managers

Jeffrey Epstein's continued access after his 2008 conviction depended not only on billionaires, politicians, bankers, and academics. It also depended on the people who managed social entry: companions, assistants, publicists, hosts, lawyers, advisers, and mutual acquaintances who decided who would be invited, introduced, seated together, photographed, defended, or quietly welcomed back.

These intermediaries were not peripheral to the network. They were the network's operating personnel. Powerful people rarely arrange every meeting themselves. Their schedules, invitations, dinners, travel, introductions, and communications are managed by others. A person seeking access to a prince, billionaire, university leader, former cabinet official, or major donor must ordinarily pass through several layers of screening.

Epstein's post-conviction survival shows that these layers did not operate primarily as barriers. In many cases, they became channels.

Ghislaine Maxwell connected Epstein to aristocratic, political, financial, and social circles. Peggy Siegal helped restore his visibility within New York's entertainment and media world. Kathryn Ruemmler entered his orbit through legal, financial, and political networks. Woody Allen and Soon-Yi Previn continued attending dinners and socializing with him after his conviction. Assistants coordinated travel, invitations, gifts, and messages. Lawyers and advisers offered professional legitimacy. Donors and academics introduced him into additional institutions.

Each individual relationship differed in seriousness. Some involved criminal conduct. Others involved social contact, professional meetings, gifts, or introductions. They should not be merged into a single accusation. Their cumulative effect, however, was unmistakable. Epstein remained socially functional because people continued treating him as someone whose invitations could be accepted and whose presence did not require immediate withdrawal.

This section examines the people who made that continued functionality possible.

### 8.1 Ghislaine Maxwell as Organizer and Social Bridge

Ghislaine Maxwell was the most important social intermediary in Epstein's world. She was not simply his companion or an acquaintance who happened to know influential people. She helped organize his domestic, social, and sexual environment and connected him to networks that his financial identity alone might not have reached.

Maxwell entered the relationship with substantial inherited social capital. She was the daughter of Robert Maxwell, the British newspaper proprietor who had cultivated relationships among politicians, intelligence officials, business leaders, and members of high society. She moved easily within British aristocratic circles and developed relationships in New York among financiers, philanthropists, celebrities, and social figures.

Her relationship with Prince Andrew was especially significant. Maxwell could introduce Epstein into a royal environment in which his own background would otherwise have been conspicuous. Andrew's friendship with her made Epstein's access appear socially authenticated. Epstein was no longer merely a wealthy American seeking proximity to royalty. He arrived through a woman already accepted within Andrew's circle.

Maxwell's role extended beyond introduction. Testimony and criminal proceedings established that she participated directly in the recruitment and grooming of girls for Epstein. She was convicted in federal court of offenses connected to that conduct. Her criminal responsibility distinguishes her from social contacts who were merely negligent, opportunistic, or morally indifferent.

Yet her function as a gatekeeper must also be understood separately from her role in the abuse. She managed relationships, hospitality, travel, household activity, and social presentation. She helped construct an environment in which Epstein could appear cultured, cosmopolitan, and connected.

A man living alone in a vast mansion and surrounded by very young women might have raised immediate alarm. Maxwell's presence altered the social appearance. She could function as hostess, conversational partner, organizer, and female reassurance. Guests arriving at Epstein's residence did not necessarily encounter a visibly isolated predator. They encountered a social setting managed by a well-connected British woman who appeared comfortable among royalty, financiers, scholars, and political figures.

This gendered function was important. Maxwell's presence could make other women less cautious. It could make male guests feel that the household had passed a basic social test. It could blur the distinction between Epstein's public dinners and the private system of exploitation occurring within the same properties.

Maxwell also understood the value of introductions. Her network included Prince Andrew and other members of British high society, American social figures, wealthy families, and people connected to politics and philanthropy. Every introduction increased Epstein's range. Every prominent person who accepted him made Maxwell's next introduction easier.

The relationship was mutually reinforcing. Epstein supplied money, residences, transportation, and access to wealthy men. Maxwell supplied social organization, recruitment, aristocratic connections, and legitimacy.

This was not a simple case of Epstein penetrating elite society through personal charm. Maxwell led him through doors she already knew how to open.

**8.2 Peggy Siegal and New York Social Rehabilitation**

Peggy Siegal occupied a different but highly consequential position. As a prominent entertainment publicist and organizer of screenings, dinners, and cultural events, she operated within New York's overlapping worlds of film, media, philanthropy, publishing, fashion, and wealth.

Her value lay not only in publicity but in curation. Siegal could decide who received invitations, who attended private screenings, who sat at dinners, and which people were placed together. In elite social environments, these decisions are forms of power. The guest list determines who is seen as acceptable.

Epstein's association with Siegal after his conviction demonstrates how social rehabilitation can occur without any formal declaration. He did not need a newspaper editorial announcing his return to respectable society. He needed invitations.

By including Epstein in private screenings, dinners, and cultural gatherings, Siegal helped place him back into rooms with prominent actors, directors, journalists, executives, philanthropists, and social figures. His presence among them implied that his conviction had not made him untouchable.

Siegal later expressed regret and said she had believed Epstein's account that he had served his sentence and had been rehabilitated. That explanation is important because it reveals the narrative through which elite reintegration was justified.

Epstein did not need to deny that he had been convicted. He could minimize the case, portray himself as having been treated unfairly, emphasize that his sentence was completed, and suggest that continued exclusion would be excessive. A socially connected intermediary willing to accept this account could then communicate rehabilitation through invitation.

The invitation itself became an endorsement.

A guest attending a Siegal event might see Epstein among familiar and respected people. The guest could assume that the host had considered the reputational issue. Another host might later conclude that Epstein was again acceptable because he had already appeared at established cultural events. Social acceptance reproduced itself through observation.

Siegal's role also illustrates the importance of entertainment and media networks in reputational recovery. Publicists do not merely promote films or individuals. They create environments in which journalists, celebrities, financiers, and cultural institutions interact. Access to those environments can reshape how a disgraced person is perceived.

Epstein's presence among film and media figures allowed him to appear less like a convicted offender seeking access and more like a familiar member of the New York social establishment. The very normality of the setting performed the rehabilitation.

The moral responsibility here differs from Maxwell's criminal role. Siegal was not convicted of facilitating Epstein's abuse. Her significance lies in helping normalize him after the conviction was known.

That normalization was not neutral. It supplied the social proof Epstein needed to continue entering other rooms.

**8.3 Kathryn Ruemmler and the Legal-Political Network**

Kathryn Ruemmler brought Epstein proximity to a different kind of prestige. She had served as White House counsel under President Barack Obama and later became a senior lawyer associated with Goldman Sachs. Her career connected presidential government, elite law, corporate finance, and institutional risk management.

Records and reporting showed that Ruemmler met Epstein after his conviction and was included in his calendars and communications. Epstein arranged meetings, offered gifts, and cultivated the relationship. He appeared to regard her as someone whose legal standing, political experience, and corporate connections could expand his network.

Ruemmler stated that she had known Epstein professionally and was unaware of the full extent of his crimes. She later expressed regret over the association. No public evidence established that she participated in Epstein's sexual misconduct.

The seriousness of the relationship lies elsewhere.

A former White House counsel was not an ordinary person unequipped to understand reputational danger. Her professional identity rested on legal judgment, institutional responsibility, and awareness of how personal relationships can affect public trust. When such a person accepted meetings or gifts from Epstein, the relationship carried more legitimating weight than ordinary social contact.

Epstein gained several potential benefits.

Ruemmler represented access to the Obama-era political and legal establishment.

Her later position connected her to one of the world's most powerful financial institutions.

Her legal reputation could reassure others that Epstein remained acceptable to sophisticated professionals.

Her presence in his calendar allowed him to claim proximity to senior government and corporate figures.

The gift relationship also matters. Gifts are not always bribes or evidence of explicit exchange. In elite networks, however, gifts create familiarity, obligation, and a sense of personal attention. Epstein was known for cultivating people through customized gestures, introductions, hospitality, and offers of assistance.

A recipient may regard each act as minor. The giver understands the accumulation.

Ruemmler's case therefore illustrates how Epstein moved through professional networks by personalizing them. He did not merely request a formal consultation. He created a social-professional relationship that blurred advice, friendship, hospitality, and influence.

The legal profession can also provide a powerful form of reputational cover. If prominent lawyers continue dealing with a convicted person, outsiders may assume that the relevant legal issues have been reviewed. A person may reason that a former White House counsel would not meet someone who remained seriously dangerous.

That assumption may be false, but it is socially powerful.

Ruemmler did not need to publicly defend Epstein. Her willingness to engage him could itself be interpreted as professional validation.

**8.4 Woody Allen, Soon-Yi Previn, and Continued Social Contact**

Woody Allen and Soon-Yi Previn were among the people who continued social contact with Epstein after his conviction. They attended dinners at his Manhattan residence and appeared within the social world he maintained during his post-conviction years.

Allen later described the relationship as involving dinners and conversation. He denied knowledge of Epstein's criminal activity beyond what was publicly reported and stated that he never observed improper conduct.

The question is not whether Allen personally witnessed Epstein abusing girls. The question is why Epstein remained an acceptable dinner host after his conviction.

Allen's own controversial public history created an unusual relationship between the two men. Epstein could associate with a famous filmmaker who had survived intense scandal and

remained culturally prominent. Allen could attend private dinners hosted by someone who continued attracting intellectuals, financiers, politicians, and celebrities.

Soon-Yi Previn's presence also mattered. As with Maxwell's role in other settings, the presence of women at Epstein's dinners could make the environment appear more conventional and socially secure. A dinner attended by established couples could appear less threatening than a private meeting between Epstein and a male guest surrounded by young women.

The social mechanism was again cumulative. Allen's attendance suggested that Epstein remained acceptable within prominent cultural circles. Other guests could see a celebrated filmmaker at the table and infer that the gathering had been socially validated.

Epstein benefited from cultural prestige in the same way he benefited from scientific, political, and financial prestige. A dinner guest did not need to invest money or make an introduction. Presence alone could be converted into reputation.

Allen and Previn also demonstrate that post-conviction rehabilitation occurred through ordinary repetition. There was no dramatic ceremony restoring Epstein's social status. He hosted dinner. Recognizable people came. They returned. Other guests attended. The pattern made his inclusion appear routine.

Routine was one of Epstein's most powerful protections.

When misconduct becomes a matter of public scandal, people often expect social exclusion to be visible. A person who continues hosting dinners and receiving prominent guests sends the opposite signal. The continued activity implies that insiders know something the public does not, that the offense was exaggerated, or that the matter has been privately resolved.

Each dinner therefore contested the meaning of the conviction.

The legal system had identified Epstein as a sex offender. The social network responded by continuing to dine with him.

**8.5 Hosting as an Act of Certification**

Elite hosting is often described as hospitality, but it also performs certification. The host certifies the guests by inviting them. The guests certify the host by appearing.

This reciprocal validation was fundamental to Epstein's network.

When Epstein hosted Prince Andrew, Bill Gates, Larry Summers, Børge Brende, Woody Allen, Noam Chomsky, Leon Black, Terje Rød-Larsen, Jes Staley, or other prominent figures, he gained more than conversation. Their presence communicated that they considered him worthy of their time.

When Peggy Siegal invited Epstein to a screening or dinner, she communicated that he could appear among her other guests.

When Ghislaine Maxwell brought Epstein into contact with Prince Andrew and aristocratic circles, she certified him through her own standing.

When academic hosts invited him into discussions or research environments, they certified his intellectual identity.

When bankers served him and lawyers met him, they certified his professional legitimacy.

Certification does not require explicit endorsement. It occurs through conduct.

A photograph, guest list, dinner, email exchange, or repeated visit can provide evidence of acceptance. Epstein could then use that evidence indirectly with the next person. He could mention someone he had hosted, refer to a meeting, or arrange an introduction that demonstrated the relationship.

The certification process was especially powerful because the guests often represented institutions. Brende represented the WEF. Summers represented Harvard, government, and economic policy. Ruemmler represented elite law and political administration. Gates represented global philanthropy. Andrew represented the monarchy. Their institutional identities entered Epstein's home with them.

The distinction between personal and institutional conduct therefore became blurred. A guest might insist that the dinner was private. Yet Epstein's interest in the guest arose largely from the office held, the institution represented, or the reputation accumulated through public work.

Private presence produced public value.

Hosting also allowed Epstein to control the environment. He selected the location, invited the participants, determined the seating, and created the circumstances in which introductions occurred. Guests may have believed they were attending for one another. Epstein remained the person who made their meeting possible.

The host thereby accumulated information. He could observe alliances, interests, rivalries, attractions, ambitions, and vulnerabilities. He could learn who wanted access to whom and which favor might later be exchanged.

This intelligence did not need to involve hidden cameras or criminal blackmail to be valuable. Social knowledge is itself power.

The certification system became circular:

Prominent guests attended because Epstein attracted other prominent guests.

Their attendance made Epstein appear more legitimate.

His legitimacy attracted still more prominent guests.

The network expanded because each person relied on the presence of the others.

No one needed to issue a formal moral judgment. Attendance supplied the judgment silently.

**8.6 The People Who Opened the Next Door**

Epstein's network cannot be reconstructed only through the most famous names. Between Epstein and each prominent person stood people who scheduled, recommended, introduced, reassured, or followed up.

Some were assistants working directly for Epstein. Sarah Kellen, Lesley Groff, Nadia Marcinkova, and others appeared in accounts of his household, travel, scheduling, recruitment, or communications. Their individual conduct varied, and allegations concerning them require separate evidentiary treatment. Collectively, they formed part of the operational machinery that kept Epstein's residences, appointments, messages, and movements functioning.

Some were professional intermediaries. Lawyers could introduce clients or frame Epstein as a financial adviser. Bankers could bring him into contact with wealthy customers. University development officials could treat him as a donor prospect. Publicists could place him on guest lists. Philanthropic advisers could present him as a fundraiser. Diplomats such as Rød-Larsen could introduce him to institutional leaders such as Brende.

Some were social intermediaries. Maxwell connected him to Andrew. Siegal returned him to cultural events. Staley linked him to bankers and British political figures. Summers linked him to academics, donors, and economic policymakers. Gates's advisers created pathways into philanthropy and biotechnology.

Each intermediary could describe the act narrowly.

It was only an introduction.

It was only a dinner.

It was only a meeting.

It was only a donation.

It was only financial advice.

It was only a gift.

It was only a technical question.

Epstein combined these fragments into a system.

The people opening doors may not always have understood what happened elsewhere in the network. Yet the system depended on their willingness to treat their own act as too limited to carry responsibility.

This fragmentation protected everyone.

The introducer could say that the recipient made an independent decision.

The recipient could say that the introducer was trusted.

The host could say that the guests came to meet one another.

The guest could say that attendance did not imply endorsement.

The institution could say that the relationship was personal.

The individual could say that staff arranged it.

Responsibility moved continuously until it disappeared.

Epstein benefited from that disappearance. He understood that elite networks were not governed primarily by a centralized screening authority. They were governed through interpersonal trust. One respected person's introduction could outweigh public warning signs.

The conviction should have stopped the chain. Instead, the chain repeatedly overrode the conviction.

The people who opened the next door were therefore not minor figures. They transformed Epstein's existing access into future access. They transferred their own credibility into the relationship and allowed him to move from one sector to another.

Maxwell opened royal and social doors.

Rød-Larsen opened diplomatic and WEF doors.

Staley opened banking and political doors.

Ito opened technology and donor doors.

Siegal opened cultural and media doors.

Summers opened academic, financial, and policy doors.

Ruemmler opened legal and political doors.

Each relationship expanded the range of the next.

The resulting network cannot be understood as the achievement of one manipulative man acting alone. Epstein supplied money, persistence, secrecy, hospitality, and strategic intelligence. His intermediaries supplied the trusted pathways.

He could not have entered elite society repeatedly without people already inside deciding that he should be admitted.

The social gatekeepers did not merely fail to keep him out.

Many of them brought him in.

**9. What Named Elites Received from Epstein**

Jeffrey Epstein's relationships cannot be explained solely by asking what he wanted from powerful people. The more revealing question is what they wanted from him. His network persisted because the exchanges were reciprocal. Epstein supplied services, opportunities, introductions, privacy, money, advice, hospitality, and access to other influential people. In return, his associates supplied fees, institutional standing, social legitimacy, confidential information, and admission into additional networks.

The benefits were not identical. Leslie Wexner granted Epstein extraordinary authority over financial and personal affairs. Leon Black paid him immense sums for tax and estate-planning work. Jes Staley treated him as a valuable banking client, personal associate, and connector. Peter Mandelson benefited from contact with financiers and international business figures. Bill Gates explored Epstein's possible usefulness in philanthropic fundraising. Larry Summers used him as an intermediary, host, correspondent, and personal sounding board. Joi Ito accepted donations and introductions to wealthy potential supporters. Terje Rød-Larsen received funding for the International Peace Institute and a personal loan. Børge Brende entered a private network that included financiers, diplomats, political strategists, and international power brokers. Ehud Barak obtained business, investment, scientific, and technological connections.

The available record does not prove that every benefit was illicit. Financial advice, philanthropy, investment, scientific discussion, and political introductions can all be legitimate activities. The moral question is why these benefits remained attractive after Epstein's conviction. His continued usefulness indicates that powerful people repeatedly concluded that association with him offered something worth preserving.

Epstein's network therefore should not be represented as a collection of passive victims deceived by a uniquely manipulative outsider. Many participants possessed superior intelligence, extensive staff, legal counsel, security resources, and decades of experience

evaluating people. They engaged Epstein because he appeared capable of delivering benefits that ordinary channels could not provide as quickly, privately, or personally.

**9.1 Financial and Tax Services**

Leslie Wexner and Leon Black provide the clearest examples of Epstein's claimed value as a financial adviser.

Wexner gave Epstein broad power over his finances, property, and personal affairs. The relationship granted Epstein authority that extended far beyond ordinary investment advice. He could act in Wexner's name, participate in property transactions, manage sensitive matters, and move through the structures surrounding one of America's largest private fortunes.

What Wexner believed he received was presumably a combination of financial management, personal service, confidentiality, and centralized control. Epstein may have appeared willing to handle matters that traditional advisers divided among lawyers, accountants, investment managers, and family-office employees. By making himself indispensable across several functions, he reduced Wexner's need to work through conventional institutional channels.

This concentration of authority created risk, but it also created convenience. A single trusted individual who understood a billionaire's finances, properties, relationships, and preferences could act more rapidly than a professional committee. The same intimacy that made Epstein dangerous may initially have made him attractive.

Leon Black's relationship involved a different form of financial usefulness. Black paid Epstein enormous sums for advice described as involving taxation, estates, trusts, family financial planning, art, philanthropy, and disputes among professional advisers.

Black was not financially unsophisticated. He had access to elite law firms, accounting firms, investment banks, and family-office experts. Epstein's attraction therefore cannot be explained merely by access to routine technical knowledge. Black appears to have believed that Epstein could coordinate complex advisers, identify unusual strategies, resolve disagreements, or achieve savings of exceptional scale.

Epstein may also have offered a style of service distinct from institutional firms. He could work privately, respond personally, move among several professional domains, and operate without the internal restrictions of a large law or accounting partnership. He could present aggressive or unconventional approaches while allowing established professionals to perform the formal implementation.

For both Wexner and Black, the relationship involved more than numbers. Financial advice at this level exposes family arrangements, inheritance plans, philanthropic intentions, personal

disputes, tax positions, property holdings, and confidential vulnerabilities. An adviser who obtains this knowledge becomes embedded in the client's private life.

Such embeddedness creates dependency. The client may continue using the adviser because replacing him would require exposing the same information to others, reconstructing complex arrangements, and acknowledging how much authority had been surrendered.

Epstein benefited financially, but he also gained something more durable: intimate knowledge of powerful people's private affairs. That knowledge increased his importance and made disengagement more difficult.

**9.2 Introductions to Money and Power**

Epstein's most transferable service was the introduction. He positioned himself between people who controlled different forms of power and offered each access to the others.

Jes Staley could provide banking relationships, financial expertise, and entry into JPMorgan Chase. Peter Mandelson could provide political influence, European connections, and access to international business. Larry Summers could provide academic prestige, economic-policy authority, and relationships with donors and investors. Bill Gates could provide philanthropic scale and global recognition. Børge Brende could provide proximity to the World Economic Forum. Ehud Barak could provide political, military, technological, and Israeli business connections.

Epstein's value arose from combining these people rather than merely knowing them separately.

To Staley, Epstein could offer contact with wealthy clients, political officials, and international figures.

To Mandelson, he could offer bankers, investors, and global business leaders.

To Summers, he could offer donors, financiers, political figures, and private international discussions.

To Gates, he could offer wealthy prospective philanthropists and scientific contacts.

To Brende, he could offer private access to financiers, diplomats, political strategists, and other influential guests.

To Barak, he could offer investors, technology entrepreneurs, scientists, and wealthy American contacts.

The participants often possessed their own extensive networks. Their willingness to use Epstein therefore suggests that he offered access of a particular kind: private, rapid, unconventional, or socially unrestricted.

Formal institutions impose procedures. Government meetings may require staff preparation and records. Banks have compliance requirements. Foundations have grant processes. Universities have development offices. Epstein's private network could bypass these structures.

He could invite two people to dinner without creating an official agenda. He could propose a meeting as a personal favor rather than an institutional request. He could reach someone through friendship when formal channels would be slow or politically sensitive.

This informality was itself a benefit. It allowed participants to explore possibilities without committing their institutions. A politician could meet a financier privately. A philanthropist could discuss a donor initiative without foundation approval. A university official could cultivate money outside normal disclosure. A banker could meet a political figure through social rather than corporate channels.

Epstein became valuable because he converted institutional power into personal access.

**9.3 Philanthropic and Scientific Prestige**

Bill Gates, Joi Ito, Martin Nowak, Larry Summers, and other participants in Epstein's philanthropic and academic network received access to money or the possibility of money.

Gates did not need Epstein's personal donations. His interest appears to have concerned Epstein's claimed ability to mobilize other wealthy people for large-scale philanthropy. Epstein presented himself as someone who could persuade billionaires to participate in ambitious funding arrangements.

For Gates, the attraction would have been scale. If Epstein could bring additional fortunes into global health or other projects, the moral and practical impact might appear substantial. The possibility of billions in new giving could make the intermediary seem worth exploring despite reputational concerns.

Joi Ito's incentives were more immediate. The MIT Media Lab depended on donors, sponsors, and access to wealthy technology and financial figures. Epstein offered both direct money and introductions. Ito could receive funding for institutional projects, personal investment activity, and relationships with additional donors.

Martin Nowak and Harvard's Program for Evolutionary Dynamics received substantial support for research. Scientists in Epstein's orbit gained access to funding, travel, conferences, unusual gatherings, and wealthy patrons willing to support speculative work.

Epstein understood the scarcity of unrestricted scientific money. Conventional grants require formal proposals, peer review, institutional reporting, and narrow research objectives. A private donor can fund ideas quickly and with fewer constraints. For ambitious scientists, such freedom is highly attractive.

The academic participants could tell themselves that the money served discovery. The research might produce genuine knowledge. The donor's moral character could be treated as separate from the scientific outcome.

Yet the exchange was not one-directional. Epstein received prestige from every institution and scholar he funded. The scientists received resources; Epstein received intellectual rehabilitation.

The same applied to philanthropic discussion. Gates might seek donors; Epstein gained association with the Gates name. Ito might seek support for MIT; Epstein gained entry into the Media Lab. Summers might seek support for projects or people; Epstein gained continued access to Harvard and economic-policy circles.

The benefit to the named elites was money or the promise of money. The benefit to Epstein was transformation from convicted offender into patron, adviser, and convener.

**9.4 Diplomatic and Geopolitical Access**

Epstein also provided access to people operating in diplomacy, international business, defense, and global governance.

Terje Rød-Larsen received financial support for the International Peace Institute and a personal loan. The institute benefited from funds that could support programs, staff, conferences, and diplomatic engagement. Rød-Larsen also gained a wealthy contact with relationships across finance, politics, and philanthropy.

In return, Epstein gained entry into United Nations-adjacent diplomacy. Rød-Larsen introduced him to Børge Brende and connected him with people who possessed formal international standing.

Brende's relationship with Epstein placed the WEF leader in private gatherings with financiers, diplomats, political strategists, and prominent international figures. These dinners could offer candid discussion and access beyond official WEF procedures. Even someone as well connected as Brende could find value in a private host capable of assembling unusual combinations of guests.

Peter Mandelson obtained similar benefits. Epstein could connect him with bankers such as Jes Staley, global business leaders such as Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, and other wealthy or politically connected individuals. Mandelson's public offices gave him formal authority, but

Epstein's network offered personal relationships that could remain useful after government service.

Ehud Barak gained access to American investors, technology ventures, scientists, and philanthropists. Epstein's participation in financing associated with Carbyne linked political and security expertise to private capital. Barak's relationships and reputation could help a company gain credibility; Epstein's money and contacts could help it gain financing.

The geopolitical benefit was therefore multidirectional. Former officials could enter investment and technology circles. Business figures could reach political leaders. Diplomats could reach private donors. Institutional executives could meet strategists and financiers outside ordinary channels.

Epstein occupied the center because he could move among all of them without being formally responsible to any electorate, board, government, or international body.

**9.5 Hospitality, Privacy, and Social Permission**

Epstein offered something that institutions cannot easily provide: privately controlled space.

His Manhattan townhouse, Palm Beach residence, New Mexico ranch, Paris apartment, private island, aircraft, and other properties created environments where guests could meet outside offices, official buildings, public hotels, or recorded conferences.

Hospitality has practical value. Epstein could arrange transportation, meals, lodging, entertainment, and introductions in one controlled setting. Guests did not need to manage logistics or explain their presence through formal institutional channels.

Privacy increased the attraction. A billionaire, politician, academic, or executive could discuss sensitive matters without staff members from competing institutions present. Participants could test ideas, complain about colleagues, discuss investments, seek personal advice, or explore arrangements that were not ready for public disclosure.

The privacy also weakened accountability. Meetings might not appear on official calendars. Conversations might produce no minutes. Gifts, introductions, and personal requests could occur without institutional review.

For some guests, the appeal may have been purely conversational or professional. For others, Epstein's environment may have offered social or sexual permissiveness. The available evidence does not justify assigning the same motive to every person who entered his properties. It does justify asking why so many experienced individuals accepted hospitality from a convicted sexual offender.

Epstein's homes offered social permission as well as privacy. Once prominent guests attended, later guests could interpret the environment as normalized. A dinner with Larry Summers, Woody Allen, Noam Chomsky, Børge Brende, Leon Black, or Terje Rød-Larsen did not look like an encounter on the margins of society. It looked like an elite salon.

The setting allowed participants to benefit from one another. Some may have attended primarily to meet the other guests. Epstein remained indispensable because he controlled the invitation.

Hospitality therefore functioned as a productive asset. It gave others privacy, convenience, access, and social opportunity. It gave Epstein information, gratitude, influence, and the status of host.

**9.6 Information, Secrets, and Potential Leverage**

Epstein's network produced information continuously.

As a financial adviser, he could learn about taxes, trusts, estates, investments, family disputes, and hidden assets.

As a host, he could observe friendships, rivalries, attractions, ambitions, and vulnerabilities.

As a broker, he could learn who wanted money, political access, institutional appointment, philanthropic recognition, or private introduction.

As a donor, he could discover which universities and researchers were desperate for funding.

As a confidant, he could receive personal disclosures from people such as Larry Summers or other correspondents who treated him as a source of advice.

Information creates leverage even when no explicit threat is made. A person who knows how a billionaire structures an estate, which politician seeks a business introduction, which academic wants private funding, or which executive wishes to meet a government official possesses bargaining power.

The possibility of surveillance and blackmail has generated extensive speculation. Epstein's properties reportedly contained substantial security and recording systems, and witnesses described unusual monitoring arrangements. Such evidence warrants investigation. It does not prove that every prominent guest was recorded or that Epstein systematically blackmailed all members of his network.

A rigorous analysis must distinguish documented information collection from universal blackmail theories.

The stronger conclusion is that Epstein's position naturally generated compromising or sensitive knowledge. He did not need to record a criminal act to gain leverage. Ordinary elite secrets could be highly valuable.

A private financial arrangement, concealed donation, undisclosed gift, embarrassing friendship, extramarital relationship, political ambition, or ethically questionable meeting could create reluctance to sever ties publicly.

Mutual exposure may therefore have helped stabilize the network. Epstein knew things about his associates. His associates knew that their relationship with him could damage them. Both sides had incentives to preserve confidentiality.

This structure can produce silence without an explicit conspiracy. No one must issue instructions. Each participant understands that full disclosure may harm several people at once.

**9.7 Why Usefulness Survived Public Disgrace**

Epstein's continued acceptance after 2008 is the clearest evidence that elite participants believed he still offered valuable benefits.

The conviction changed the public facts but did not eliminate his services.

Wexner had already helped create his financial identity.

JPMorgan continued serving him for years.

Deutsche Bank later accepted him.

Leon Black paid him extraordinary fees.

Jes Staley continued corresponding with him.

Bill Gates agreed to philanthropic meetings.

Larry Summers continued contact and consultation.

Joi Ito accepted money and donor introductions.

Terje Rød-Larsen maintained financial and social ties.

Børge Brende attended dinners and exchanged messages.

Ehud Barak continued meetings and business-related engagement.

Noam Chomsky met him.

Woody Allen and Soon-Yi Previn dined with him.

Kathryn Ruemmler accepted meetings and gifts.

These people did not all receive the same benefit, and their conduct did not carry equal moral or legal significance. Together, however, they reveal a stable pattern. Epstein remained connected because he remained useful.

Public disgrace did not remove his access to wealth.

It did not remove his ability to introduce people.

It did not remove his homes, aircraft, staff, or hospitality.

It did not remove his knowledge of private finances and relationships.

It did not remove his connections to universities, politicians, bankers, scientists, and philanthropists.

The elite network therefore treated the conviction as a reputational problem to be managed rather than an absolute moral boundary.

Some participants may have believed Epstein's minimizing account of his offenses. Some may have avoided investigating. Some may have viewed the case as legally concluded. Some may have convinced themselves that philanthropic or scientific goals justified contact. Others may have considered the association private enough to escape scrutiny.

These explanations differ psychologically but produce the same institutional result: continued admission.

Epstein understood that powerful people often judge relationships through utility. A person who can still provide money, access, discretion, or influence may survive conduct that would permanently exclude someone with nothing to offer.

His network was therefore not sustained by charisma alone. It was sustained by transactions.

The named elites received financial advice, introductions, donations, investment opportunities, private venues, social access, intellectual stimulation, diplomatic contacts, and confidential assistance.

Epstein received money, legitimacy, information, institutional access, and protection from complete exclusion.

The continued exchange reveals the moral structure of the network. The exploitation of vulnerable girls was treated as less decisive than the benefits available to powerful adults.

That is why Epstein survived within elite society after conviction.

He still had something they wanted.

## 10. Institutional Complicity Beyond Individual Scandal

Jeffrey Epstein's survival within elite society cannot be explained as a collection of unrelated personal mistakes. His activities required banks to process money, universities to accept donations, advisers to arrange meetings, foundations to receive funds, lawyers to structure transactions, assistants to manage schedules, and institutional leaders to overlook warning signs. The network persisted because organizations repeatedly converted individual relationships into durable systems of accommodation.

Institutional complicity does not necessarily mean that an organization knowingly participated in Epstein's sexual crimes. It can also arise when an institution supplies essential services despite credible warnings, conceals a relationship to preserve financial benefits, permits its prestige to rehabilitate a convicted offender, or distributes responsibility so widely that no one acts. The institution may condemn the individual publicly while continuing to benefit privately.

JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche Bank, MIT, Harvard University, the International Peace Institute, and the World Economic Forum each occupied a different part of Epstein's network. The banks provided financial infrastructure. The universities provided intellectual legitimacy. IPI provided diplomatic access. The WEF leadership relationship provided proximity to Davos and global public-private governance. Law firms, family offices, foundations, and advisory networks supplied the professional mechanisms connecting these sectors.

The relevant question is not simply whether one executive, professor, or donor officer behaved badly. It is whether the organization possessed enough information, authority, and institutional capacity to stop the relationship and nevertheless allowed it to continue.

### 10.1 JPMorgan Chase

JPMorgan Chase provided Epstein with banking services from the late 1990s until 2013. The relationship continued for approximately five years after his 2008 conviction. During that period, Epstein remained a wealthy private-banking client whose accounts, payments, withdrawals, and relationships passed through one of the largest and most sophisticated financial institutions in the world.

Jes Staley was a central figure, but JPMorgan's institutional responsibility cannot be confined to him. Staley's personal relationship with Epstein helped protect and elevate the client, yet the bank's continued service required the participation of account managers, compliance officers, risk personnel, lawyers, transaction processors, and senior executives.

Internal concerns were raised. Employees questioned Epstein's criminal history, his cash activity, his reputation, and the risks associated with retaining him. The existence of these warnings is crucial because it moves the case beyond accidental ignorance. JPMorgan was not simply unaware of a hidden problem. Parts of the institution identified the problem while other parts continued the relationship.

The bank later attempted to distinguish Staley's conduct from its own, arguing that he had concealed aspects of his relationship and misrepresented relevant facts. Staley's actions deserve independent scrutiny, but the institutional record remains. A major bank cannot provide years of service through one person acting alone.

Epstein also offered JPMorgan commercial value. He held accounts, generated fees, and could introduce other wealthy individuals. In private banking, a client's network may be as valuable as the client's existing assets. A person who brings access to billionaires, investors, entrepreneurs, and political figures becomes a potential source of future business.

This created a conflict between risk management and revenue. Compliance concerns pointed toward termination. Commercial incentives favored retention. The bank's eventual decision to remove Epstein came years after the public conviction and internal warnings.

JPMorgan later faced civil litigation and substantial settlements arising from allegations that its services enabled Epstein's operation. Those proceedings did not establish that every employee knew the full extent of his abuse. They demonstrated that institutional responsibility can arise when a bank continues supplying indispensable financial infrastructure despite facts that should have required decisive action.

Without banking services, Epstein's ability to maintain properties, pay employees, transfer money, support intermediaries, fund institutions, and operate internationally would have been severely constrained. JPMorgan was therefore not merely adjacent to the network. It was part of the machinery that allowed the network to function.

### 10.2 Deutsche Bank

Deutsche Bank accepted Epstein as a client after JPMorgan ended its relationship with him. This sequence makes the institutional failure especially difficult to characterize as innocent oversight.

By 2013, Epstein's conviction was several years old. His criminal status was publicly available. Another major bank had already decided that continuing the relationship was unacceptable. Deutsche Bank nevertheless saw an opportunity to acquire a wealthy and well-connected client.

The institution provided accounts and processed transactions for Epstein and related entities until 2018. Regulators later identified failures in due diligence, account monitoring, and the handling of suspicious or high-risk activity connected to him.

The Deutsche Bank case illustrates how competition among institutions can undermine moral exclusion. When one bank removes a client, another may regard the departure as a business opportunity. The second institution may persuade itself that stronger controls, closer monitoring, or a narrower interpretation of risk will make the relationship manageable.

From Epstein's perspective, the transition preserved continuity. He did not need the entire banking system to accept him. He needed one major bank willing to maintain his accounts and treat him as a legitimate client.

This institutional substitution weakened the consequences of JPMorgan's eventual rejection. A meaningful sanction would have required a shared understanding across financial institutions that Epstein's conviction and conduct made him unacceptable. Instead, market competition allowed him to move from one prestigious bank to another.

Deutsche Bank's role also demonstrates that risk-management procedures are only as strong as the institution's willingness to enforce them against valuable clients. Formal systems may require enhanced review, monitoring, and escalation, yet commercial relationships can continue when senior personnel believe the revenue or network opportunity justifies the danger.

The bank later paid penalties and entered settlements related to its handling of Epstein. These consequences confirmed that the failure was institutional rather than merely reputational. It involved systems designed to detect and manage precisely the type of risk he presented.

**10.3 MIT and Harvard**

MIT and Harvard supplied Epstein with a different but equally valuable resource: intellectual legitimacy.

At Harvard, Epstein's large donation to the Program for Evolutionary Dynamics helped establish him as a patron of science. His relationship with Martin Nowak and other academics placed him near prestigious research in mathematics, biology, genetics, evolution, and related fields. Even after the formal donor relationship became problematic, personal and academic contacts preserved elements of his access.

Harvard later acknowledged that Epstein continued receiving privileges and association beyond what should have been permitted. The institution's difficulty lay partly in the separation between central university policy and faculty autonomy. Administrators could restrict formal access while professors continued private meetings, correspondence, or social contact.

This division allowed responsibility to fragment. Faculty members could describe Epstein as a private acquaintance or donor. Administrators could say that no official relationship existed. Epstein could continue invoking Harvard through the people and programs with which he remained associated.

MIT's failure was more explicit. Joi Ito and the Media Lab accepted Epstein-linked money and cultivated his help in obtaining additional donors after his conviction. Internal awareness of the reputational problem did not lead immediately to rejection. It led to efforts to keep Epstein's involvement quiet.

The use of anonymity or concealed attribution showed that participants understood the relationship would be unacceptable if publicly visible. Secrecy was therefore not incidental. It was the mechanism through which the institution attempted to retain the benefit while avoiding the cost.

Nicholas Negroponte's defense of accepting Epstein's money revealed the utilitarian reasoning behind the accommodation. Funds could support valuable research. The institution could separate the money from the donor. Scientific outcomes could be treated as morally superior to the source of the funding.

That reasoning ignored the reciprocal nature of the exchange. Epstein did not simply lose money while MIT gained research support. He received meetings, introductions, association with technological innovation, and the ability to present himself as someone still welcomed by one of the world's leading scientific institutions.

The institutional failure at MIT and Harvard was therefore not limited to donor vetting. It involved a deeper refusal to acknowledge that prestige itself was being transferred. The universities treated their reputations as if Epstein could borrow them without altering their own moral standing.

**10.4 The International Peace Institute**

The International Peace Institute provided Epstein with entry into diplomatic and United Nations-adjacent networks.

Under Terje Rød-Larsen's leadership, IPI accepted approximately $650,000 from Epstein-linked sources after Epstein's conviction. Rød-Larsen also received a personal loan from Epstein. These relationships were not fully disclosed to the institute's governing board at the time.

IPI later emphasized that Epstein's donations represented a small percentage of its overall revenue and that an external review found no evidence of illegality. Those conclusions addressed the scale and legal status of the funds. They did not answer the central ethical question.

The significance of the donations was not determined by whether IPI would have collapsed without them. The money created a relationship between Epstein and the leader of an organization embedded in international diplomacy. Rød-Larsen could provide introductions, access, and credibility that were disproportionate to the monetary value of the donations.

His introduction of Epstein to Børge Brende illustrates this conversion. Epstein's financial relationship with Rød-Larsen helped place him one step from the president and chief executive of the World Economic Forum.

IPI therefore became part of a larger exchange:

Epstein supplied funds and a personal loan.

Rød-Larsen supplied diplomatic legitimacy and introductions.

The institute's reputation helped normalize Epstein's presence.

The failure of board disclosure also demonstrates how institutional governance can be bypassed through the authority of a dominant leader. When the head of an organization controls donor relationships and external contacts, other officials may not possess enough information to evaluate conflicts of interest.

Rød-Larsen's resignation acknowledged the seriousness of the failure. Yet institutional accountability requires more than removing one leader after exposure. It requires asking why donor controls, conflict disclosures, and board oversight did not detect or prevent the relationship while it was active.

**10.5 The World Economic Forum**

The World Economic Forum's connection to Epstein arose most directly through Børge Brende and the wider Davos ecosystem.

No public evidence establishes that Epstein held a formal position within the WEF, served as an official partner, or directed its institutional program. The absence of formal membership, however, does not eliminate the significance of his access to the organization's serving president and chief executive.

Brende attended three reported dinners at Epstein's Manhattan residence in 2018 and 2019 and communicated with him by email and text. Their discussions reportedly included Davos participants, WEF strategy, international coordination, and the potential role of the Forum in a changing global architecture.

The relationship originated through Terje Rød-Larsen, whose own institutional and financial connections to Epstein gave the introduction credibility. Brende accepted that credibility without discovering or acting upon Epstein's public criminal record.

The institutional problem was therefore not that Epstein somehow breached WEF headquarters. It was that the organization's chief executive entered a sustained relationship with him through a trusted diplomatic intermediary.

The WEF's later response confirmed the matter's institutional significance. Its Governing Board referred the issue for review, outside counsel investigated, and Brende eventually stepped down. The sequence demonstrated that the relationship could not be dismissed as purely private.

The Davos ecosystem also created broader opportunities for Epstein. Even without formal status, he could use participant information, accommodation, dinners, and introductions to broker access among political and financial figures. The Forum produced the concentration of power; Epstein operated within the surrounding informal network.

This raises an accountability problem characteristic of Davos. The WEF can distinguish official events from private dinners, side meetings, corporate receptions, and independently organized gatherings. That distinction is administratively real. It also permits the institution to benefit from the prestige and activity surrounding Davos while denying responsibility for much of what occurs there.

Epstein exploited this gap between institutional convening and private conduct. He could use the density and status of the gathering without appearing on the official program.

The WEF case therefore shows how a private convening institution can create a valuable network without fully governing its informal extensions. When its own chief executive entered Epstein's private circle, the boundary between official and unofficial Davos became even less persuasive.

**10.6 Law Firms, Foundations, Family Offices, and Advisory Networks**

Between Epstein and major institutions stood a large professional class that made elite relationships operational.

Lawyers drafted agreements, trusts, wills, settlements, and estate structures.

Accountants and tax advisers handled financial arrangements.

Family-office employees managed assets, property, philanthropy, travel, and household affairs.

Foundation personnel evaluated donations and donor relationships.

Executive assistants scheduled meetings, transmitted messages, purchased gifts, and arranged transportation.

Public-relations advisers shaped explanations after relationships became public.

Investment managers and bankers introduced clients and processed transactions.

These professionals often avoid scrutiny because they can describe their conduct as technical. A lawyer drafted a document. An accountant prepared a return. An assistant scheduled a dinner. A foundation officer processed a gift. Each act appears narrow and professionally neutral.

Together, however, these acts constituted the infrastructure of Epstein's network.

Leslie Wexner's relationship with Epstein required lawyers, property specialists, accountants, and employees to recognize Epstein's authority.

Leon Black's payments involved professional advisers, tax structures, trusts, and estate-planning arrangements.

Bill Gates's meetings required scheduling, security, briefing, and advisory systems.

Joi Ito's donor relationship involved MIT development structures and internal communications.

Epstein's estate planning involved lawyers and named potential executors such as Boris Nikolic.

Political and diplomatic dinners required assistants, drivers, security personnel, and hosts.

Professional neutrality can become a shield when each participant refuses to consider the cumulative purpose of the work. Ethical responsibility is reduced to technical compliance. As long as a document is lawful, a transaction is processable, or a meeting is properly scheduled, the broader relationship is treated as someone else's concern.

This division of labor is essential to institutional complicity. It allows morally consequential outcomes to emerge from actions that appear individually routine.

A sophisticated offender does not need every professional to endorse him personally. He needs each one to complete a limited task without interrupting the larger system.

**10.7 From Failure of Due Diligence to Willful Institutional Accommodation**

The phrase "failure of due diligence" is appropriate when an organization overlooks a hidden fact despite reasonable procedures. It becomes inadequate when the warning is public, repeatedly raised, and consciously managed.

Epstein's 2008 conviction was not secret. JPMorgan retained him. Deutsche Bank later accepted him. MIT personnel sought ways to conceal donations. Harvard-affiliated contacts continued

engaging him. IPI received money, while its leader borrowed personally from him and introduced him to others. Brende met him years after the conviction while leading an institution centered on elite relationship management.

At some point, repeated failure becomes accommodation.

Accommodation can take several forms.

An institution may knowingly accept money while concealing the donor.

A bank may continue servicing a profitable client despite internal warnings.

A university may restrict formal access while allowing informal relationships to continue.

A board may remain uninformed because its leader controls the relationship.

An executive may rely on a trusted introduction rather than perform independent vetting.

A professional adviser may treat each transaction as isolated from the client's larger conduct.

No single act must reveal an explicit intention to support a predator. The institution accommodates him by repeatedly declining to impose the consequences its own information demands.

The term willful does not always mean that participants desired Epstein's crimes. It means they desired the benefits of the relationship strongly enough to avoid, minimize, compartmentalize, or conceal the facts that should have ended it.

The institutions received money, clients, fees, donations, introductions, access, and prestige.

Epstein received financial infrastructure, intellectual legitimacy, diplomatic entry, philanthropic relevance, and continued elite acceptance.

This reciprocity is what transforms individual scandal into institutional complicity.

Epstein could not have sustained his operation through personal charm alone. He required banks to move money, universities to validate him, advisers to structure his affairs, intermediaries to make introductions, and institutions to treat his conviction as manageable.

The organizational failures were not peripheral to his power. They were the means through which his power endured.

The central institutional indictment is therefore not that every organization knowingly joined Epstein's criminal enterprise. It is that several of the world's most sophisticated organizations possessed the capacity to recognize and exclude him, encountered facts that demanded exclusion, and nevertheless continued supplying the services and legitimacy he needed.

They did not merely fail to stop him.

They continued doing business with him.

## 11. The Epstein Files, Rumored Names, and Standards of Judgment

The phrase “the Epstein files” creates the misleading impression that a single authoritative archive exists in which every named person occupies the same evidentiary position. In reality, the public record is a composite assembled from criminal investigations, civil litigation, flight records, contact books, calendars, emails, financial documents, photographs, witness statements, institutional reviews, police reports, depositions, and unsolicited tips submitted to authorities. These materials differ radically in reliability, context, and significance.

A name may appear because the person traveled with Epstein, attended a dinner, received an email, was entered into an address book, was discussed by somebody else, or was accused of misconduct. These are not equivalent facts. An appearance in a contact list proves less than repeated correspondence. A calendar entry proves less than a completed financial transaction. An anonymous allegation proves less than sworn testimony corroborated by independent records.

At the same time, evidentiary distinctions can be manipulated to protect powerful people. Defenders may demand proof of a criminal conspiracy before acknowledging any ethical failure. They may isolate each meeting, payment, introduction, or trip and declare that none alone proves abuse. This atomized reasoning can erase a pattern that becomes unmistakable when the pieces are considered together.

The proper standard is neither indiscriminate accusation nor institutional exoneration. Each person must be judged according to the strongest evidence actually available, the timing and repetition of the relationship, the benefits exchanged, the knowledge reasonably expected of someone in that position, and the consequences of continued association.

### 11.1 A Name in a File Is Not a Single Category

An Epstein-related name can appear in several fundamentally different categories.

The weakest category is incidental mention. A third party may refer to a political leader, celebrity, banker, academic, or business executive in an email without that person’s knowledge. An investigative tip may mention someone without supplying evidence. A name may appear because Epstein claimed a relationship that was exaggerated or nonexistent.

An address-book entry establishes that contact information was retained. It does not establish that the person met Epstein, knew him well, or participated in misconduct. Epstein collected names aggressively and benefited from appearing more connected than he was.

A calendar entry shows that a meeting was contemplated or scheduled. It does not always prove that the meeting occurred. Repeated calendar entries, however, become more significant when supported by emails, visitor records, photographs, testimony, or follow-up correspondence.

Flight records establish presence on an aircraft during a particular segment. They do not, by themselves, establish the purpose of travel or misconduct at the destination. Bill Clinton's documented flights, for example, must be distinguished from unproven claims about what occurred during or after those journeys. The same principle applies to every passenger.

Photographs establish co-presence at a moment in time. Images of Donald Trump with Epstein, Prince Andrew with Epstein, Ehud Barak entering Epstein's residence, or prominent academics attending Epstein-supported gatherings provide evidence of association but not automatic proof of criminal participation.

Emails and text messages are stronger because they reveal direct communication, tone, purpose, duration, and reciprocal familiarity. The extensive communications involving Jes Staley, the continuing exchanges with Larry Summers, and the messages between Epstein and Børge Brende provide more information than an isolated photograph.

Financial records are stronger still when the question concerns material benefit. Payments from Leon Black, Epstein-linked donations to MIT or the International Peace Institute, the personal loan to Terje Rød-Larsen, and banking services supplied by JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank establish concrete relationships with measurable institutional consequences.

Sworn testimony and victim statements occupy another category. They deserve serious attention but must be evaluated for detail, consistency, corroboration, and the opportunity of the accused to respond. Virginia Giuffre's allegations concerning Prince Andrew carried greater evidentiary weight than anonymous internet rumor because they were specific, repeated, connected to a known trafficking system, and supported by contextual evidence. Andrew denied the allegations and settled the civil case without admitting liability.

The files must therefore be read hierarchically. A person should not be accused of sexual crimes merely because a name appears. Nor should repeated, documented, beneficial association be dismissed as meaningless simply because it does not prove sexual abuse.

**11.2 Documented Association Versus Alleged Sexual Conduct**

The distinction between association and sexual conduct is essential.

Documented association can include meetings, correspondence, travel, financial services, gifts, dinners, donations, introductions, or institutional access. Such evidence may establish poor judgment, ethical failure, reputational laundering, or institutional accommodation without proving participation in Epstein's sexual crimes.

Bill Gates's meetings with Epstein after the conviction are documented. That fact supports criticism of Gates's judgment and of the access he conferred. It does not establish that Gates participated in Epstein's abuse.

Leon Black's enormous payments to Epstein are documented. They justify inquiry into the services provided, the scale of compensation, and why Black continued using Epstein after conviction. The payments do not themselves establish participation in sexual exploitation.

Noam Chomsky's post-conviction meetings are documented. They show that Epstein remained acceptable to a celebrated intellectual. They do not prove sexual misconduct by Chomsky.

Børge Brende's dinners and communications with Epstein are documented. They establish direct access to WEF leadership and a serious failure of screening and disclosure. They do not prove Brende's participation in Epstein's crimes.

Prince Andrew's case occupies a different evidentiary category because a named accuser alleged direct sexual conduct. His relationship must therefore be assessed through both documented association and the specific allegation.

The same distinction applies to Marvin Minsky. His presence in Epstein-supported scientific settings is documented. The allegation concerning sexual contact was serious but disputed and never adjudicated.

The paper must neither collapse these categories nor use their differences to trivialize association. Continued contact after conviction can be morally condemnable even when no sexual allegation exists.

**11.3 Public Denials and Their Testability**

Public denials should be compared with documents, dates, and the internal logic of the explanation offered.

Bill Clinton's representatives have stated that his travel was related to philanthropic work, that staff and security personnel accompanied him, and that he knew nothing of Epstein's crimes. Those statements must be compared with flight records, itineraries, accompanying passengers, and any evidence concerning later contact.

Donald Trump has emphasized that he fell out with Epstein and had not spoken with him for many years. That claim must be considered alongside photographs, video footage, his 2002

public description of Epstein, the Palm Beach social context, and disputed accounts of why the relationship ended.

Bill Gates has described his meetings as an effort to explore philanthropic fundraising and has called the association a serious mistake. That explanation is compatible with the absence of evidence of sexual misconduct. It does not answer why Gates, his advisers, and his institutional machinery considered Epstein an acceptable intermediary after conviction.

Ehud Barak has said that his contacts concerned business, science, philanthropy, and technology and that he did not participate in sexual activity involving Epstein. Those claims must be assessed alongside the frequency of meetings, the post-conviction timing, visits to Epstein's residence, and investment relationships.

Larry Summers has expressed regret about his association. The documentary question is not whether regret was later stated but how long the correspondence continued, what subjects were discussed, what advice was sought, and what benefits Epstein obtained from the relationship.

Børge Brende has said that he did not know of Epstein's criminal background. The testable question is whether such ignorance was reasonable for the chief executive of the World Economic Forum, whether earlier descriptions of the relationship were complete, and what institutional processes failed to identify publicly available information.

Leon Black has maintained that Epstein provided legitimate tax and estate-planning services. The explanation must be tested against the scale of the fees, the work product, the alternatives available to Black, and the continuation of the relationship after conviction.

Jes Staley has denied knowledge of Epstein's crimes and denied participating in them. Those denials must be considered alongside the extent, tone, and duration of their communications, his visits to Epstein's properties, his sponsorship of Epstein within JPMorgan, and later institutional findings.

A denial is evidence of the person's stated position. It is not the end of analysis.

**11.4 The Problem of Selective Disclosure and Redaction**

The surviving record is incomplete.

Some documents remain sealed or heavily redacted to protect victims, witnesses, grand-jury secrecy, investigative methods, or personal privacy. Other records may have been destroyed, lost, withheld, or never created. Private conversations and informal meetings often leave little documentation.

Institutional control also affects disclosure. Banks, universities, foundations, law firms, family offices, and corporations possess internal records that the public may see only through litigation, regulatory action, investigative reporting, or official inquiry. The absence of a released document may therefore reflect lack of access rather than absence of evidence.

Epstein himself contributed to documentary ambiguity. He exaggerated relationships, cultivated powerful names, communicated through intermediaries, and operated across several residences and organizations. A calendar could overstate access. A deleted message could conceal it. A financial transfer might reveal a relationship without explaining its purpose.

Redaction creates another difficulty. A document may clearly describe a meeting or allegation while withholding the person's identity. Speculation then spreads, and internet communities attempt to fill the blank with famous names. Such speculation should not be presented as established fact.

Selective disclosure can also distort the apparent importance of individuals. A person whose communications were preserved may appear more deeply involved than someone whose records were deleted or remain sealed. Documentary abundance is not always equivalent to actual centrality.

These limitations require humility. They do not justify assuming that nothing can be known. The task is to state clearly what the documents establish, what they suggest, and what remains unresolved.

**11.5 Excessive Caution as Elite Protection**

Caution is necessary, but it can become a political weapon.

Powerful people often benefit from a standard under which only a criminal conviction permits public judgment. Under this rule, repeated meetings, secret donations, enormous payments, concealed gifts, institutional warnings, and post-conviction hospitality are treated as morally irrelevant unless prosecutors prove participation in sexual abuse beyond a reasonable doubt.

That is not the standard applied in ordinary institutional life.

Employees lose positions for undisclosed conflicts of interest.

Executives are disciplined for reputational risk.

Public officials are criticized for accepting inappropriate gifts.

University leaders resign over donor concealment.

Bankers are sanctioned for compliance failures.

Board members are expected to avoid relationships that compromise institutional trust.

The powerful should not receive a lower ethical standard merely because the most serious criminal allegation cannot be proved against each of them.

Excessive caution often appears through linguistic retreat. A repeated relationship becomes "contact." A private dinner becomes "an encounter." A financial dependency becomes "professional advice." Concealment becomes "a disclosure issue." Institutional accommodation becomes "poor judgment."

These phrases may be technically accurate while morally evasive.

The post-conviction chronology provides a reasonable basis for stronger judgment. Gates, Summers, Black, Ito, Rød-Larsen, Brende, Staley, Barak, Chomsky, Ruemmler, and others had different relationships with Epstein, but their continued engagement collectively demonstrates that his conviction was not treated as disqualifying.

That conclusion does not accuse them all of sexual crimes. It identifies a moral fact visible in their documented conduct.

Elite protection also occurs through atomization. Each relationship is isolated and explained as a unique mistake. Gates pursued philanthropy. Summers discussed ideas. Black sought tax advice. Ito wanted research funding. Rød-Larsen needed institutional support. Brende attended business dinners. Staley managed a valuable client.

Taken separately, each explanation can sound plausible.

Taken together, they show a convicted sexual offender functioning as financier, donor, host, adviser, fundraiser, diplomat-adjacent broker, scientific patron, and confidant because powerful people continued assigning him those roles.

**11.6 Avoiding Fabrication and Guilt by Mere Mention**

Moral clarity does not justify fabrication.

The paper must not describe a rumored meeting as documented, a proposed appointment as completed, an address-book entry as friendship, or a flight as proof of sexual conduct. It must not repeat anonymous internet lists as though they were court findings. It must not assign motives that the evidence cannot support.

This discipline protects more than the reputations of named individuals. It protects the credibility of victims and of the larger institutional argument. Unsupported accusations allow defenders of the network to discredit documented evidence by associating it with rumor.

The correct approach is to identify the strongest supportable conclusion for each person.

For Bill Clinton, the record supports documented travel and association, not an automatic finding of sexual misconduct.

For Donald Trump, it supports social familiarity and public praise during an earlier period, along with later claims of estrangement, not every allegation circulating online.

For Bill Gates, it supports repeated post-conviction meetings and philanthropic discussions, not participation in Epstein's sexual crimes.

For Leon Black, it supports extraordinary payments and a continuing advisory relationship, not an unproven sexual accusation.

For Jes Staley, it supports a sustained, intimate, and institutionally consequential relationship, alongside his denials of knowledge and misconduct.

For Prince Andrew, it supports both documented post-conviction association and a specific sexual allegation that he denied and later settled civilly without admitting liability.

For Børge Brende, it supports repeated dinners, communications, discussion of WEF matters, deficient vetting, and institutional consequences, not criminal complicity in Epstein's abuse.

For Terje Rød-Larsen, it supports donations, a personal loan, undisclosed conflicts, and gatekeeping introductions, not an allegation that he participated in sexual crimes.

For Joi Ito and MIT, it supports concealed post-conviction donations and institutional accommodation.

For Noam Chomsky, Woody Allen, Kathryn Ruemmler, Larry Summers, and other post-conviction associates, it supports continued social or professional acceptance that conferred legitimacy upon Epstein.

These conclusions are already serious.

The evidentiary standard should therefore be graduated rather than binary. Criminal allegations require strong and specific proof. Institutional and ethical judgments may rest on documented patterns of association, benefit, concealment, warning, and continued access.

The files do not reveal one undifferentiated conspiracy in which every named person performed the same act. They reveal a network in which different people supplied different forms of value.

Some supplied money.

Some supplied banking.

Some supplied introductions.

Some supplied political status.

Some supplied academic prestige.

Some supplied hospitality.

Some supplied silence.

Some supplied the next open door.

A rigorous account should not accuse beyond the evidence. It should also refuse to pretend that only criminal guilt matters.

The documented scandal is already profound: after Jeffrey Epstein's exploitation of vulnerable girls had entered the public record, named leaders of finance, politics, philanthropy, academia, diplomacy, law, and global institutions continued to find him useful.

Rumor is not evidence.

Continued documented admission is.

**12. Conclusion: The Named Elite Chose Continued Access**

Jeffrey Epstein's network cannot be explained adequately as the achievement of a lone predator who repeatedly deceived otherwise vigilant institutions. That interpretation assigns nearly all agency to Epstein while reducing the politicians, bankers, billionaires, diplomats, academics, lawyers, philanthropists, and institutional leaders around him to passive victims of manipulation. The documentary pattern supports a harsher conclusion. Epstein gained entry because named insiders admitted him, remained in contact with him, accepted his services, took his money, paid him extraordinary fees, attended his dinners, used his introductions, and allowed their own reputations to reinforce his.

The relationships were not uniform. Leslie Wexner's delegation of financial authority differed from Leon Black's enormous advisory payments. Jes Staley's extensive personal and banking relationship differed from Bill Gates's philanthropic meetings. Prince Andrew's association and the allegations against him differed from Noam Chomsky's intellectual encounters. Joi Ito's concealed donor cultivation differed from Børge Brende's dinners and messages. These differences matter when assigning individual responsibility.

The cumulative pattern matters equally. Epstein occupied the intersection of finance, politics, philanthropy, academia, diplomacy, technology, and private hospitality because people in each sector continued treating him as useful. Banks gave him financial infrastructure. Universities gave him intellectual prestige. Politicians and royalty gave him public status. Diplomats and

institutional executives gave him international reach. Social gatekeepers gave him invitations and normalization. Each sector strengthened his access to the others.

His 2008 conviction should have disrupted this system. Instead, large portions of it survived for another decade. The period after conviction reveals the moral character of the network more clearly than the years when Epstein's conduct remained hidden from much of the public. By then, continued engagement required either extraordinary ignorance, deliberate avoidance, acceptance of Epstein's minimizing narrative, or a judgment that the benefits of association outweighed the moral cost.

The central finding is therefore not merely that Epstein possessed powerful friends. It is that powerful people and institutions continued assigning him valuable roles after he had become publicly disqualified from ordinary trust.

**12.1 Epstein's Network Was Reciprocal**

Epstein's network functioned through exchange. He did not simply collect famous names for personal gratification. He offered services that influential people valued.

To Leslie Wexner, he offered financial management, centralized authority, discretion, and personal service.

To Leon Black, he offered tax, estate, philanthropic, and family-office advice that Black considered worth extraordinary compensation.

To Jes Staley and JPMorgan, he offered a valuable private-banking relationship and possible introductions to additional wealthy clients.

To Bill Gates, he offered the possibility of connecting major fortunes to large philanthropic projects.

To Larry Summers, he offered introductions, hospitality, correspondence, access to wealthy people, and a private channel for discussion and advice.

To Joi Ito and MIT, he offered direct funding and introductions to other donors.

To Terje Rød-Larsen and the International Peace Institute, he offered financial support and personal assistance.

To Ehud Barak, he offered money, investors, technology relationships, and access to American financial and scientific circles.

To political, royal, academic, and cultural guests, he offered private settings in which influential people could meet outside formal institutional procedures.

In return, Epstein received fees, access, legitimacy, institutional association, confidential information, social acceptance, and the visible company of people whose reputations strengthened his own.

This reciprocity explains why the network endured. Epstein did not need everyone to admire him. He needed them to value what he could provide. The participants did not need to approve of every part of his life. They needed to compartmentalize the relationship sufficiently to retain its benefits.

The network was therefore neither purely social nor purely financial. It was an exchange system in which money, access, information, prestige, and discretion circulated together.

**12.2 Post-Conviction Association as the Decisive Evidence**

The most revealing relationships are those that began or continued after 2008.

Epstein's conviction transformed his sexual exploitation from private allegation into public fact. It did not reveal every later accusation, every victim, or the full scale of his activities, but it established enough to make ordinary confidence impossible.

Yet JPMorgan continued serving him. Deutsche Bank later accepted him. Leon Black continued paying him. Joi Ito cultivated him as a donor. Terje Rød-Larsen maintained financial and social ties. Bill Gates agreed to meetings. Larry Summers continued communicating with him. Børge Brende attended dinners and exchanged messages. Ehud Barak continued meeting and doing business with him. Noam Chomsky met him. Woody Allen and Soon-Yi Previn dined with him. Kathryn Ruemmler entered his social-professional orbit. Prince Andrew maintained contact after the conviction.

These relationships did not all involve knowledge of Epstein's continuing abuse. They nevertheless demonstrate that conviction did not produce effective exclusion.

The defense of ignorance becomes less persuasive as institutional power increases. Gates possessed advisers, lawyers, staff, security personnel, and one of the world's largest philanthropic organizations. Brende led an institution devoted to identifying and convening global leaders. Staley was a senior executive within a bank equipped with compliance and risk systems. Ito led a major research institution whose administrators understood donor reputational risk. Rød-Larsen was an experienced diplomat managing an international policy organization.

The question is therefore not simply what each individual personally knew. It is why people surrounded by sophisticated institutional resources failed to learn, failed to ask, or chose not to treat what was already known as decisive.

Post-conviction association reveals that Epstein's value survived his disgrace. That survival was not created by Epstein alone. It was granted by the people who continued using him.

**12.3 Davos as a Concentration of the Broader System**

Davos did not create Epstein's network, but it concentrated many of its essential elements.

The World Economic Forum brought together political leaders, financiers, corporate executives, academics, philanthropists, diplomats, technology entrepreneurs, and representatives of international institutions. Around the official program developed a less visible environment of private dinners, hotel meetings, receptions, rented residences, bilateral conversations, and invitation-only gatherings.

Epstein recognized this environment as a market for access. His reported role as a "Davos concierge" reflected his effort to identify participants, solve logistical problems, propose introductions, and place himself between people seeking one another.

The named examples demonstrate the mechanism. He sought to connect Peter Mandelson with Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem. He appeared within arrangements involving Jes Staley, Alistair Darling, and Mandelson. He participated in a Mongolia-related meeting involving Larry Summers. Through Terje Rød-Larsen, he obtained direct access to Børge Brende, the president and chief executive of the WEF.

Brende's relationship was especially important because it placed Epstein near the institutional center rather than merely the social periphery. Their dinners and communications showed that Epstein was treated as someone with whom the WEF leader could discuss participants, institutional strategy, and international coordination.

The significance of Davos was therefore structural. It supplied the density of power, scarcity of access, informality, privacy, and status competition on which Epstein's brokerage depended.

He did not need formal membership in the WEF. He needed the concentration of people produced by it.

Davos became one location where the larger system could be seen in compressed form: public authority and private wealth interacting through relationships that were difficult for outsiders to observe and nearly impossible for the public to govern.

**12.4 Institutional Morality Revealed by Named Decisions**

Institutions often describe their values through mission statements, codes of conduct, public commitments, and ethics policies. The Epstein record provides a different measure. It reveals institutional morality through decisions.

JPMorgan's morality was expressed in the decision to continue servicing Epstein despite conviction and internal warnings.

Deutsche Bank's morality was expressed in the decision to accept him after JPMorgan ended the relationship.

MIT's morality was expressed in the effort to obtain Epstein's money while reducing the visibility of his involvement.

Harvard's morality was expressed in the persistence of access and scientific association after formal concerns had emerged.

The International Peace Institute's morality was expressed in accepting Epstein-linked support while its president maintained a personal financial relationship with him and introduced him to others.

The World Economic Forum's morality was tested when its serving president maintained contact with Epstein through dinners and messages without discovering or acting upon his public criminal history.

These institutions later commissioned investigations, issued statements, accepted resignations, paid settlements, or introduced reforms. Such responses matter. They also occurred after external exposure.

The deeper test is what the institution did when the relationship remained profitable, private, useful, or prestigious.

Institutional complicity does not require a board resolution endorsing criminal conduct. It can arise through accommodation: processing transactions, concealing donations, accepting introductions, overlooking conflicts, fragmenting responsibility, and treating public conviction as a manageable reputational complication.

The named decisions reveal an institutional order in which moral exclusion was negotiable. Epstein's conduct was severe, but his usefulness repeatedly produced exceptions.

**12.5 From Infiltration to Invitation**

The language used to describe Epstein's network determines where responsibility is placed.

To say that Epstein infiltrated elite society emphasizes his aggression, deception, intelligence, and persistence. All were important. He manipulated people, cultivated their ambitions, adapted his identity to different audiences, and exploited weaknesses in institutional systems.

But infiltration is only half the process. A guarded network cannot be entered repeatedly without cooperation from within.

Ghislaine Maxwell introduced Epstein into royal and aristocratic circles.

Leslie Wexner gave him authority, property-related advantages, and financial credibility.

Jes Staley protected and advanced his position within elite banking.

Peggy Siegal returned him to prestigious social events.

Joi Ito admitted his money into the MIT Media Lab despite awareness of the reputational problem.

Terje Rød-Larsen accepted financial support and opened diplomatic and WEF doors.

Bill Gates agreed to meetings because Epstein might help obtain philanthropic money.

Larry Summers treated him as a useful correspondent, host, intermediary, and adviser.

Børge Brende entered his home repeatedly and maintained direct communication.

These were invitations in the broadest institutional sense. They were decisions to meet, correspond, accept, pay, host, introduce, serve, or return.

Epstein's network should therefore not be imagined as a fortress conquered by a uniquely cunning outsider. It was a series of doors opened by people who already possessed the authority to decide who belonged.

The motivations were likely diverse. Some wanted money. Some wanted introductions. Some wanted financial advice. Some wanted donations. Some wanted intellectual stimulation. Some wanted privacy. Some wanted access to others in the network. Some may have believed Epstein's account of himself. Some may have avoided asking what they did not want to know.

The common outcome was continued admission.

This admission reveals something deeper than negligence. It reveals a hierarchy of values. The exploitation of vulnerable girls did not outweigh every other consideration. For too many powerful people, Epstein's usefulness remained more immediate than the suffering attached to his name.

That is the final moral judgment of this paper.

Jeffrey Epstein did not sustain his post-conviction power because elites were incapable of excluding him. These same institutions routinely exclude people who lack money, status, credentials, invitations, or influential sponsors. They possess security systems, compliance offices, legal departments, donor reviews, reputational advisers, and social gatekeepers precisely because access matters to them.

They could exclude Epstein.

They repeatedly chose not to.

His survival within elite society was therefore not merely a failure of defense. It was the product of reciprocal interest, institutional accommodation, and named decisions by people who believed he still had something worth offering.

Epstein was not only an infiltrator.

He was an invited man.

## 13. References

### 13.1 Federal Prosecutions, Investigations, and Document Archives


1. United States Department of Justice. Epstein Library. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, continuously updated through 2026.
2. United States Department of Justice. DOJ Disclosures: Jeffrey Epstein Records. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, 2025–2026.
3. United States Department of Justice. “Department of Justice Publishes 3.5 Million Responsive Pages in Compliance with the Epstein Files Transparency Act.” January 30, 2026.
4. United States Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General. Epstein Files Transparency Act: Production of Department Materials. Letter to Congress, January 30, 2026.
5. United States Department of Justice. Epstein Files Transparency Act: Section 3 Report to Congress. February 14, 2026.
6. United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York. “Jeffrey Epstein Charged in Manhattan Federal Court with Sex Trafficking of Minors.” July 8, 2019.
7. United States v. Jeffrey Epstein. Indictment, No. 19 Cr. 490. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2019.
8. United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York. United States v. Jeffrey Epstein, 19 Cr. 490: Victim and Witness Information. 2019.
9. United States Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility. Investigation into the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida’s Resolution of Its 2006–2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims. November 2020.
10. United States Department of Justice. “Statement on DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility Report on Jeffrey Epstein Investigation.” November 12, 2020.
11. United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York. Report 23-085, June 2023.

12. United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York. "Ghislaine Maxwell Charged in Manhattan Federal Court for Conspiring with Jeffrey Epstein to Sexually Abuse Minors." July 2, 2020.

13. United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell. Indictment, No. 20 Cr. 330. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2020.

14. United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York. "Statement of U.S. Attorney Damian Williams on the Verdict in United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell." December 29, 2021.

15. United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York. "Ghislaine Maxwell Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison for Conspiring with Jeffrey Epstein to Sexually Abuse Minors." June 28, 2022.

16. Giuffre v. Maxwell. No. 15 Civ. 7433. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed 2015, with records unsealed in successive releases through 2024.

17. Giuffre v. Prince Andrew. No. 21 Civ. 6702. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2021–2022.

18. Giuffre, Virginia, and Prince Andrew. Joint Settlement Filing. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, February 15, 2022.

19. United States Department of Justice. Interview of Ghislaine Maxwell, July 24, 2025. Redacted transcript released through the Epstein Library.

20. United States Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. "DOJ OIG Announces Initiation of Audit of Compliance with the Epstein Files Transparency Act." April 23, 2026.

**13.2 Banking, Wealth Management, and Regulatory Records**

21. New York State Department of Financial Services. In the Matter of Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch, and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas. Consent Order, July 6, 2020.

22. New York State Department of Financial Services. "DFS Imposes $150 Million Penalty on Deutsche Bank in Connection with Bank's Relationship with Jeffrey Epstein." July 7, 2020.

23. Government of the United States Virgin Islands v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. No. 22 Civ. 10904. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2022–2023.

24. United States Virgin Islands Department of Justice. "USVI DOJ Achieves Historic $75 Million Victim-Supporting Settlement with JPMorgan Chase." September 26, 2023.

25. Jane Doe 1 v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. No. 22 Civ. 10019. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2022–2023.

26. Jane Doe 1 v. Deutsche Bank AG. No. 22 Civ. 10018. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2022–2023.

27. Financial Conduct Authority. Decision Notice: James Edward Staley. May 30, 2023.

28. Financial Conduct Authority. “FCA Decides to Fine and Ban James Staley.” October 12, 2023.

29. Financial Conduct Authority. “Upper Tribunal Upholds Jes Staley Ban.” June 26, 2025.

30. Financial Conduct Authority. Final Notice: James Edward Staley. July 23, 2025.

31. Apollo Global Management. “Apollo Global Management Announces Conclusion and Release of Independent Review.” January 25, 2021.

32. Dechert LLP. Report of the Independent Review of Leon Black’s Professional Relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. Released by Apollo Global Management, January 2021.

33. Apollo Global Management. Report concerning Leon Black and Jeffrey Epstein. Exhibit 99.1 filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, January 22, 2021.

34. United States Senate Committee on Finance. Letter and Document Requests Concerning Leon Black’s Payments to Jeffrey Epstein. July 24, 2023.

35. United States Senate Committee on Finance. United States Virgin Islands–Leon Black Settlement Agreement. Publicly released committee document, 2023.

36. United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Letter to Federal Banking Regulators Regarding Financial Institutions and Executives Connected to Jeffrey Epstein. February 25, 2026.

37. Reuters. “Deutsche Bank to Pay $75 Million to Settle Lawsuit by Jeffrey Epstein Accusers.” May 18, 2023.

38. Reuters. “Deutsche Bank $75 Million Settlement with Epstein Accusers Wins Preliminary Approval.” June 16, 2023.

39. Reuters. “U.S. Judge Approves Deutsche Bank $75 Million Settlement with Epstein Accusers.” October 20, 2023.

40. Reuters. “JPMorgan $290 Million Settlement with Epstein Accusers Wins Preliminary Approval.” June 27, 2023.

41. Reuters. “JPMorgan’s $290 Million Settlement with Epstein Accusers Wins Final Approval.” November 9, 2023.

42. Reuters. “JPMorgan Pays $75 Million to Settle Lawsuit over Jeffrey Epstein with U.S. Virgin Islands.” September 26, 2023.

43. Reuters. “JPMorgan Processed More than $1 Billion for Epstein, U.S. Virgin Islands Says.” August 31, 2023.

44. Associated Press. “JPMorgan to Pay $75 Million on Claims That It Enabled Jeffrey Epstein’s Sex-Trafficking Operations.” September 26, 2023.

**13.3 Harvard, MIT, and Scientific Patronage**

45. Harvard University. Report Regarding Jeffrey Epstein’s Connections to Harvard University. May 1, 2020.

46. Jenner & Block LLP. Report Concerning Jeffrey Epstein’s Connections to Harvard University. Prepared for Harvard University, 2020.

47. Harvard University Office of the General Counsel. Report Concerning Jeffrey E. Epstein’s Connections to Harvard University. 2020.

48. Goodwin Procter LLP. Report Concerning Jeffrey Epstein’s Interactions with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. January 10, 2020.

49. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “MIT Releases Results of Fact-Finding on Engagements with Jeffrey Epstein.” January 10, 2020.

50. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “Jeffrey Epstein and MIT.” August 22, 2019.

51. Reif, L. Rafael. “Fact-Finding and Action on the Media Lab.” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 7, 2019.

52. Reif, L. Rafael. “Preliminary Fact-Finding about MIT and Jeffrey Epstein.” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 12, 2019.

53. Reif, L. Rafael. “Learning from the Facts and Moving Forward.” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 10, 2020.

54. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Jeffrey Epstein and MIT: Frequently Asked Questions. January 10, 2020.

55. Farrow, Ronan. “How an Élite University Research Center Concealed Its Relationship with Jeffrey Epstein.” The New Yorker, September 6, 2019.

56. Emanuel, Kerry, et al. “Two Donors, Two Deaths, Two Responses.” MIT Faculty Newsletter, September 2019.

57. Royden, Leigh, and Rosalind Williams. “MIT: Where Now?” MIT Faculty Newsletter, 2019.

58. Danheiser, Rick. “Epstein and MIT: The Unanswered Questions.” MIT Faculty Newsletter, January 2026.

59. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Statement on MIT, the Media Lab, and Jeffrey Epstein. September 2019.

**13.4 Leslie Wexner, Leon Black, and Private Wealth**

60. Wexner Foundation. Independent Review of Jeffrey Epstein’s Involvement with the Wexner Foundation. February 24, 2020.

61. Wexner, Leslie H. Public statement concerning Jeffrey Epstein and the termination of their relationship. August 2019.

62. Apollo Global Management. Independent Review concerning Leon Black’s Professional Relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. 2021.

63. United States Senate Committee on Finance. Correspondence concerning the compensation Leon Black paid Jeffrey Epstein and the tax and estate-planning services purportedly supplied. 2023.

64. Reuters. “Leon Black to Step Down as Apollo CEO after Review Details Jeffrey Epstein Payments.” January 25, 2021.

65. Reuters. “U.S. Commerce Chief, Goldman Sachs Lawyer, and Apollo Co-Founder to Testify about Epstein Ties.” March 4, 2026.

**13.5 Davos, the World Economic Forum, and Diplomatic Access**

66. Miller, Hugo, and Peter Guest. “Davos ‘Concierge’ Jeffrey Epstein Used WEF to Broker Elite Meetings.” Bloomberg News, February 17, 2026. Republished by SWI swissinfo.ch.

67. World Economic Forum. “Press Statement from Co-Chairs André Hoffmann and Larry Fink on Behalf of the Board of Trustees; Press Statement from Børge Brende.” February 26, 2026.

68. World Economic Forum. “Børge Brende: Former President and CEO of the World Economic Forum.” Institutional biography, accessed June 15, 2026.

69. World Economic Forum. World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2026. Institutional meeting record, January 19–23, 2026.

70. Reuters. “World Economic Forum Investigates Its CEO over Epstein Links.” February 5, 2026.

71. Reuters. “CEO of World Economic Forum Quits after Epstein Ties Come to Light.” February 26, 2026.

72. International Peace Institute. Statement from the Board of IPI. October 29, 2020.

73. PassBlue. “Terje Rød-Larsen, a Norwegian Diplomat, Quits a New York Think Tank amid Links to Jeffrey Epstein.” October 29, 2020.

74. Waage, Hilde Henriksen, and Ada Nissen. “The Pitfalls of Peacemaking.” Peace Research Institute Oslo, May 19, 2021.

75. United Nations. “Secretary-General Appoints Terje Rød-Larsen of Norway as United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.” September 21, 1999.

76. Reuters. “UK Police Launch Investigation into Mandelson over Epstein Leaks.” February 3, 2026.

77. Reuters. “UK’s Starmer Calls Alleged Passing of Sensitive Information to Epstein ‘Disgraceful.’” February 3, 2026.

78. Cassidy, John. “The Jeffrey Epstein Files Are Peter Mandelson’s Final Disgrace.” The New Yorker, February 16, 2026.

79. Financial Times. “Peter Mandelson Lobbied against U.S. Bank Reforms on Epstein and Staley’s Behalf.” February 3, 2026.

80. Sky News. “What Do the Epstein Files Say about Lord Peter Mandelson?” February 8, 2026.

**13.6 Bill Gates, Larry Summers, and Philanthropic Brokerage**

81. Reuters. “Bill Gates ‘Took Responsibility for His Actions’ over Epstein Links, Foundation Says.” February 25, 2026.

82. Reuters. “Bill Gates Testifies Epstein Pressured Him Using Knowledge of His Affairs.” June 10, 2026.

83. Reuters. “Gates Foundation Says It Has Opened External Review of Epstein Engagement.” April 21, 2026.

84. PBS NewsHour. “What to Know about Bill Gates’s Relationship with Jeffrey Epstein as He Is Interviewed in House Probe.” June 2026.

85. Reuters. “Larry Summers Says He Is Stepping Back from Public Commitments after Epstein Emails.” November 18, 2025.

86. Reuters. “Harvard Launches Probe of Summers and Other Individuals over Epstein Ties.” November 19, 2025.

87. Reuters. “Larry Summers Leaving Positions at Harvard and OpenAI after Epstein Emails.” November 19, 2025.

88. Reuters. “American Economic Association Bans Epstein Correspondent Larry Summers from Involvement with Group.” December 2, 2025.

89. Reuters. “Larry Summers to Resign from Harvard over Epstein Ties.” February 25, 2026.

90. PBS NewsHour. “Emails Reveal Epstein’s Network of the Rich and Powerful despite Sex-Offender Status.” November 14, 2025.

**13.7 Political, Royal, and Social Relationships**

91. Reuters. “Prince Andrew Must Face Sex-Abuse Accuser’s Lawsuit.” January 12, 2022.

92. Reuters. “Prince Andrew Settles Lawsuit by Sex-Abuse Accuser Virginia Giuffre.” February 15, 2022.

93. Reuters. “What We Know about Prince Andrew’s Settlement with Virginia Giuffre.” February 15, 2022.

94. BBC Newsnight. Prince Andrew and the Epstein Scandal: Interview with Emily Maitlis. Broadcast November 16, 2019.

95. Thomas Jr., Landon. “Jeffrey Epstein: International Moneyman of Mystery.” New York Magazine, October 28, 2002.

96. Associated Press. “Trump’s Onetime Friendship with Jeffrey Epstein Is Well-Known.” July 24, 2025.

97. Fahrenthold, David A., Beth Reinhard, and Kimberly Kindy. “Trump Called Epstein a ‘Terrific Guy’ Who Enjoyed ‘Younger’ Women before Denying Relationship with Him.” The Washington Post, July 8, 2019.

98. Reuters. “Bill Clinton to Lawmakers Investigating Epstein: ‘I Saw Nothing.’” February 27, 2026.

99. Reuters. “What the Epstein Files Reveal about Ties to Politicians, Business Titans, and Other Figures.” April 9, 2026.

100. Reuters. “Clinton Says Trump Told Him of ‘Some Great Times’ with Jeffrey Epstein.” March 2026.

101. Associated Press. “Israel’s Ehud Barak Says He Regrets Knowing Epstein after Documents Detail Their Long Friendship.” February 2026.

102. Times of Israel. “Jeffrey Epstein Was Ehud Barak’s Business Partner as Late as 2015.” July 11, 2019.

103. Reuters. “Goldman Sachs’ Top Lawyer Accepted Gifts from ‘Uncle Jeffrey’ Epstein, Documents Show.” February 3, 2026.

104. Reuters. “Top Goldman Sachs Lawyer Kathryn Ruemmler Resigns over Epstein Links.” February 13, 2026.

105. Reuters. “Jeffrey Epstein Gave Her a $9,350 Handbag, but Did Goldman Sachs’ Departing Top Lawyer Violate Ethics Rules?” February 2026.

**13.8 Maxwell, Social Gatekeeping, and Cultural Rehabilitation**

106. United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell. Trial transcript and admitted exhibits. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2021.

107. United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York. “Ghislaine Maxwell Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison.” June 28, 2022.

108. Farrow, Ronan. “The ‘Family Business’ of Ghislaine Maxwell.” The New Yorker, 2019.

109. The New York Times. Reporting on Peggy Siegal’s social events and Jeffrey Epstein’s post-conviction return to New York cultural circles, 2019.

110. The New York Times. Reporting on Woody Allen and Soon-Yi Previn’s post-conviction dinners with Jeffrey Epstein, 2019–2023.

111. The Wall Street Journal. Reporting based on Jeffrey Epstein’s calendars, emails, visitor records, and planned meetings with prominent political, legal, financial, and academic figures, 2023–2026.

**13.9 Investigative Books and Long-Form Reporting**

112. Brown, Julie K. Perversion of Justice: The Jeffrey Epstein Story. New York: Dey Street Books, 2021.

113. Edwards, Bradley J. Relentless Pursuit: My Fight for the Victims of Jeffrey Epstein. New York: Gallery Books, 2020.

114. Patterson, James, John Connolly, and Tim Malloy. Filthy Rich: The Shocking True Story of Jeffrey Epstein. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2016.

115. Brown, Julie K. “Perversion of Justice” investigative series. Miami Herald, 2018.

116. Stewart, James B., Matthew Goldstein, Jessica Silver-Greenberg, and David Enrich. Investigative reporting on Jeffrey Epstein’s finances, banks, advisers, and institutional relationships. The New York Times, 2019–2026.

117. Enrich, David. Reporting on Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan, Jes Staley, Leon Black, and Epstein’s financial network. The New York Times, 2019–2023.

118. Khadeeja Safdar and David Benoit. Investigative reporting on Jeffrey Epstein’s calendars, meetings, philanthropy, and relationships with business and political figures. The Wall Street Journal, 2023–2026.

119. Bloomberg News. Investigative reporting based on emails contained in the 2026 Department of Justice release, including Epstein’s use of Davos as an access and brokerage platform. 2026.

**13.10 Elite Networks, Brokerage, Reputation, and Institutional Power**

120. Bourdieu, Pierre. “The Forms of Capital.” In Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, edited by John G. Richardson. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986.

121. Burt, Ronald S. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

122. Coleman, James S. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal of Sociology 94, supplement, 1988: S95–S120.

123. Granovetter, Mark S. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6, 1973: 1360–1380.

124. Granovetter, Mark S. “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 3, 1985: 481–510.

125. Khan, Shamus Rahman. “The Sociology of Elites.” Annual Review of Sociology 38, 2012: 361–377.

126. Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.

127. Mizruchi, Mark S. “What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates.” Annual Review of Sociology 22, 1996: 271–298.

128. Padgett, John F., and Christopher K. Ansell. “Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434.” American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 6, 1993: 1259–1319.

129. Podolny, Joel M. “Networks as the Pipes and Prisms of the Market.” American Journal of Sociology 107, no. 1, 2001: 33–60.

130. Useem, Michael. The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

131. Wedel, Janine R. Shadow Elite: How the World’s New Power Brokers Undermine Democracy, Government, and the Free Market. New York: Basic Books, 2009.

132. Harrington, Brooke. Capital without Borders: Wealth Managers and the One Percent. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.

133. Domhoff, G. William. Who Rules America? The Triumph of the Corporate Rich. 7th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2014.

134. Lin, Nan. Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

135. Brass, Daniel J., Joseph Galaskiewicz, Henrich R. Greve, and Wenpin Tsai. “Taking Stock of Networks and Organizations: A Multilevel Perspective.” Academy of Management Journal 47, no. 6, 2004: 795–817.

136. Palazzo, Guido, and Ulf Richter. “CSR Business as Usual? The Case of the Tobacco Industry.” Journal of Business Ethics 61, no. 4, 2005: 387–401.

137. Ashforth, Blake E., and Vikas Anand. “The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations.” Research in Organizational Behavior 25, 2003: 1–52.

138. Darley, John M. “The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption.” Brooklyn Law Review 70, no. 4, 2005: 1177–1194.

139. Vaughan, Diane. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

140. Jackall, Robert. Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

The author has published over 5,500 AI-assisted papers at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Douglas-Youvan/research . Google Scholar has indexed these preprints, and if you want a particular reference, the AI mode of a Google search (Gemini) has efficiently catalogued these preprints.